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This thesis examines procedures the U.S. Navy employs in preparing the
annual Program Objectives Memorandum. Beginning with an overview of the
POM process in the Department of Defense, the thesis proceeds to a detailed
exploration of POM activities in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
The narrative focuses on two of the major "roles'—Resource and
Assessment Sponsors. These two "sponsors" are described as they
functioned during the POM-87 cycle, in the context of their relationships
with major review groups, claimancies. and other major POM participants.
Events of the POM-87 cycle are recounted as they actually occurred in two
offices, to demonstrate how POM development took place in the real world.
Among the major findings is that the Navy POM is prepared according to a
variety of procedures, with considerable latitude accorded to individual
managers. The complexity of the POM development process has created a
web of relationships that is not always clearly understood. A particularly
valuable aspect of this work is the bibliography; this listing constitutes an
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. A NOTE ON MY CHOICE OF TOPIC
The most important activity of any enterprise is, arguably, the manner
in which its resources are obtained and allocated—the process of resource
determination. 1 Lacking resources, the enterprise could not operate. In the
world of government, the resource determination process has received
considerable attention, particularly at the national level, and probably no
agency has received a greater share of attention than the Department of
Defense.
Despite the great interest, the resource determination process within
the Department of Defense is not well understood by most of the individuals
who are affected by it, internal or external to the department. It is not, for
that matter, thoroughly understood by many of the individuals in the
position of making defense resource decisions.
This lack of understanding is attributable to several possible causes. To
begin with, the U.S. Department of Defense is unquestionably the most
complex agency of the federal government. It commands the second largest
share of federal funds—nearly 30 percent of the total federal budget (only
'Various terms will be used in this thesis to refer to the overall
process by which organizations make decisions regarding their resources—
"resource allocation," "resource determination," "resource decision-making/
etc. "Allocation" appears to be the generic term used most widely in
academic literature; however, in the Department of the Navy, "allocation"
has a particular meaning—the specific process by which the Comptroller of
the Navy allocates funds to Navy organizations, which funds have been
apportioned to the Department of Defense by the Office of Management and
Budget, following their appropriation by the Congress. Except as may be
specifically noted, this thesis will not use allocation in that narrow sense.
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the Department of Health and Human Resources, whose budget includes the
funds associated with the Social Security system, exceeds the DoD share).
Moreover, the Department of Defense itself is not only large, it is
complex. This complexity—both functionally and organizationally—has led
to a tremendous diversity of policies and procedures . This diversity has
flourished both horizontally among the three military Departments and
various Defense agencies that make up the Department of Defense and
vertically within each Department and agency.
In short, the outsider expecting to find the Department of the Army
making resource decisions in the same manner as its counterparts in the
Air Force or Navy will be disillusioned. Looking at any one Department, he
will most likely have no better luck at finding a universal procedure for
resource determination throughout that Department.
However, unless he has considerable experience with the defense budget,
these discoveries may take some time to emerge. This is due to another
reason for the lack of understanding of defense resource decision-making:
the scant availability of documentation regarding the actual processes.
Although much is written for publication about "defense spending," a
large share of this writing is done by journalists and scholars who have no
actual experience with the process. They must rely, therefore, on what
written primary-source material is made available to them, secondary
sources (such as the work of their predecessors), and what information they
can extract by listening to defense resource decision-makers.
Another source of information about the defense resource decision-
making process can be found in the published material of the professionally
oriented periodicals {Defense Week, Aviation Week, ArmedForces Journal,
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etc.) A similar source of information is published by the various interest
groups who follow defense matters (The Heritage Foundation, the Brookings
Institute, the numerous so-called "professional organizations" such as the
Reserve Officers Association, the Army League, and so forth). However, in
these cases, the writing is typically done from an advocacy viewpoint— in
support and/or opposition to specific defense programs or policies. It is
likely that most of the authors have only the most fundamental
understanding of how the decisions are actually made within the Pentagon
to request dollars and manpower for those particular programs or policies.
There is, on the other hand, no dearth of unpublished writing available on
defense resource decision-making, in the form of internal memoranda,
directives, manuals, briefings, etc., generated within the Department of
Defense. However, these are obviously directed to an internal DoD audience
and are not typically available to the outsider. In fact, they are often not
released to all of the cognizant participants in the resource decision-
making activity.
Moreover, much of what actually takes place may be far different than
what has been described on paper. Not only do the directives fail to cover
every relevant detail, often actual practice simply departs from what has
been prescribed.
The obvious question arises: "So what?" Why should we care about the
details. The bottom line is, after all, what the Congress decides; what
comes out of the Department of Defense is simply a proposal.
The answer is as obvious as the question: since the Congress practices
budget decision-making on the margin, concentrating specific attention only
on selected programs each year, the annual proposal emerging from the
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Pentagon is, in large part, what becomes the executed budget . This means
simply that many— arguably, most—of the real resource determination
decisions are made not under the dome of the Capitol, but some four miles
west, across the Potomac, in the rings and corridors of the Pentagon. Since
those dollars account for between one quarter to one third of the total
federal outlays in any given year, the process by which decisions are made
merits the attention of every person involved in that process.
B. SCOPE
The ambition pursued by this thesis is, therefore, to expand
understanding of the process of resource determination in the Department of
Defense. In an attempt to fill, however partially, a longstanding gap in the
area of information about the more detailed aspects of resource decision-
making, the thesis will focus on a limited area.
It is appropriate at this point to define the scope—that is, what goals
this work will attempt to meet, and (equally important!) those it will not .
What It Is
This thesis will attempt to present a discussion and analysis of
selected portions of the Defense resource decision-making process,
specifically: within the Navy Department.
What It Is Not
Given the necessity of limiting the research and analysis, as well as
keeping the final product to a reasonable length, this thesis will not
attempt to accomplish any of the following:
• Present a comprehensive picture of the Defense resource determination
process in toto,
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• Serve as "the representative" description of Defense resource
determination;
• Present the detailed procedures followed by any suborganizations other
than those specifically named herein;
• Provide a valid comparison of the procedures followed by one
suborganization with respect to those followed by any other(s), except
as specifically indicated.
The final disclaimer brings forth one overriding conclusion of the
research upon which this thesis is based: there is to date no published
treatment dealing with the comparisons of resource decision-making within
the various subunits of the Department of Defense—either among the three
military departments or among the numerous subunits of the Navy
Department. Such analyses would be of tremendous benefit, were they
available. Not only would they foster a greater understanding of the
process(es) by which defense resource decisions are made, they would
conceivably pave the way to a general benefitting from one another's
mistakes/successes. That is, we in the Navy may be following a procedure
that produces "inferior" results (the quotation marks are intended to
indicate subjectivity) to those attained by the Air Force or the Army.
Within the Navy, one primary decision-maker may have his staff performing
to protocol that results in a much "better" (more effective, more efficient,
and/or more politically defensible) end product than that coming out of the
office of his colleague. Lacking a comprehensive, detailed study of the
overall Defense resource decision-making process together with its many,
many variations, we will never know.
If this thesis succeeds in illuminating even a small portion of the
process as it has actually been experienced, then a small step will have




In attempting to understand the overall process by which the
Department of Defense makes resource decisions, I determined that the best
method would go beyond an examination of written theory or procedures, to
an illustration of an actual segment of the Department of Defense. My
intent was to investigate how the procedures actually took place in a given
annual cycle. As logical facets of the investigation, I hoped to identify such
elements as the following:
• Major role-players;
• Their functions and how they actually performed them;
• The interrelationships among players;
• The significant factors affecting how players performed;
• The bases for prescribed performance—written guidance, informal
direction, etc.;
• Deviations between prescribed performance and actual.
A logical product of this investigation would naturally be the
identification of weaknesses in the process, problem areas that had
hindered performance.
2. Selected Area of Investigation
Beginning with a broadly based look at the Department of Defense, I
studied the Planning-Programming-and-Budgeting process in macro,
acquiring a familiarity with the PPBS resource determination process as it
has evolved in the last three decades and as it is now practiced. Since, as
an officer in the U.S. Naval Reserve, I can expect to spend the majority of my
career within the Department of the Navy, I focussed my attention on that
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particular subunit of the Department of Defense, limiting myself further to
the Navy, excluding the Marine Corps. Extending that logic a bit further, I
decided to concentrate on the programming phase of the Planning-
Programming-and-Budgeting cycle, since my next tour will involve work in
that field.
Following a review of the programming process within the Navy, I
selected two organizations as the focal points of my most detailed
investigation:
• The Office of the Deputy Ch ief of Naval Operations for Manpower.
Personnel, and Training (OP-0 1 ), and
• The Office of the Director of Naval Reserve (OP-09R); the
individual heading this office serves concurrently as the
Commander, Naval Reserve Forces.
As will be clarified in subsequent chapters, these two organizations
between them represent most of the major roles in the programming
process. The fact that so many different programming functions are carried
out in "so few offices creates a web of relationships which itself
contributes to the outcome of programming activities. Understanding
programming as it was carried on in these offices illustrates not only the
major roles and how they interact, but also the many overlaps and conflicts
among those roles.
I purposely avoided choosing offices with a heavy involvement in
major-systems acquisition. The acquisition process, although it may be
considered as a subset (and/or accessory) of the Planning-Programming-
and-Budgeting System, is of such magnitude and complexity as to deserve
separate treatment. I chose to focus, instead, on programming in its more
general terms.
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To understand the programming process as practiced in the Navy, I
chose a recent annual cycle and followed the activities that took place in
my two primary offices. Since these two organizations do not operate in a
vacuum, it was obviously necessary to research relevant activities that
occurred in other organizations throughout the Navy. My "secondary focal
points" included:
• The Office of the General Director. Navy Programming (OP-90)
• The various reviewing organizations that participate in the Navy
programming cycle, principally, the Department of the Navy
Program Strategy Board, the Program Review Committee, and
the Program Development Review Committee.
I focused my investigation on the programming cycle involved in the
budget for Fiscal Year 1987. This will be referred to throughout the
remainder of this thesis as "POM-87".2 I chose POM-87 because it is the
most recently completed programming cycle as of this writing (development
of POM-88 was still in progress).
3." Research Sources
My initial understanding of the PPBS process within the Department
of Defense was obtained from personal experience (five years in OP-90 and
OP-Ol, working primarily with programming-phase activities). I also
researched a selection of published material, the bulk of which was
generated during the late 1960's, the late 1970's, and early 1980's. These
recurring floods of publication have been in response to major evolutionary
points in the Defense resource determination process (the institution of
PPBS, the attempt at Zero-based Budgeting, and the revisions made by the
2
I will employ the accepted DoD jargon; POM is an acronym for Program
Objectives Memorandum, the tangible product of the programming phase of
the annual resource determination process.
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Reagan Administration, respectively). As stated earlier, this genre
typically deals with PPB5 in overview and/or in theory.
I took particular interest in the few available studies of PPBS that
deal with the actual practice of the system within the Department of
Defense. To the extent possible, I obtained unpublished material from
within the Department of Defense (directives, memoranda, presentations,
etc.) There were occasional difficulties involving security classifications
of some documents. I have followed my intent of keeping this thesis
unclassified; in some instances, this has required "writing around" certain
details. Despite the occasional security constraints, this last type of
material—internally generated directives, memoranda, briefings, eta-
represents one of my two-most-used sources of documented information on
the actual practice of PPBS.
Finally, I conducted interviews with several individuals who
actually participated in the process during the year upon which I based my
investigation, as well as many who are participating in the current cycle.
4. Terminology. Jargon and Acronyms
Despite the parochial nature of its subject matter, this thesis is
written for an audience assumed to be unfamiliar with the extensive
"special language" that pervades the military community. To that end, I have
strived to forego the use of jargon and acronyms wherever Standard English
will conveniently convey the meaning intended. To minimize confusion,
those special terms I have employed are defined in a brief glossary
(Appendix A) at the end of the thesis.
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D. ORGANIZATION: A ROAD MAP OF THE THESIS
The contents of the thesis will be arranged as follows:
Chapter II: Navy Programming In Overview
This chapter will describe the basic programming process as.
prescribed, identifying the major role-players, their functions,
and their significance.
Chapter III: The Resource Sponsor Function: OP-01
In Chapter III, the process of assembling POM-87 will be traced
as it actually occurred for one Resource Sponsor; the
discussion will cover the factors influencing how OP-01
performed its functions and what problems arose.
Chapter IV: The Assessment/Appraisal Function: 0P-09R
Similar to the preceding chapter, this discussion will trace the
assessment function as it took place 1n one office, including
how that office related to its "assessees" and to other organi-
zations. The discussion will cover the outcome of POM-87 for
that assessment area.
Chapter V: Analysis and Findings
This chapter will summarize the important findings emerging
in the preceding discussions, emphasizing areas in which
obvious weaknesses or problems adversely affected the
performance of the various players. Potential weaknesses or
shortcomings will be discusses, as well. An important part of
19
this chapter will be the personal observations of some of the
major players who participated in POM-87.
Chapter VI: Conclusions and Areas for Further Research
20
PROGRAMMING IN THE NAVY DEPARTMENT :
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS
To understand the various programming activities in specific Navy
offices and to appreciate their significance, one must first understand the
overall process of programming as it is prescribed within the Department of
the Navy, the Navy Department, and the Navy itself. One understands the
workings of an engine by first looking at the engine rather than at the
individual gears.
As an initial step in this regard, the distinction among the three
organizations named in the preceding paragraph will clarify the hierarchy of
organizational elements that shape the programming process.
The Department of the Navy refers to the major component of the-
Department of Defense; unique among its counterparts, Army and Air Force,
the Department of the Navy encompasses not one but two military
services: the Navy and the Marine Corps.
The organizations that are the focus of research for this thesis are
within the Navy Department, which is the suborganization of the
Department of the Navy including Washington-based headquarters activities
of the two military services under the Jurisdiction of the Department, the
Navy and the Marine Corps. [Ref. 1: p. 1]
The principal organization in the Navy Department related to the U.S.
Navy is, of course, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, usually
referred to by his acronymed title, "CNO." As that title indicates, CNO is
responsible for directing operations of the Navy. He is, additionally,
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responsible for ensuring that the resources required by those operations are
properly planned for, programmed, and budgeted. His Marine Corps
counterpart, the Commandant, enjoys parallel responsibilities for that
service. [Ref. I: p. 2; Ref. 2: p. 00-3, Ref. 3: pp. 1-3] 1
Both officers report to the Secretary of the Navy. Twice a year, the
Department of the Navy submits resource allocation proposals to higher
authority—namely, the Department of Defense. The actual submissions of
resource allocation proposals are signed by the Secretary, not by the
professional military officers.
The process by which the decisions embodied in those proposals are
made is complicated and characterized by a collection of similarities and
disparities. Although some of the process is formally dictated by guidance
from both within the Department of the Navy and beyond, much of what
happens is not controlled by any formal prescription from higher levels of
authority. Moreover, much of what actually happens is not adequately
documented, nor does reality always match what was formally prescribed.
Within the Navy itself, the process is far from uniform among the many
subordinate organizations of the service. Although the Chief of Naval
Operations nominally controls most of the major role-players who make
resource decisions for his organization [Ref. 2: pp. viii-ixl, those players do
not fulfill their functions in a uniform manner. The final resource proposal
product is something that the CNO can endorse and forward, but it in no way
represents a simple, easily understood, or easily described process.
throughout this thesis, the pronouns "he," "him," and "his" will be used
in referring to specified officials; this is done to avoid the awkwardness of
repeated "he/she," "him/her," "his/her" construction— certainly, no
restriction of those billets to masculine status should be inferred!
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A. THE DOD CONTEXT
To understand resource decision-making within the Navy requires
understanding of the overall process within the Department of Defense.
There are, indeed, formally prescribed procedures for allocating resources;
the question is, how extensive this guidance is, and how it is applied at
lower levels within the DoD.
I. The Planning. Programming, and Budgeting System
A brief synopsis of DoD's overall resource determination system
will put the programming phase into context. A logical initial step in this
regard is defining the system currently in use: "PPB5."
A quarter century ago, the Department of Defense instituted a fairly
radical change in the method by which it prepared its proposed budget for
submission to the President and the Congress. As every management scholar
knows, the name assigned to the revolution was "PPB5," for Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System, and the chief revolutionary was then-
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Numerous published references
describe the general nature of PPB5, its purposes, and how it differed from
previous methods of resource determination. However, most of these treat
PPBS at a broad level, or in theoretical terms; although the new system
originated in the Department of Defense, most of the published work does
not address it from the standpoint of how the process actually functioned,
at least not to any level of detail.
McNamara's performance with his newly installed system led the
Johnson Administration to institute it throughout the Executive Branch of
the Federal government. This was short-lived, however; in 1971, "PPBS"
was dropped (in name, at least) from all agencies save for DoD.
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Today, the non-DoD student of government would relate to PPBS as
DoD"s process of resource determination, with special attention to "budget
formulation." In macro, that definition will serve.
A prevailing theme of this thesis is that the resource determination
process within the Department of Defense is not fully understood, even by
those who participate in that process (much less by outsiders). The various
participants view PPBS from numerous perspectives and interpret its "real"
purposes in numerous ways, depending, perhaps, on the role they themselves
play and the level from which they perceive the system. One indication of
this diversity of understanding can be found in variety of "official"
definitions/descriptions in the several DoD directives; for example:
The PPBS is a cyclic process . . . [that] provides for decision-making on
future programs and permits prior decisions to be examined and analyzed
from the viewpoint of the current environment . .
.,
and for the time
period being addressed. IRef. 4: p. 3J
The DOD PPBS is the normal process within which the Secretaries of the
Services] and the Secretary of Defense make decisions on force levels,
weapons systems, and support programs. IRef. 5: p. 1J
The ultimate objective of the PPBS shall be to provide the operational
commanders-in-chief the best mix of forces, equipment, and support
attainable within fiscal constraints. IRef 6: p. 1J
PPBS is the DOD resource management system. Controlled by the
Secretary of Defense CSECDEF), its purpose is to identify mission needs,
match them with resource requirements, and translate them into budget
proposals. IRef. 7: p. 2J
These quotes should prove not only that PPBS is not perceived or
understood uniformly within the Department of Defense, but that no single
definition of the system seems to prevail. The first sentence of the last
example offers the best—certainly the most succinct—description of the
system. For purposes of this thesis, PPBS is considered to encompass all
the activities involved in preparing the annual budget proposal that the
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Secretary of Defense submits to the President. That is, PPBS comprises the
activities internal to DoD.
PPBS has evolved considerably in its 25 years of practice, with the
revisions associated primarily with changes in Presidential
Administrations. The varying political philosophies of the Administration
in control, together with the personal management styles of the incumbent
political appointees who run DoD, will obviously have a tremendous effect
on how resources are allocated. [Ref. 8] Despite the several revisions,
however, it is likely that Mr. McNamara would still recognize at least the
essence of his creation.
The basic elements of that creation have remained intact.
Specifically, these include three major features:
• A division of the budget formulation process into three phases:
— Planning (to determine the objectives the organization hopes to
attain; defense planning is based on an analysis of "the threat" from
potential enemies);
-- Programming (the initial step in determining what combinations of
resources will best attain the objectives identified during
planning); and
— Budgeting (translating the programming output in terms of
specifically quantified fiscal and manpower resources).
• Determination of resource proposals in terms of objective-based
program, rather than individual line items of expenditure; that is,
emphasizing output rather than input.
• Consideration of programs in multivear spans, versus solely on an
annual basis.
The three PPBS phases comprise an annual cycle, the end product of
which is the Department of Defense budget submission to the President. He,
in turn, includes the DoD proposal in his total proposal for the Executive
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Branch, submitted each January to the Congress for final deliberations and
enactment.
Obviously, much deliberation occurs long before the Congressional
players go to work. The competition for resources begins at the lowest
levels of the DoD organization, and the deliberations and tradeoffs occur
repeatedly throughout the budget preparation period, both within the
Department of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget.
It should not be assumed from the descriptions of the three phases
that PPB5 is a linear activity, where each phase flows neatly and
identifiably into the next. In practice, the demarcations between the phases
are often arbitrarily established; "planning" terminates when some higher
authority says it does, although the actual activities involved in planning
may still be in process.
2. The Programming Phase
The emphasis of this thesis is on the middle phase of PPB5:
programming . It is at this point that the abstractions of the planning phase
begin to assume realistic characteristics. Mission and program objectives
are assessed in terms of resource constraints; alternatives for attaining a
given objective are developed, examined, and traded off; reality becomes
closer. Of particular significance is the fact that the programming phase
marks the introduction of fiscal and manpower constraints; planning
typically occurs in an unconstrained atmosphere.
a Programming: What Is It?
As with PPB5 in general, official DOD documents offer a variety
of descriptions and definitions of programming:
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The DoD Components develop proposed programs consistent with the
policy, strategy, force, resource, and fiscal guidance provided in the
tDefense Guidance! These programs, expressed in the [Programming
"Objectives Memoranda], reflect systematic analysis of missions and
objectives to be achieved, alternative methods of accomplishing them,
and the allocation of resources. In addition to the budget year, the
program period is the A years beyond the budget year iRef. A. p. 4j
Programming, i.e., the structuring of resources by mission [Ref. 9:
In the programming phase, the services and defense agencies propose
programs that are designed to meet the mid-range (five year) objectives
of the Defense Guidance and to fit within the fiscal constraints of the
projected DoD budgets. IRef. 10: p. 6J
Programming is the portion of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS) which links planning to budgeting. The Department of the
Navy Programming System is the normal process within which CNO, CMC,
SECNAV, and SECuEF make decisions on modernization, force levels,
readiness, and sustainability. IRef. II: p. 3-1
J
The basic purpose of the programming phase is to translate Department of
the Navy approved concepts and objectives into a definitive structure
expressed in terms of time-phased resource requirements including
personnel, monies and procedures that 'cost out' force objectives for
financial and manpower resources five years into the future "
IRef. 12: p. III-1J
The"programming phase is the first point in the PPBS process where
fiscal constraints must be factored with requirements. IRef. 7: p. 16J
There are two milestone products associated with the
programming phase: the Program Objectives Memorandum and the Program
Decision Memorandum .
For each DoD Component (that is, Military Department or Defense
Agency), the chief product of the programming phase is its individual
Program Objectives Memorandum. 2 Each POM is further classified according
to the fiscal year whose budget it supports ("POM-83," the first year of
which is refined into the budget proposal for Fiscal Year 1983, and so forth).
throughout DoD, the long title is almost universally shortened to its
acronym, "POM." That acronym will be used throughout this thesis.
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The POM constitutes a proposal of how the Military Department
or Defense Agency would like to expend its resources in the budget year and
the four years following. It is worth repeating that the POM is merely a
proposal; it does not constitute a final decision— that authority is left to
the elected officials in the Legislative Branch, who will authorize and
appropriate for the actual programs and expenditures.
In fact, the individual POM's have several hurdles to pass before
the proposals they embody reach Congressional desks in the form of the
President's Budget. Midway through May of each year, the Military
Departments and Defense Agencies submit their POM's to their parent
department, DoD. Throughout the summer, the individual POM's are reviewed
(by various staff offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of Management and
Budget; the other services are given the opportunity to review them, as
well).
The central coordinating function for programming activities at
the DoD headquarters level is carried out by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of Defense's headquarters staff organization.
Following the review of the individual POM's, the Secretary of Defense, with
the advice of his corporate board of directors, the Defense Resources Board,
issues his approval of the consolidated DoD POM, including revisions to the
individual Military Department and Defense Agency POM's submitted in May.
The vehicle for conveying that approval is the second tangible product of the
programming process, the Program Decision Memorandum, or "PDM."
The PDM marks the end of the programming phase. The fact that
it is an official directive signed personally by the Secretary of Defense
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emphasizes his importance as the chief resource decision-maker ror his
Department. His subordinates may or may not agree with his final decision
;
he, however, owns the authority to make that decision. [Ref. 4: p. 8]
b. Programming Phase Guidance
The review of the individual POM's implies their comparison to
some pre-established standards or guidelines against which they were
formulated. To be sure, the Office of the secretary of Defense does issue
some formal guidance as to how the Military Departments and Defense
Agencies should conduct their programming activities.
However, it would be a distortion to assume that this guidance
either provides for a uniform process for the suborganizations of DoD, or
that it guarantees a uniformly prepared budget proposal— that is, one in
which resource decisions were made on the same theoretical bases or via
the same type of deliberative or analytical procedures.
Unquestionably, the Military Departments and Defense Agencies
vary considerably in their programming procedures. Although the end
products—the POM's—do conform to 05D guidance in terms of content (to
the extent content is specified) and form, the routes taken by each DoD
component are different indeed.
An important explanation for this is twofold: first, the 05D-
level guidance is neither extensive nor is it detailed: secondly, that
guidance deals more often in terms of what the final product should be.
rather than how that product should be prepared.
A brief examination of the 05D guidance illustrates this point.
Such guidance falls into one of two categories: standing directives or those
issued annually to apply to the current PPB5 cycle.
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in the first category, 05D has issued three basic directives
dealing with the PP55 in general. The first of these is DOD Instruction
7045.7, "Implementation of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System." Last updated on May 23, 1984, "DODI 7045.7" covers the process in
macro, primarily in terms of output rather than procedures. That is, DODI
7045.7 very briefly describes the various activities that are scheduled to
occur at the 05D level during each PPB5 cycle, the major role-players and
their responsibilities, and the major documents that are involved. Notably
absent from this basic directive is any specific discussion of how each DoD
Component is to implement PPBS within itself.
The second directive, DoD Instruction 7045.14, "The Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System," is merely a synopsized version of
DOD! 7045.7.
The third important standing directive issued at the DoD level is
DoD Instruction 7045.8, "Procedures for Updating the Five Year Defense
Program Data." The FYDP constitutes the official documentation of
Department of Defense programs, thus, its periodic revisions mark the
tangible results of the PPBS cycle.
Two other major programming guidance documents are issued by
OSD annually: Defense Guidance (DG) and the POM Preparation Instructions
(PPI). However, like the standing instructions, these two documents are
couched in terms of what the final product shall be, rather than how each
DoD Component— the Services and Defense Agencies— are to go about
constructing that product.
The first document, Defense Guidance, constitutes the official
statement of overall Department of Defense (and, by extension, current
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Presidential Administration) policy for resource determination. It bears
reiterating that Defense Guidance dictates the final product's content: it
rarely specifies how individual service or defense agency POM's should be
prepared. Defense Guidance is, moreover, written in very broad terms
("Threat Assessment," "Policy Guidance," "Strategy Guidance," "Force
Planning Guidance," etc.) It is up to each Military Department and Defense
Agency to interpret that broad guidance into specific programming
proposals. 3
Only rarely will Defense Guidance direct specific programming
actions; when this happens, it is very selective, in the nature of telling
one's building contractor, "I want a house that will withstand all weathers
with a minimum of outside maintenance—you may wish to consider the
strongest available building materials as a medium (possibly brick); I do,
however, want a brass doorknocker, molded in the form of an anchor, about
six inches long."
The single most straightforward portion of Defense Guidance is
its fiscal guidance section, in which specific fiscal ceilings ("targets") are
issued for each Military Department and Defense Agency. Following the
basic premise of decentralized decision-making, however, the fiscal
ceilings are not specified according to appropriation or function.
The second annual programming phase guidance issued by 05D is
the POM Preparation Instructions. This is nothing more or less than a style
guide for the written documentation that constitutes one part of "the POM."
The POM Preparation Instructions include some specifics regarding the
3Defense Guidance is classified SECRET, due to the unclassified nature
of this thesis, specific details of its contents are not possible.
content (especially the types of statistical data). However, they typically
include no policy guidance, save by implication, and never include specific
programming direction.
c. The Nature of the "POM"
It is useful at this point to explain what is actually included in
the product called the "Program Objectives Memorandum." As stated earlier,
the POM is the tangible result of the programming phase. Individual POM's
are submitted by each Military Department and each Defense Agency to the
05D in May of each year. During the summer, the various POM's are evaluated
by various staff offices within the DoD and the Office of Management and
Budget and reviewed by the Defense Resources Board (the composition and
function of this body will be discussed later). Following approval by the
Defense Resources Board, the several individual POM's are consolidated into
the DoD POM.
However, what exactly is it that the Military Departments and
Defense Agencies submit? Or, if you saw a POM, what would it look like?
The actual POM, while tangible in one respect, is also somewhat
abstract. It consists physically of two items:
• Several volumes of documentation (usually, this includes a summary of
the submitting Department/ Agency's overall changes to the status quo;
detailed discussion of selected programs, such as research and
development projects; and statistical data, such as types of manpower).
• A computer tape that contains a proposed change to the existing
resource allocation, which would revise the resource amounts and
distributions currently contained in the Five-Year Defense Plan resource
matrix.
The POM is also an abstraction of sorts, representing the
proposed changes to the status quo. At any moment, the Department of
Defense has a blueprint for resource allocation that extends at least eight
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years from the present moment, the so-called Five-Year Defense Plan. The
FYDP A
,
despite its name, actually includes fiscal and manpower resource
data for eight years—the year just completed, the current year, the year for
which the Congress is deliberating the President's Budget proposal, and the
following five years. For example, FYDP displays published in calendar year
1 986 would include data for FY 1 984 (amounts actual ly expended), FY 1 986
(in current execution, reflecting amounts as enacted by Congress), FY 1987
(under Congressional review), and a 5-year block beginning with FY 1986
(the fOCUS Of POM-38). [Ref. 4: p. 6; Ref. 13: p. 19]
A good description of the FYDP would be as the official
scorecard of Department of Defense resource decision-making. Updated
three times each year (in response to the decisions made during
programming and budgeting phases of PPB5), the FYDP constitutes a
snapshot of how defense resources are being allocated and how DoD
proposes to allocate them in the future.
Both the FYDP and the POM, incidentally, are considered to be
internal working documents for the Department of Defense; due to their
inclusion of future-year proposed resource applications, they are not-
intended for dissemination to outsiders, particularly in the Congress. A
modified version of the FYDP, showing only resources up through the year of
the budget currently submitted in the President's Budget, is provided to
Congress. The POM is never officially provided to that body (although it is
not unheard of for copies to make their way into Congressional offices).
Universally referred to by its phoneticized acronym; for most insiders,
it comes out sounding something like "fiddup"; the Air Force says it, "fie-
dip."
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Programming—often referred to as "the POM process"--looks at
the status quo in blocks of five-years, with greatest emphasis on the first
year (which will, in turn, be refined into the annual budget proposal
submitted to OSD, the President, and the Congress). Why not just
concentrate on the first year? The answer to this harks back to one of the
basic tenets of PPBS as it was first instituted in the 1960's: to be
realistic, budget decisions must include consideration not only of what is
required immediately, but of what will be required over the expected life of
a given program. The 5-year horizon is deemed to be long enough to give a
good idea of the on-going costs of a program and short enough to be credible,
d. The Issue of Control
The obvious question arises as to why the guidance emanating
from the DoD level is as broad as it is, giving so much latitude to DoD
Components. After all, the defense budget is an expression, in concrete
terms, of the political philosophies of the incumbent Presidential
Administration. As such, one might expect considerable attention to
ensuring uniformity of process as well as of product.
Partial answers to this question may be found in the standing
guidance documents, the DoD Instructions described above (boldface added
for emphasis):
The Secretary of Defense, assisted by the Defense Resources Board,
exercises centralized control of executive policy direction by
concentrating on major policy decisions, defining planning goals, and
allocating resources to support these objectives. . . . The Heads of DoD
Components shall develop and execute the necessary programs and
provide the day-to-day management of the resources under their control
and shall participate in meeting the objectives and requirements of
national security as identified in the PPBS. IRef. 6: p. 3]
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The Secretary of Defense will provide centralized policy direction
while placing program execution authority and responsibility with
the DoD Components. iRef. 4: p. 2J
The background for this management philosophy is explained in
numerous documents from the early years of the Reagan Administration.
Shortly after assuming control of DoD, the Reagan appointees conducted a
quick (30-day) study of the PPB5 as it was being practiced 20 years and five
Presidential Administrations after its inception. The conclusions of that
study reflect a basic philosophy of decentralized authority, with the bulk of
decision-making devolved to levels below the highest officials. Then-
Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci articulated the premise in his
official 1981 memo announcing his intention to revise PPBS:
We will achieve better Defense management by working toward a system
of centralized control of executive policy direction and more
decentralized policy execution. Workinq with the Service Secretaries,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and OSD staff, the Secretary
and I will concentrate on major policy decisions, definition of planning
goals and the allocation of resources necessary to strengthen the
horizontal integration of our four Services into a balanced Armed Forces
Team. . . . Through this controlled decentralization, subordinate line
executives will be held accountable for the execution of our approved
programs and policy decisions. This will focus Service management
efforts on improving the operational efficiency of each department.
IRef. 14: p. A-2J
The analogy to a specification provided to a contractor is apt.
That is, OSD will provide guidance on what purposes are to be fulfilled and
perhaps broad instructions on ways of attaining those goals. However, it is
up to the individual Military Department/Defense Agency to work out the
details. The implication is that if the final product appears to be in
accordance with the specification, DoD will not be overly concerned about
how that product was constructed. That implication oversimplifies the
reality, however. Despite the professed philosophy of allowing subordinate
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activities maximum latitude, the Secretary of Defense has definitely
retained the right to scrutinize and overrule subordinate decisions as he
may see fit. Mr. Cariucci's phrase, "controlled decentralization/' sums it up
Pest:
B. THE NAVY CONTEXT
Given the prevailing OSD philosophy of "controlled decentralization/' the
Secretary of the Navy has -considerable latitude in formulating his
Department's POM. Obviously, his final submission to OSD in May must
comply with the generalized guidance in the Defense Guidance, as well as
with any specific programming actions that document may have contained
The physical products—the POM documentation and the FYDP update—must
comply with pertinent OSD directives (POM Preparation Instructions and DoD
Instruction 7045. 7-H, respectively). However, the procedures by which the
Department of the Navy POM will be constructed are left almost entirely up
to the "discretion of the SECNAV.
Following in the pattern of his senior, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Navy has devolved much of the actual procedural
development and decision-making to his two Service chiefs, the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Like his boss,
however, he has retained final approval of program content. He even has his
own analytical staff, the Office of Program Appraisal (OPA).
In recent years, the Reagan-appointed SECNAV, John Lehman, has taken
an increasingly active role in POM formulation, entering into the process
well before the final approval point and going into considerable detail. He
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has, in short, instituted himself as an architect of the Department of the
Navy POM, rather than merely an approval -granting senior
I. Guidance for the Programming Phase
a. Standing Guidance
Parallel to the situation at the OSD level, the Department of the
Navy has certain standing directives covering PPBS in general and the
programming/POM preparation phase in particular. The similarity extends
to the nature of the directives; that is, they are primarily descripti ve rather
than prescriptive, with an emphasis on final products rather than on the
methods by which those product are to be produced.
Two standing directives specifically deal with PPBS matters:
Secretary of the Navy instruction 5000. 16D, "'Policy, Roles, and
Responsibilities with the Department of the Navy for Implementation of the
DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System"-; and the Department of .
the Navy Programming Manual.
The former, 5ECNAVIN5T 5000. 16D, has two stated purposes:
first, to promulgate the relevant OSD-level directive on PPBS, DODI 7045.7;
and, second, to define the roles and responsibilities of various Department
of the Navy officials in PPBS matters.
Like its OSD counterpart, DOD! 7045.7, SECNAVINST 5000. 1 6D
deals in broad terms. In fact, the emphasis is on descriptions of individual
functional responsibilities, to the near-complete exclusion of procedure.
The PPBS cycle is not discussed separately. Interestingly, the instruction
was last updated in 1970; given the three changes in Presidential
Administration since that point, together with the more frequent changes in
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Secretary of the Navy incumbency, this could imply that SECNAVINST
5000. 1 6D is not viewed as a particularly important directive.
Although the instruction is of comparatively ancient vintage, it
is written so broadly as to still be applicable in large part. However, it no
longer represents an accurate depiction of the major role players in the
PPB5 process. At least one organization has been added during the tenure of
Secretary of the Navy Lehman: the Department of the Navy Program Strategy
Board. This group has attained a position of considerable influence in
resource deliberations.
The second major standing directive for PPB5 matters within
the Department of the Navy is the DON Programming Manual. This gives a far
greater level of detail than SECNAVINST 5000. 16D, going into more
extensive coverage of the activities involved in the planning, programming,
and budgeting phases (plus a full chapter on the Congressional budget
process). However, although the coverage is more extensive than the
5ECNAV instruction, the Programming Manual is far from being a definitive
procedural manual. Like the 05D directives, it deals in terms of end
products rather than procedures for constructing those products.
The Programming Manual does identify the major Navy role-
players, define their responsibilities and— to a degree-explain their
relationships with one another. It also describes the various documents
involved in the PPB5 phases.
However, the DON Programming Manual suffers from a serious
flaw: it was last revised in 1979 (the listed revisions since have concerned
data-processing code changes; the text per se, and the descriptions of the
POM/programming process have not been amended). This obsolescence
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renders the Programming Manual all but useless when taken by itself. Some
of the descriptions are still accurate; many others have long been outdated
(some documents described no longer exist at all; others have been changed
in name and/or content). Like 5ECNAVIN5T 5000. 16D, it includes no mention
of the Department of the Navy Program Strategy Board.
The Manual's description of the POM process itself applies to the
situation during the Carter Administration, when the Department of Defense
was experimenting with so-called Zero-Base Budgeting; almost the first
thing the Reagan appointees did upon taking office in 1981 was to terminate
this particular process of budget formulation. For the historian interested
in a generalized description of how ZBB was to be implemented in the
Department of the Navy in the late 1970's, the currently available DON
Programming Manual will be quite interesting. For the current practitioner
of PPB5 as of themid-1980's, the Manual has limited value.
Unfortunately, it is frequently referred to in both formal and
informal situations as the basic governing procedural guidance for
programming. At best, this is misleading for the uninitiated!
Why an updated edition of the Programming Manual has not been
issued is a matter of some mystery.
Responsibility for maintaining the Manual is assigned to the
Director, Department of the Navy Programming Information Center (DONPIC);
this is, incidentally, the same individual who is responsible for coordinating
the annual Department of the Navy POM submission, comprising both Navy
"
and Marine Corps proposals. The Navy POM is prepared under the direction of
the Chief of Naval Operations; the individual specifically responsible for
coordinating the Navy POM is the same officer holding the title of Director,
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DONPIC. In short, he and his staff are extremely busy and possibly have
simply not had the time to spend on the revision of standing directives. 5
More likely, the revision of the Programming Manual is not
viewed as crucial by anyone who matters. In that light, the Programming
Manual takes on the implication of 5ECNAVIN5T 5000. 16D--a not
particularly important piece of paper.
Since this thesis deals primarily with the POM process within
the Navy, rather than within the Department of the Navy, the balance of this
discussion will focus on the Navy"s procedures, guidance, etc.; it should not
be assumed that these apply to the Marine Corps, unless specifically
identified as emanating from the DON level,
b. Annual Guidance: The POM Serials
In the absence of meaningful, currently applicable guidance from
the Department of the Navy standing directives, programming guidance is
issued on a recurring basis, in the form of memoranda prepared in the
office having chief responsibility for coordinating POM-related activities,
the Director, Navy Program Planning (OP-090).
The detailed responsibility for coordinating the Navy's POM
formulation is delegated to one of OP-090's three direct subordinates, the
Director, General Planning and Programming Division (OP-90). OP-90 is the
individual discussed earlier, who has the concurrent title of Director,
Department of the Navy Program Information Center. This duality of titles
5The chapter on the Programming Phase was rewritten shortly after the
Reagan Administration took office, to reflect the several modifications to
the process that were instituted as part of the so-called "Carlucci
Initiatives" of 1981. That revision has never been published; it would, by
now, be outdated.
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involves a duality of reporting relationships; in his OP-90 role, he is
concerned with the Navy POM and reports (via OP-090) to the individual
ultimately responsible for that POM, the Chief of Naval Operations. In his
Director of DONPIC role, however, he works for the Secretary of the Navy.
This duality allows him to issue direction applicable at either
the Navy level or the Department of the Navy level (that is, when the
direction is to apply to both Marine Corps and Navy matters).
Throughout the course of each annual POM cycle, OP-90 issues a
series of memoranda dealing with a variety of relevant topics. These
memos--referred to as "POM 5erials"--constitute the most widely accepted
and universally applied guidance. Most POM Serials deal with the Navy POM
(the Marine Corps issues its own comparable directives), occasionally, OP-
90 will switch to his Department of the Navy role, when the issue at hand
involves both Marine and Navy. Typically, OP-90 (a rear admiral) personally
signs the POM Serials. In some cases, however, the issues under discussion
are of such importance that OP-090 (a vice admiral) or even the CNO himself
will sign the Serial.
The POM Serials provide the primary medium of communication
among POM participants throughout the POM preparation and review cycle.
They cover subjects both broad and specific; approximately 35 to 40 are
written each year.
The first POM Serial marks theofficial kickoff of POM
activities. Published in late August/early September each year, the first
serial is referred to by its number, which identifies it by the POM year to
which it applies and its number within that year's series. For example, POM
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87-1
--most commonly called "87-dash-r— published in September 1934,
refers to the first POM Serial of the POM-87 cycle.
The first annual serial has an additional significance : it
presents the overall guidance for POM activities, including basic definitions
of activities, documents, participants, and other basic information
regarding the POM process. In this regard, the first serial constitutes the
real programming manual for the Navy. Updated each year (and more often,
as may be required), "87-1" fills the gap left by the outdated DON
Programming Manual and SECNAV1N5T 5000. 1 60. This makes considerable
sense, because the POM process within the Navy is not static; procedures,
management styles, and policies may change from year to year, depending on
any number of factors— the personal philosophy of the incumbent 5ECNA.V,
the mood in Congress, the incumbent President, etc.
POM Serials are issued on a flexible basis throughout the POM
development and review cycle— in short, whenever 0P-90/D0NPIC (or any of
his bosses) needs to communicate with POM participants. Typically, each
serial after the first deals with a fairly narrow topic area (for example:
"CNO Program Analysis Memoranda, Baseline Area Appraisals and Warfare
Appraisals"; "Procedural Guidance for POM-87 Baseline Assessments';
"Sponsor Guidance for Department of the Navy Extended Planning Annex",
"Requirements for Data Entry").
The purpose of a POM Serial can be either informative or
prescriptive. Two of the most important POM Serials issue programming
guidance to POM resource decision-makers: the Department of the Navy
Consolidated Programming Guidance (DNCPG) and the CNO Programming and
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Fiscal Guidance (CPFG) [Ref. 15: p. A). These will be discussed in greater
detail later in this narrative.
2. A Basic Characteristic of Maw PPB5: A Dual System
To understand the Navy POM process requires first an appreciation
of the dual system of resource decision-making that characterizes Navy
PPB5. Navy resource management distinguishes between programming and
budgeting activities. Each phase has a distinct set of relationships, with
different offices assigned lead responsibility and different participants
taking dominance in resource decision-making.
During the programming phase, the most significant players are
Resource Sponsors, working under the coordination and direction of the
Director, General Planning and Programming Division (OP-90 ). During the
budgeting phase, the power shifts to the claimants , working under the coor-
dination and direction of the Director, Fiscal Management Division (OP-92 ).
The Resource Sponsors and OP-90 take a back seat during the budgeting
phase, as do the claimants and OP-92 during programming.
In effect, the Navy operates two related but distinct resource
decision-making systems. Among the symptoms of this duality: two levels
of detail (more general for the programming, more detailed for budgeting);
two effective data bases; two distinct processes for determining and
reviewing resource decisions, involving two sets of players. Among the
consequences: not infrequent confusion as to the "real" decisions made
during either phase; occasional conflicting decisions; lack, of meaningful
communication between the two sets of players. The last carries the most
potential for danger.
43
As the organization chart in Figure 2-1 suggests, possible instances
in the nature of "right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing" should
be reconciled at the OP-090 level, since he is the reporting senior for both
the OP-90 and OP-92 organizations. On major issues, or matters of high
visibility, this would be true. However, it will always be true that much
"real" decision-making effectively occurs at lower levels of the
organizations participating in each phase; the grassroots players in POH do
not fully understand the functions and responsibilities of their budget-
phase counterparts (and vice versa). In fact, many of the rank-and-file
participants have only a scant appreciation for "their own" phase, with
frequent confusion over how their own roles fit into the overall scheme,
much less into the overall context of PPB5 in general. Nonetheless, many of
the decisions made by such people are approved without intense scrutiny by
higher levels.
While it is true in theory that "the boss" should be capable of
identifying and reconciling such conflicts or discrepancies, it is equally
true in practice that "the boss" will almost inevitably lack the time and
resources to review sets of proposals in great detail. This is particularly
true when discussing a total resource amount in excess of $100 billion (the
Navy's approximate share of total Defense dollars).
The problems associated with the Navy*s dual system of resource
determination pervade the POM process and are at the root of many of the
weaknesses in POM formulation discovered during the course of this











































































Figure 2-1. Major POM Players
in the Department of the Navy
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3. Major PON Participants
The foregoing discussion highlights one important problem area
involving relationships among POM participants. The large number of
significant players and their varying responsibilities have created a
complicated web of interrelationships. The result is a system that is
sometimes not only difficult to understand but that contributes directly to
other potential weaknesses in the system.
Since the focus of this thesis is the POM-87 cycle, the definitions
of major participants, their roles and responsibilities, are drawn chiefly
from POM Serial 87-1, augmented by analytical comments from other
sources as noted.
Figure 2-1 offers an overview of the major players within the
Department of the Navy. The first section of this chapter discussed the
significance of three of them— the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval
Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. To recap their
importance here: the Secretary of the Navy bears full responsibility for the
Program Objectives Memorandum for the Department of the Navy. He has
devolved extensive authority for POM development to his two service chiefs,
CNO and CMC, while retaining significant control over their POM
development processes. The discussions of other major players will add
meaning to the roles of these three top resource decision-makers.
The stars in each cell indicate the military grade of the individual
heading that organizational component. With the exception of the Secretary
of the Navy and his Secretariat the Under Secretary of the Navy and
Assistant Secretaries), the major players are flag officers, almost all in
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The two-starred cells
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immediately below the three-starred subdivisions represent the individual
within that subdivision with lead responsibility for PPB5 matters.
a. Resource Sponsor
As intimated earlier, the Resource Sponsor is in the dominant
authority chain during the POM cycle. According to official definition in
POM Serial 87-1, the Resource Sponsor is responsible for "an identifiable
aggregation of resources that constitute inputs to task accomplishment."
[Ref. 15: Encl. 2, p. 1] In practical terms, this means that he constitutes the
basic "responsibility center" for resource decision-making during POM
development. Following formulation of his own program proposal, he is
charged with defending it during the several reviews to which it will be
subjected during the programming phase, both within the Navy and beyond.
As one veteran of POM preparation6 described them, the Resource Sponsors
"actually 'own' the resources that are the U.S. Navy."
OP-02 (submarine warfare), for example, owns all of the resources— the
construction of the submarines, the operating of the submarines, the
overhauling of the submarines, the manning of the submarines—
everything associated with submarine warfare. He is responsible, not
just for modernizing the submarine force, not just for building a
submarine force or for operating it, but for the full spectrum. He is
responsible for what is going on in the submarine force today—the
submarines that are actually in the water— for the programming [for the
first year of the POMJ, and for the lona-range submarine warfare plan out
through the year 2000. [Ref. 16: p. \45\
The Resource Sponsorships are organized to coincide closely with the
organization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, as can be seen in
Figure 2-2. The three-starred vice admirals with two-digit codes (OP-0 1
,
OP-02, etc.) are the CNO's Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations , or "DCNO's."
Captain Ray Walsh, USN; Captain Walsh served on the staff of OP-90 for
three POM cycles during the early 1980's, as the primary action officer for
coordinating POM development.
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Figure 2-2. DCNOs/DMSOs with Resource Sponsorships
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The three-starred vice admirals with codes beginning "OP-09"
are Directors of Major Staff Offices, or "DMSO's". Every DCNO is also
assigned responsibilities as a Resource Sponsor. Eight of the eleven DMSO's
had Resource Sponsor responsibility in POM-87.
Figure 2-2 lists the 13 Resource Sponsors and their general
areas of responsibility (note that one Sponsor, OP-095, has been assigned
two programmatic areas).
The Resource Sponsorships can be further categorized as "Platform'' or
"Support." OPs-02, -03, and -05 are Platform Sponsors, with responsibility
for the major warf ighting tasks; the rest are Support. [Ref. 1 71
Because of the duality of the Navy's resource management
system, the uninitiated observer of Navy resource determination may well
be confused as to who actually has decision-making authority. Like the
story of the blind men with the elephant, his perception will be shaped
according to whom he speaks first—Resource Sponsor or major claimant. It
will also depend on what point in the PPB5 cycle is under consideration.
Resource Sponsors have the lead in formulating programmatic
resource proposals, at a fairly generalized level of detail. Claimants are
responsible for executing the proposals made by Resource Sponsors, with a
large part of that job involving the more specific pricing out of those
proposals.
The significance of this is that during the programming phase,
primary decision-making authority rests with the Resource Sponsor The
claimant (who is going to have to translate into reality what the Resource
Sponsor has formulated) takes a back seat during POM development, he may
?
suggest and recommend resource realignments, but he has no effective
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power to enforce his desires during programming. The Resource Sponsor is
not obligated to 3cquiesce--or even to listen, save under prescribed
circumstances discussed later in this chapter.
The lines of jurisdiction between claimants and Resource
Sponsors are not necessarily easy to understand;. That is, one Resource
Sponsor will "own" resources of several of the 26 major claimancies.
Conversely, an individual claimant will be responsible for the resources
assigned to multiple Resource Sponsors. This relationship is illustrated
conceptually in Figure 2-3.
An actual example of the multiplicity of relationships: the
Resource Sponsor OP-03, who is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Surface Warfare, "owns" naval bases in both the Commander in Chief, Naval
Forces Atlantic (C1NCLANTFLT) and Commander in Chief, Naval Forces
Pacific (CINCPACFLT) claimancies; OP-05, the DCNO for Air Warfare owns
the air facilities in those claimancies. Thus, the CINCLANTFLT and
C1NCPACFLT claimants must court both Resource Sponsors (as well as many
others!) for resources during each POM development cycle. Since each
Resource Sponsor has chunks of several claimancies, each claimant must
compete with every other claimant in that Resource Sponsorship. The
claimant will find himself embroiled in as many competitions as he has
Resource Sponsors. The lesson should be obvious: the astute claimant will
maintain the best possible communication with every one of his Resource
Sponsors. In practice, the lesson is not always applied.
Looking at the jurisdictions of each Resource Sponsor listed in




















Figure 2-3. Cloimont versus Resource Sponsor
only clear but logical. In fact, resource assignments are not always
straightforward, nor are they made on a consistent basis.
In general, the labels give a good idea of each Resource
Sponsor's area of responsibility. Numerous exceptions and inconsistencies
characterize resource jurisdictions.
An example will illustrate this last point: the titles indicate that OP-03 is
responsible for "Surface Warfare," and that OP-Ol is responsible for
Manpower, Personnel, and Training. As was stated earlier, a Resource
Sponsor—particularly a Platform Sponsor— theoretically has the
responsibility for the entire spectrum of activities, and hence resources,
associated with his area. "Training" is obviously a necessary ingredient to
surface warfare. However, OP-Ol's designated jurisdiction includes
"training." The quick conclusion is that he has the responsibility for
training the sailors who will eventually man OP-03's ships and operate his
naval bases.
This is not the case. All the Platform Sponsors (and many of the
Support Sponsors) have assumed some of the responsibility for training
within their assigned areas. OP-Ol's primary training responsibilities
involve basic training, rather than mission-specific. That is, OP-Ol "owns"
Recruit Training for enlisted personnel, Officer Candidate School for non-
aviation officer candidates, the U.S. Naval Academy, and the Reserve Officer
Training Corps. The quick reader will note the qualification attached to
Officer Candidate School. The Navy operates a separate training facility for
aviation officer candidates; that facility is under the Resource Sponsorship
of OP-05.
S2
The foregoing constitutes a fairly straightforward exception.
Most inconsistencies are not. Housing is an excellent example of the
confusion. On the premise that "he who owns the facility is responsible for
running it in all respects/' the Platform Sponsors own most of the norma!
components that make up their naval bases and air stations— the buildings,
the hangars, the docks, etc. Such a normal component of most naval
installations is government housing. The Platform Sponsors do have respon-
sibility for unaccompanied personnel housing— the Bachelor Officer Quar-
ters and Bachelor Enlisted Quarters. Government-owned family housing, on
the other hand, resides in toto within the Resource Sponsorship of OP-Ol.
One obvious effect of such inconsistencies is the complication
of relationships among Resource Sponsors. Should, for example, OP-03 have
a need for bachelor housing at one of "his" bases, he has the freedom,
jurisdictionally, to fund it. Should the need be for family housing, however,
he must petition OP-Ol to include it in the OP-Ol program proposal. He will
find himself in competition with hundreds of other requests for OP-Ol 's
constrained resources.
This brings up the issue of how Resource Sponsors manage the
resource determination process during POM development. Specifically, what
procedures do they follow in adjusting the existing resource profiles. From
whom do they receive guidance and/or requests for realignment? Which
petitioners must they favor? What method do they use in making their
decisions?
The answer is deceptively easy: each Resource Sponsor has
considerable latitude in how he formulates his portion of the Navv POM .
Following the philosophy at the OSD and DON levels, the CNO has imposed
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relatively few procedural requirements on his Resource Sponsors. Like most
guidance from higher levels of authority, CNO's edicts deal more with
products rather than procedures.
It is also true that his directives typically provide the most
specific guidance, including occasional detailed programming actions. Of
enormous significance is his specification of resource constraints for each
Resource Sponsor. As mentioned previously, Defense Guidance includes
fiscal controls for each Military Department and Defense Agency. 5ECNAV
makes the initial division between the Navy and the Marine Corps. The CNO
takes the process one step further, dividing the Navy's total dollar and
manpower allocations among his Resource Sponsors.
He also directs some specific programming actions. However,
the general nature of most CNO directives is specification of a particular
end result . Rarely does he specify what the Resource Sponsor must forego
or how he must realign his resource base to accommodate the directive.
Even more rarely will the CNO dictate specific analytical procedures or
methods of evaluation Resource Sponsors should use in making their
resource decisions.
Taking into account such guidance from the CNO (and other
higher authorities), plus the inputs he receives from other groups with an
interest in how he allocates the resources assigned to hirn, the Resource
Sponsor formulates his own mini-POM proposal—officially termed Sponsor
Program Proposal. This has been shortened to the acronym, 5PP, in common
Pentagon usage. Together, the 14 5PP"s, as revised during internal Navy and
Department of Navy reviews, make up the Navy POM that is submitted to 05D
each May.
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The following chapter will detail formulation of one Resource
Sponsor's portion of the POM. That discussion will illustrate the variety of
methods a Resource Sponsor may employ in POM development—including,
such issues as from whom he must receive resource adjustment directives
and/or requests, how he "validates" his proposal to higher authorities, etc.
It is sufficient at this point to state that a Resource Sponsor
has relationships with a variety of players, most within the Navy
Department, but many— the major claimants— in the "real" Navy. The
following sections of this chapter will describe the most significant of
those relationships.
b. Assessment Sponsors
One of the important relationships a Resource Sponsor has
during POM development is with the Assessment Sponsors. These
individuals might best be described as watchdogs, charged with monitoring
broadly defined functional or task areas. Figure 2-4 indicates the eight
Assessment Sponsors who played during the POM-87 cycle, along with their
assigned areas
.
The purpose of the assessment function has its roots in the
basic naval doctrine enunciated in Naval Warfare Plan No. I, which states
that the Navy has "two principal and distinct responsibilities: ( 1 ) to
maintain current fleet readiness, and (2) to ensure future force
capabilities. According to POM Serial 87-1, "these responsibilities are the
focus of the assessment function." [Ref. 15: Encl. (2), p. 3]
Assessment areas cut across Resource Sponsor jurisdictions.
For example, almost every Resource Sponsor owns manpower; most have at
least some involvement in logistics.
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V, Assessment Sponsors
OP-Ol—Manpower, Personnel, &. Training
OP-04—Logistics
OP -06— Internationa) Defense Plannino
0P-09*>—Research, Development, and Acquisition
0P-09R —Naval Reserve
OP-009—Physical Security
OP-095—Naval Varfare (including Electronic Varfare)
OP- 094— Insofrmation Systems and Base Communications
Figure 2-4. DCNOs/DPISOs with Assessment Sponsorship
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In his watchdog role., the Assessment Sponsor examines each
Resource Sponsor's existing and proposed resource alignments with regard
to the assessment area. OP-Ol looks at manpower resources (specifically,
the types and numbers of manpower associated with each Resource
Sponsor's total resource line), as well as programmatic areas pertaining to
training and personnel administration. As stated in the earlier discussion
of Resource Sponsor jurisdictions, most of the Resource Sponsors own some
sort of training programs. As Assessment Sponsor, OP-Ol is charged with
determining whether the resources devoted to those training programs are
the proper type and amount. The quick reader will have already remembered
that OP-Ol is also a Resource Sponsor, whose jurisdictions includes
numerous training programs. Does this mean that he "assesses" himself? In
a word. yes. This overlapping of responsibilities is a significant feature of
the POM relationships. Gilbert and SulHvan fans might be reminded of Pooh-
Bah in "The Mikado," who as the Minister of Morals was offended at the
suggestion of accepting bribes but as the Councillor of the Exchequer was in
a perfect position to write out a check.
Resource Sponsors work under stringent constraints for both
manpower and fiscal resources. As will be repeatedly evident, they have
numerous "petitioners" trying to convince them how to program those
resources. The Assessment Sponsor is one such petitioner; his job is to
promote coverage of his parochial interests. The opportunity for conflict of
interest is obvious. Whether or not it actually occurs is extremely difficult
to document, at least for outsiders to the organizations involved.
The Assessment Sponsor has two opportunities to examine each
Resource Sponsor's resource base: at the outset of POM development
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(October/November), and again following the submission of the Resource
Sponsor's Program Proposal to OP-90 (March). The purpose of the first look
is to recommend changes to the resources in the approved program base,
prior to POM adjustments. These recommendations are documented in the
Baseline Assessment Memoranda, which are sent to the cognizant Resource
Sponsors (with a copy to OP-90). The second look analyzes Sponsor Program
Proposals to ascertain whether or not the Baseline Assessment Memoranda
recommendations were followed at the individual Resource Sponsor Level. A
scorecard is documented in the Post-SPP Assessment, sent to the same
players. If his recommendations fell on deaf Resource Sponsor ears, the
Assessment Sponsor may persuade higher authorities to direct change
during the "end-game" period prior to finalization of the Navy POM (April-
May).
This underscores- an important point about the Assessment
Sponsors" role in POM formulation: they themselves have no power to
enforce a Resource Sponsor to comply with their assessment. Should the
Resource Sponsor disagree as to the critical ity of the assessment, he will
not have to accommodate it unless directed by higher authorities during the
"end-game" period following submission of the Resource Sponsors' Program
Proposals.
Another aspect of the assessment function is that it does not
cover all facets of the Navy's resource base. As can be seen from the list in
Figure 2-4, some of the areas are of such broad scope as to preclude
detailed examination in the compressed schedule of annual POM
development. This is particularly true during the post-proposal assessment
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(typically, Assessment Sponsors have two to three weeks to review up to 14
Sponsor Program Proposals; this does not facilitate in-depth examination).
In addition, each Assessment Sponsor does not review his area
comprehensively each year. Prior to the first assessment, selected topics
are chosen (usually at the initiation of the Assessment Sponsor, subject to
approval by OP-90, the PON activities coordinator). Only these topics are
examined during that cycle, and these only at the margin.
The exception to this is a relatively recent innovation, whereby
one Assessment Sponsor is assigned to conduct a comprehensive review of
his area, not just at the margin but in its entirety. Introduced in the POM-
84 cycle, the Baseline Area Appraisal has had mixed results, in terms of its
perceived quality and its impact on resource decision-making. Again, the
massive scope of most of the assessment areas restrict examination to
certain subsets.
In POM-87, the area selected for in-depth review via a Baseline
Area Appraisal was the Naval Reserve. The Director of Naval Reserve, OP-
09R, was assigned the task.
The Assessment Sponsor function is discussed in greater detail
in Chapter 4 of this thesis, using the actual experience of two Assessment
Sponsors during the POM-87 cycle,
c. Appropriation Sponsor
Another perspective of review involves the Navy's resource base
as the Congress (and the internal Department of Defense budgeting-phase
players) see it: in terms of appropriations. Figure 2-5 lists the Navy




































































OP- 01—Military Personnel, Navy
OP-03—Ship Construction & Conversion






Operations & Maintenance, Navy
OP-094—Reserve Personnel, Navy
Operations & Maintenance , Navy Reserve
Military Construction, Navy Reserve
Figure 2 5. DCNO's/DMSOs with Appropriation Sponsorship
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According to POM Serial 87-1, the function of the Appropriation
Sponsor is to "ensure that programs submitted are properly structures,
priced, supported and balanced within fiscal controls" (the Serial offers no
further direction on how this will be accomplished). Appropriation Sponsors
are also to "advise the resource sponsors and OP-90 regarding the
feasibility of programs and make recommendations based upon their more
detailed knowledge of the budget process." [Ref. 15: End. (2), p. 3]
The impact of Appropriations Sponsors on POM development is not entirely
clear from the foregoing official guidance. Programming deals with
resource alignment in a different fashion that does budgeting. Not only is
the level of detail different in the two PPB5 phases (from "generalized"
programming to "specific" budgeting), the aggregation of resources is
different, as well.
Programming, as the name implies, emphasizes resources in
terms of output—specifically, "programs" designed to fulfill a pre-defined
mission or attain some objective. As such, Department of Defense
resources have been categorized into programmatic aggregations (based on
the ten major defense programs established in the 1960's 7 ). Each "program"
may contain several types of resources—manpower (active-duty military,
Reserve, and/or civilian) and fiscal (one or more of the Congressional ly
approved appropriations). This concept is illustrated in Figure 2-6
For example, the Navywide Personnel Administration Support
System constitutes a "program," categorized under Major Defense Program 9














Figure 2-6. Appropriations versus Programs
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(Administration). "PASS" includes ail three types of manpower: the Military
Personnel, Navy, and Reserve Personnel, Navy, dollars to pay the active and
Reserve manpower, Operations and Maintenance, Navy, dollars to pay the
civilian employees and cover all other operating expenses; Military
Construction, Navy, dollars to pay for the physical facilities in which PASS
offices are housed; and Other Procurement, Navy, dollars to pay for major
equipment investments. Since some PASS offices are on installations
devoted primarily to the Naval Reserve, the program also includes resources
from the Military Construction, Navy Reserve; and Operations & Maintenance.
Navy Reserve; appropriations.
Although the Resource Sponsor tends to look first from the
programmatic perspective, it does not mean that he is impervious to the
type of appropriations are involved. The Appropriation Sponsor looks solely
at the matter in terms of appropriations. However, his input is only
formally called for toward the end of POM development, after the Resource
Sponsors have submitted their individual Sponsor Program Proposals for
review, balancing, and consolidation into the Navy POM. Another fact
remains clear: like Assessment Sponsors and claimants, Appropriations
Sponsors lack the effective power to force Resource Sponsors to comply,
d. OP-090
As stated earlier, the responsibility for overseeing the POM
development has been assigned to the Director of Navy Program Planning
(OP-090). As the organization chart in Figure 2-1 confirms, OP-090
reported directly to the Chief and Vice Chiefs of Naval Operations. A three-
starred vice admiral, he is effectively their pointman for resource matters
throughout the PPBS cycle. OP-090's tasks are best summarized by the
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single sentence from the OPNAV Organization Manual that states his official
mission:
To exercise centralized supervision and coordination of the Navy program
planning and study effort to ensure the integration of planning,
programming, budgeting, and appraisal within OPNAV and the management
echelons subordinate to CNO. IRef. 2: p. 090-3J
A more concise statement later in the same document better
synopsizes the essence of his job: "Provides professional and technical
advice on program and budget matters to CNO." The process by which he
accomplishes that responsibility is obviously more complicated, involving
him in a great deal of coordination throughout the PPBS phases.
As the organization chart shows, OP-090 has three two-starred
Rear Admirals reporting directly to him. The titles of these three— the
Director of the General Planning and Programming Division (OP-90), the
Director of the Program Resource Appraisal Division (OP-91 ) and the
Director of the Fiscal Management Division (OP-92)--indicate how OP-090
apportions his responsibility to coincide with the duality of the PPBS
process. Two of the Division Directors--OP-90 and OP-92--are OP-090's
point men during the planning/programming and budgeting phases,
respectively. His thtrd subordinate, OP-91, plays an important role in POM
development.
(1) OP-90—"The Honest Broker" . OP-090's formally stated
duties include numerous references to his responsibilities in the
programming process. These statements could well serve as the job
description for his Rear Admiral subordinate, OP-90, because that individual
is the workhorse who actually bears the bulk of the such OP-090 functions
as described:
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Provides guidance and exercises centralized coordination in the
preparation, preview, presentation, and subsequent promulgation of
CNO/VCNO decisions on Navv programs and plans.
Reviews and evaluates programs for balance of individual programs and
overall balance within the Total Navy programs. Ensures adequacy of
programs development to support Navy plans. When necessary,
recommends changes to program sponsors to CNO or VCNO.
Reviews program, financial and manpower decisions and evaluates their
impact on the Navy program efforts. Recommends to program sponsors or
to the VCNO program adjustments to restore overall program balance.
Evaluates program progress and makes, as required, recommendations for
corrective action to the program sponsors or the CNO.
The foregoing are quoted in full because they provide a fairly
explicit summary of OP-090's (and, by extension) OP-90's role during the
programming phase of PPB5; this is not always the case with such
documents.
As is obvious, the OP-090 job carries considerable power; by
extension, so does the OP-90 billet 8 During POM development, both wield
considerable impact over resource decision-making. The nickname for OP-
90, "The Honest Broker," reflects his job responsibilities. Not only does he
coordinate POM activities, he is given the task of turning 1 4 "mini-POM's'--
the Sponsor Program Proposals-- into one consolidated Navy POM,
characterized by compliance with all necessary guidance, reflecting a "good'
balance among programs and priorities, and acceptable to the CNO and the
Secretary of the Navy.
in short, although the Resource Sponsors constitute the first
line of decision-makers, their proposals can be overruled if OP-090 deems
SSignif icantly, almost every OP-90 incumbent of recent years has gone
on to the Navy's top jobs; the list of former OP-90's includes several
VCNO's, Chiefs of Naval Material, and even CNO's.
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them to be in need of adjustment (due to failure to accommodate particular
programs, lack of balance among programs, specific direction from higher
authority to accommodate particular objectives, etc.) As the frontline
manager of the POM process, OP-90 is more often the actual source of such
recommendations. OP-090's three stars permit him to deal on an equal ba-
sis with the designated CNO/DM50 Resource Sponsors (refer to Figure 2- 1 ),
his spokesman is usually two-starred OP-90.
As mentioned in the first reference to the organization chart in
Figure 2-
1 , each of the Resource Sponsors has appointed a two-starred
deputy to deal with PON development. Their comparable rank allows OP-90
to deal with them horizontally. Inevitably, conflicts arise. One can imagine
the frequency with which the various Rear Admiral Resource Sponsor
deputies must report to their bosses that OP-90 has meddled with their
program. Presumably, the Vice Admiral Resource Sponsor can go over OP-
90's head and request reconsideration by his boss. For that matter, he can
go up even higher and petition the VCNO or even the CNO. However, if there
are instances in which OP-090 has failed to support the judgments of his
subordinates, they are certainly not well documented! For practical
purposes, the OP-090 organization constitutes a reasonably solid front,
what they say usually goes. 9
OP-90 carries out his POM responsibilities via a fairly small
staff of "analysts"—approximately two dozen mid-grade (0-4 through 0-6)
officers and civilians. These analysts deal with the total Navy resource
90ne assumes that the staff have a fairly good feel for the CNO's and
SECNAV's opinion before issuinq edicts on potentially volatile Resource
Sponsor disagreements.
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base in terms of functional or task area (for example.. "Air Warfare",
"Manpower, Personnel, and Training",. "Base Operating Support", "Naval
Reserve"; etc.) Each analyst has been assigned responsibility for reviewing
certain Resource Sponsors' Program Proposals, as well as for monitoring
each appropriation. In short, the individual OP-90 analysts have numerous
reviewing and monitoring responsibilities, dealing with several
perspectives on the Navy*s total resources.
(2) OP-91 . One prevailing theme of Navy resource decision-
making is that it involves consideration of the Navy's resource base from
multiple perspectives. The Assessment Sponsors, for example, look at
programmatic resources from broadly defined areas of warfare tasks. The
functions assigned to OP-91 , the Director of the Program Resource
Appraisal Division, are somewhat similar but more comprehensive.
OP-91 provides OP-090 with analytical services on a broader,
more abstract basis than OP-90. As CNO's "appraiser," OP-9 1 is charged
with such tasks as the following:
Reviews and analyzes resources for readiness, sustainability, logistics,
manpower and support requirements.
Defines and describes planning, programming, and policy issues for
addressal in development of the Nay's POM. Prepares CPAMs. . . .
Assists in the preparation of the annual Navy Pom submission to OSD and
assists in the review of corollary OSD Issue Papers and the Program
Decision Memorandum.
Provides program appraisals and reviews including resource tradeoffs and
options for CNO and OP-090.
Serves as the Senior Navy advisor for resource analysis to CNO and
SECNAV. IRef. 2: p. 91-1 J
Fairly early in the POM development cycle, during the autumn, a
series of CNO Program Analysis Memoranda (CPAM's) are developed by
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various organizations. The CPAM provides a "fiscally constrained and
issue/capabilities oriented overview of the [most recent] FYDP . .
.
update .... CPAMs will focus attention on policy and programmatic
issues." [Ref. 15: p. 3.] In POM-87, OP-91 was assigned CPAM's in
Manpower, Personnel and Training, Readiness and Sustatnablllty (Including
Fleet Support and Sealift), and Resources. 10
A CPAM helps set the stage for POM development, by addressing
implications of existing and predicted weaknesses in the Navy's resource
allocation. As its name implies, the CPAM is intended to inject analysis
into resource decision-making.
At the point of their initial presentation, the CPAM's do not
constitute directives for Resource Sponsor action. Their primary audience
is the CNO (and his POM development staff). If he (and they) are convinced
of the validity of CPAM recommendations, he may wish to formally direct
their implementation; this will typically be included in CNO's formal
guidance document, issued to Resource Sponsors in February.
That guidance should contain no major surprises for Resource
Sponsors, however, since they (and/or their deputies) will have been in
attendance when the CPAM's are presented in the fall.
(3) OP-92 . The dual nature of the Navy's resource decision-
making system has already been covered in some detail In this chapter. That
discussion should not be interpreted to indicate that OP-92, the Director of
the Fiscal Management Division, has no role In POM development. It does
mean that he takes a back seat. This is literally true in one symbolic case:
10Two other CPAMs were prepared in POM-87: Maritime Strategy
(OP-06), and Research, Development & Acquisition (OP-098).
68
the PDRC. The PDRC—short for Program Development Review Committee-
might best be described as OP-90's board of directors. ] ] The PDRC is
composed of the two-star flag officers in Figure 2-
1
, and representatives
from the Secretariat. This board provides a forum for presentation of
almost every major milestone of the POM development process—CPAM's,
appraisals, Sponsor Program Appraisals, amd so forth. Significantly, the
seats at the conference table are reserved for the Resource Sponsor
representatives and two or three others. OP-92 sits behind one of these
"primary participants." Presumably, if a proposal at hand represented
something in complete disarray from the OP-92/budgetary perspective (for
instance, a fiscally unexecutable program), he presumably would speak up.
e. Navy Component Commanders
The Navy Component Commanders (a relatively recent term for
what used to be called the Fleet Commanders in Chief) are the major group
of non-Navy Department residents who wield influence in the POM
development process. Notwithstanding the fact that they are also major
claimants, and as such can only request and/or recommend programming
actions to the Resource Sponsors, they are also the Navy's operational
commanders, the men responsible for putting the resources to best use.
Among the changes in defense management introduced by the
Reagan Administration, the so-called Carlucci Initiatives of 1981,
increased emphasis was accorded operational commanders in the PPB5
process overall. In the Navy's POM development, the Fleet Commanders in
Chief have the opportunity to make input early in the cycle, during the
1 iThe highly descriptive term used by a past OP-90, Rear Admiral Robert
Walters.
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autumn "setting the stage" months while Resource Sponsors are beginning to
formulate their proposals. At that point, the Fleet Commanders are briefed
on what OP-090 and OP-90 feel are the most likely POM issues; they in turn
make their views known. This, together with their direct input to the
Resource Sponsors as claimants, "will ensure that [they] have a voice in the
entire programming process."
A formal vehicle for that "voice" is the "Top Five" submission,
whereby the five most important priorities of each Component Commander
are submitted to the CNO.
However— like so many of the "petitioners"— the Navy
Component Commander cannot force a Resource Sponsor to give him what he
wants simply by saying he wants it. POM Serial 87- 1 hastens to assure that
"Navy Component Commander inputs will receive full consideration during
the development of CPAM's, warfare appraisals, and SPP's." It stops short
of commanding Resource Sponsors to actually accommodate those inputs.
Given the position that the Fleet CINC's occupy in the Navy
hierarchy (four-star admirals, the peers of the CNO), one assumes that their
requests carry more than the average clout relative to other POM inputs.
One logical target for their recommendations is the CNO's formal guidance
to Resource Sponsors issued in February. In short, if he can convince the
CNO that his need is great enough, the Fleet CINC may have it translated as a
"do- it" for the cognizant Resource Sponsor.
4. Review Groups
To recap somewhat: the basic responsibility center for resource
decision-making during the programming phase is the Resource Sponsor. The
preceding discussion has introduced some of the players who recommend
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and/or direct what decisions the Resource Sponsor should make. However,
he retains considerable latitude in deciding how to allocate the resources
assigned to his jurisdiction.
This is not to say that he can make those decisions unilaterally. He
is monitored continually throughout the POM development process. Not only
does OP-90 keep track of what the Resource Sponsors are doing, various
groups of individuals periodically review all important aspects of POM
development.
Four groups are of particular significance: in ascending order of
seniority, these are the Program Development Review Committee, the
Program Review Committee, the CNO Executive Board, and the Department of
the Navy Program Strategy Board.
a. The Program Development Review Committee
Introduced in the preceding discussion of "Major Players," the
"PDRC" consists of two-star officers, including representatives from every
DCNO and DM50 office. Other members of the PDRC include a two-star
Marine General (OP-90's counterpart in the Marines), one or more
representatives from the Secretariat, and the Director of the Office of
Program Appraisal. The PDRC, chaired by OP-90, constitutes the first
important line of review. In effect, it is a flag-level working group for POM
development. Virtually every presentation—CPAM, appraisal, 5PP, etc—Is
debuted before this group before being heard in the more rarif led three- and
four-star chambers.
Perhaps the most important purpose of the PDRC is as a forum
for communication, to ensure that the Resource Sponsors and others with a
direct involvement in POM development are kept apprised of what is
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happening. All Resource Sponsors are represented; all hear the
recommendations in the CPAM's and appraisals. Following submission of the
Resource Sponsor Program Proposals, the Resource Sponsor representative
makes an oral presentation before the PDRC, so that his boss' colleagues can




Chaired by OP-090, the "PRC* comprises the three-star DCNO's
and DMSO's, as well as the Marine major general mentioned above, and the
Director of the Office of Program Appraisal. The PRC hears almost all the
same presentations and briefings given to their Junior counterparts in the
PDRC.
A relatively recent innovation (first introduced in the POM-84
cycle), the PRC was created to reduce the number of briefings given to the
CNO Executive Board. Previously, the -complete PDRC schedule was repeated
before the CNO-chaired board. Since a typical POM development cycle gives
rise to some thirty briefings in the space of approximately six months, and
since the CEB has numerous other reviewing responsibilities, it is easy to
see how the Navy's top leadership could spend its entire working day
closeted in semi-darkened conference rooms, gazing at viewgraphs, and
listening to action officers read them the text thereon.
The PRC comprises almost the same membership as the CEB,
less the CNO and the VCNO.
c. The CNO Executive Board
If the PDRC can be termed OP-90's board of directors for POM
development, the TEB" can be described as filling the same need for the
CNO. A major difference is that the CEB may be convened for any matter on
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which the CNO wishes council. The group does play a role in POM
development decision-making, but only at critical points. They typically
hear the summary presentations, rather than every appraisal, proposal, etc.
d. The Department of the Navy Program Strategy Board
Another creation of recent vintage, the "DPSB" was an
innovation of Secretary of the Navy Lehman. Its functions parallel those of
its counterpart at the OSD level, the Defense Resources Board. Like that
group, the membership of the DON Program Strategy Board is heavily
weighted toward the Navy's civilian executive staff—that is, the politically
appointed Under Secretary and Assistant Secretaries of the Navy. Military
members include the CNO and Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Director
of the Office of Program Appraisal, OP-090 and his Marine Corps
counterpart, OP-90 and OP-095 (the Director of Naval Warfare).
Secretary Lehman personally chairs the DPSB. It thus
represents the final decision-making point within the Department of the
Navy. As asserted earlier in this chapter, Mr. Lehman has taken an
increasingly active role in POM development as his tenure has progressed.
He has injected himself into the decision-making process earlier each cycle;
by POM-87, the DPSB had reached the point where it was acknowledged as
"the centerpiece of final POM development." [Ref. 15: p. 2] This naturally
created challenges for the CNO staff members involved in POM development.
It in effect derailed what they had in prior years come to expect as a
predictable, upward flowing review process, in which the big boss didn't see
the product until they had fine-tuned and refined it. The big boss made it
clear that he (and his civilian executives) intended to have a hand in the
fine-tuning and refining activities.
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As the discussions in the following chapters of what actually
happened during POM-87 will confirm, the DP5B exerted considerable impact
on results—and on the process itself.
5. Navy Programming: The Process in Summary
The preceding sections of this chapter have introduced various
elements of the Navy POM development process—the major players, some of
the decision-support products (CNO Programming Analysis Memoranda,
appraisals, Baseline Assessements, etc.) Before proceeding to the next
chapters' recounting of actual POM-87 events, a brief synopsis of the Navy
POM cycle will wrap up any loose ends, putting the balance of the
information in this chapter into context.
In terms of timing, the Navy POM development process is roughly
divided into three phases: Program Planning (August-January); Programming
(January-April); and Final POM Development (April-May).
a. Program Planning (August-January)
This stage commences with the publication of POM Serial XX- 1,
and terminates mid-January, with the issuance of Defense Guidance. 12 Dur-
ing the program planning phase, the basic analytical groundwork is laid,—
the CPAM's, appraisals, Baseline Assessments, claimant input, etc.—setting
the stage for Resource Sponsors to array their programs, determine their
priorities, and make their tradeoffs.
12The scheduled release date for Defense Guidance has proven vastly
unreliable during the 1980's. In some years, it arrives "on time" (or at least
during the month of January); more often, it drifts in weeks or even months
later. This obviously places certain inconvenience on those involved in POM
development, requiring them to indulge in considerable second-guessing and
furious last-minute corrections.
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During POM-87, two pieces of preliminary guidance were
promised during the program planning phase: CNO Planning and Programming
Guidance and the Department of the Navy Planning Guidance, aimed at their
respective levels of POM decision-makers. POfl-87 procedures consolidated
these into a single document.
As stated repeatedly throughout, claimants do not enjoy
extensive power during the POM development phase of the Navy's PPBS cycle.
They do, however, have a voice in making their desires known: Claimant
Input via OP-90
. As will be emphasized in the following chapter, Resource
Sponsors have considerable latitude in how they structure their Sponsor
Program Proposal development. Few Navywide procedures specify from
whom Resource Sponsors must accept input; fewer still constitute specific
direction to program resources.
That is, a Resource Sponsor may request recommendations from
the claimants having resources in his jurisdiction. Then again, he need not.
Obviously, many claimants felt themselves to be cut out of important
decisions. As a partial solution to this, OP-90 coordinates a process
whereby claimants submit their issues via him. This is officially called
Claimant Input. OP-90 in turn forwards those issues (that is, resource
requests) to the cognizant Resource Sponsor.
That action does not, unto itself, compel the Resource Sponsor
to comply with the claimant's request; it simply ensures that the request
becomes a matter of public record.
At the presentation of his Sponsor Program Proposal in March,
each Resource Sponsor is required to acknowledge the "top five" issues
received from each claimant and to tell what he did with those requests .
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He faces the same requirement for other types of
recommendations (i.e., resource requests!) he receives from his various
petitioners—Baseline Assessments, appraisals, etc. A proviso has been
applied to almost all such "petitions," however, the individual making the
recommendation is also instructed to identify offsetting resources from
within the same area. That is, if a claimant identifies a deficiency in OP-
Ol's funding of a particular program In his clalmancy—say, in the Personnel
Administration Support System program—he must accompany his request
with specific resources from elsewhere in his clalmancy to cover the
additions he wishes made to PASS. (In effect, the claimant is simply asking
the Resource Sponsor to approve a reprogramming request!) Failure to
identify offsets immediately relieves the Resource Sponsor of any
obligation to accommodate the request. The next chapters will Indicate how
this worked in practice.
One of the final activities during the Program Planning phase
gives the Resource Sponsors the opportunity to themselves become
petitioners of a sort: during the Program Issues Summary, each Resource
Sponsor is afforded the chance to present what he believes to be his "top
five" issues requiring resolution during the POM deliberations. These issues
typically fall into one of two categories: pleas for additional resources or
exhortations to protect an existing pool of resources. The ultimate goal of
the Program Issues Summary— like that of most activities during the
Program Planning phase— is to inject content into the CNO's Programming




During this stage, Resource Sponsors put the finishing touches
on their mini-POM's, the Sponsor Program Proposals. They have received
"resource requests" from dozens, perhaps hundreds of petitioners. What is
happening to them will be repeated on a larger scale during the final POM
development stage: they are struggling to identify and accommodate the
truly necessary requests, remain within fiscal and manpower controls, find
areas to cut in their existing programs in order to fund the new increments,
retain an acceptable balance among their various programs—and comply
with whatever mandatory guidance they may have received from higher
authority.
The most significant source of such direction is the CNO's
Programming and Fiscal Guidance . Typically issued in mid-February (as a
POM Serial), CPFG is arguably the most significant POM development
guidance the Resource Sponsors receive. To be sure, the Secretary of the
Navy and the Department of the Navy Program Strategy Board will inevitably
affect some of his resource decisions, but the guidance he receives from his
immediate boss, the CNO, comprises the most comprehensive directive he
may expect.
CPFG is scheduled for release following issuance of Defense
Guidance, so that the CNO can interpret and pass on relevant directives from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In addition to overall policy and
guidance from the OSD level, CNO's guidance will include policy enunciations
from his own level. He may also direct Resource Sponsors to make specific
programming decisions (establish new training programs, fund specific
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equipment, etc.) CPFG edicts are widely accepted as "do-its," not subject
to negotiation (at least not publicly).
Undoubtedly the most eagerly awaited section of CPFG are the
four pages detailing the fiscal and manpower controls for each Resource
Sponsor. These represent the real bottom line for Sponsor Program Proposal
development and final ization. The perennial hope is, naturally, for an
increase over the status quo. As the Reagan era began, Resource Sponsors
were not disappointed. As the Administration moves into its later years,
the plump increases of POM-83 and -84 are no more. Increments, such as
they are, are much more modest and not infrequently negative.
In addition to dollars, each Resource Sponsor is constrained as
to the military and civilian manpower he has at his disposal. Since the
Congress authorizes specified numbers of military manpower for each
service, it is up to the service to allot that resource among its
suborganizations. In this regard, manpower becomes Just that~"a
resource," subject to the same constraints as money.
The end product of the Resource Sponsor's balancing/prioriti-
zing/offsetting/refining exercise is his Sponsor Program Proposal. His SPP
(not unlike the Department of the Navy POM into which it will ultimately be
folded) consists of two tangible products. The first is a computerized
"revision" to the existing Five Year Defense Program resource array, which
portrays his recommended changes in resource levels. The data processors
in OP-90 produce an "updated" resource array, which is then turned over the
the OP-90 analysts for scrutiny.
The second tangible product of the SPP is the presentation—an
executive summary designed for briefing the PDRC and PRC. This is when
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the Resource Sponsor has his day in the sun—and when his peers can see
how what he has done might affect their own resource lines. Part of the
5PP presentation typically requires accounting for various "petitions," such
as Claimant Input, Baseline Assessments, and the like. Were those
recommendations/resource requests accommodated? If not, why not (the
failure of the petitioner to identify offsets from within his own
jurisdiction is probably the most frequent explanation). The Resource
Sponsor is usually required to formally account for any specific actions
directed by CPFG.
Following the presentations at the two-starred PDRC level, the
Resource Sponsor may be directed to make certain revisions. For instance,
if he failed to accommodate a provision of CPFG or a warfare appraisal
recommendation or whatever, OP-90 may direct him to do so before the
presentation is given to the next level of reviewers. The process may be
repeated at the higher level.
The vehicle for communicating these "do- its" is commonly
called a 'ZOW." 13 The ZOW represents a non-negotiable "do-it."
The Resource Sponsor is also obligated to prepare a special
document dealing solely with the Claimant Input via OP-90. Called the
Sponsor Program Proposal Document, this reiterates what was done with
claimant requests in the 5PP and why. The Sponsor Program Proposal
Document is forwarded to the claimant, as the only formal feedback he
receives on SPP's.
13The origin of this is obscure; it may be unique in DoD jargon in that it
is op_t an acronym—perhaps it was coined on its onomatopoeic merits.
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The Assessment Sponsors conduct their Post-5PP Assessment
during the first two to three weeks following 5PP submission. Their
specific goal is to measure the final 5PP against the Baseline Assessment
produced five months earlier.
The final activity of the programming phase scheduled for the
POM-87 cycle was the Program Evaluation Summary . The Program
Evaluation Summary was intended to, for the first time, present the
fourteen mini-POM's as a consolidated Navy POM. Intrinsic to this would be
the identification of major unresolved issues requiring resolution by CNO
and the Secretary of the Navy.
The presentation of the Program Evaluation Summary was
scheduled to signal the transition into the final stage of POM development.
[Ref. 15: p. 10]
c. Final POM Development: The '"End Game" (April-May)
According to the initial schedule for POM-87, the "end game"
was to focus on summary briefings to the Department of the Navy Program
Strategy Board. From this forum, the DPSB Chairman, Secretary Lehman,
would make his final decisions on the Navy POM, resolving outstanding
conflicts and problems and making any other adjustments he personally
deemed desirable. As the following chapters will discuss, some
modifications to the schedule occurred, which had significant Impact on the
outcome for some players.
C. CONCLUSION
The Resource Sponsor holds the basic decision-making authority in POM
development. The latitude accorded to OPNAV Resource Sponsors allows
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them to determine their own procedures to a great extent; as long as the
final product complies with mandatory guidance and is defensible
throughout the review process, the Resource Sponsor will unlikely be
challenged as to the methods he used to create that product.
However, as this chapter was intended to demonstrate, he does not work
in a vacuum. His actions are reviewed by numerous groups, from several
dimensions. To take the discussion from a description of what should
happen, the following chapter will describe what actually did happen for one
Resource Sponsor as he developed his annual Sponsor Program Proposal
during the POM-87 cycle.
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III. THE RESOURCE SPONSOR FUNCTION: OP-QI
The previous chapter dealt with the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System in its overall Department of Defense and Department of
the Navy contexts. The purpose of that discussion was to describe the
system as it is covered by formal guidance and directives— that is, how it
is supposed to work. Among the prevailing themes emerging throughout this
thesis is the premise that actual experience does not always accurately
reflect the prescription. In many cases, the formal guidance and directives
do not extend to the level of detail actually involved in PPBS activities. In
some instances, the actual practice simply departs from the formal
guidance.
The purpose of the next three chapters is to explore what actually
happened during a recent programming cycle, in selected offices in the Navy.
The focus will be on two of the "sponsorship" functions defined and
described in Chapter 2: Resource and Assessment. Each function will be
examined in terms of how players performed in their roles in the real-world
of POM-87 development; the discussions will identify the more significant
events that shaped each sponsor's performance and important relationships
with other players--other sponsors, OP-90, the various review groups, and
so forth.
Since the Resource Sponsor represents the primary focus of resource
decision-making during the development of the annual Navy Program
Objectives Memorandum, examination and analysis of a real Resource
Sponsor's POM-87 experience is a logical place to begin.
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The Resource Sponsorship selected for examination is the Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, and Training (OP-0 1 ). ] The
next sections of this chapter will outline the general organization of the
OP-0 1 office, in the context of POM-87 development; describe some of the
major events of that cycle; and summarize the ultimate outcome of the
OP-Ol POM efforts.
A. THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR MANPOWER, PERSONNEL,
AND TRAINING: THEOP-01 RESOURCE SPONSORSHIP
i. Major Players
The DCNO for Manpower, Personnel, and Training is the fifth largest
Navy Resource Sponsor, in terms of the dollars he controls (approximately
$5.2 billion of the Navy's $100 billion total obligational authority for Fiscal
Year 1987).
According to the official statement of his mission, OP-01's chief
responsibility is:
To implement CNO responsibilities for managing the planning and
programming of [Manpower, Personnel, and TraininqJ resources, budgeting
for military personnel and appraisal of Navy's total force MPT programs;
to develop systems for requirements determination of total force MPT
resources and allocation of military personnel . . . . IRef. 2: p. 01-3J
Before examining the OP-Ol resource line in detail, a description of
the organization, particularly those portions involved in PPBS activities,
will set the stage by identifying the major players and their roles as
prescribed by official directives.
Military usage often refers to the individual occupying a particular job
by the title of that job, hence "OP-Ol" becomes the effective title of the
vice admiral occupying that slot at the moment, as well as referring to the
job itself. This thesis will follow that convention.
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Figure 3-1 presents the OP-01 organization in macro: the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations (a vice admiral), his principal deputy (a rear
admiral) and his six Division Directors (all except for OP- 14, rear admirals;
OP- 14 is a civilian employee in the Senior Executive Service). In addition,
OP-01 has several "special assistants." One of these is OP-01 R, who
advises him on Naval Reserve matters. Like the Division Directors, OP-OIB
and OP-01 R have been assigned "Program Manager" responsibility for
specified aggregations of resources.
Just as OP-090 serves as the CNO's pointman for PPB5 matters,
OP- 12, the Director of the Total Force2 Programming and Manpower
Division, occupies a parallel position in the OP-01 organization.
As was pointed out in the previous chapter (refer to Figures 2-2,
2-4, and 2-6), OP-01 is not only a Resource Sponsor, but an Assessment
Sponsor and an Appropriation Sponsor, as well. Interestingly, the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations Organization Manual, the official source of
OP-OI's mission and function statements, does not specify any of OP-Ol's
assigned sponsorship responsibilities (although it addresses them by
implication); the formal designations seem to have originated in the annual
POM Serial Memoranda [Ref. 15: End. (2), p. 1]
OP- 12 is the coordinator for all three types of activities. As should
emerge during the discussion in this and succeeding chapters, OP-12's
overlapping roles and responsibilities significantly affect how OP-01
performs his overall PPBS responsibilities.
2"Total force" refers to the notion that the Navy comprises various types
of manpower—full-time active-duty military, Reservists (both full-time
active-duty and part-time "weekend warriors"), and civilian.
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Figure 3-1. Organization of the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Manpower, Personnel, and Training (OP-01)
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Figure 3-2 focuses on the OP- 1 2 suborganization. Of the five
branches, OP- 120 has major responsibility for most POM-related activities
associated with all three types of sponsorship. OP- 120, a Navy captain
(0-6) billet, is thus the focal point for each of the overlapping OP-01 POM
responsibilities.
Significantly, the OP- 120 branch was reorganized at the outset of
major POM-87 events. This had considerable impact on the course of POM
development that year relative to prior cycles. A brief examination of how
OP- 12 formerly operated will clarify the rationale for the reorganization
and the the revisions in how OP-01 handled his resources during the POM-87
cycle.
2. Components of the OP-01 Resource Line: What OP-01 "Owns"
The OP-01 Resource Line includes, as the DCNO's title implies,
programs relating to the Navy's manpower management, personnel
administration, and training functions. 3 The discussion in the previous
chapter concerning the manner in which resources are assigned to particular
Resource Sponsors stressed that OP-01 does not own all resources involved
with Navy manpower, personnel administration, and training programs. It
would be difficult to neatly summarize exactly what OP-01 does own, much
less the rationale underlying specific assignments. In general, it would be
3Navy parlance distinguishes between the two similar terms "manpower"
and "personnel." The first refers to the more abstract notion of billets, the
latter to the bodies who actually fill those billets. That is, manpower
issues would involve the types of manpower—military or civilian—and
numbers of billets to be programmed. Personnel matters would involve such
issues as particular personnel administration efforts (drug rehabilitation,
operation of the Naval Military Personnel Command, etc.)
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accurate to say that he owns some manpower and some programs relating to
personnel and training.
"Manpower" refers to a resource unto itself— that is, the billets
authorized for the various types of manpower, subject to constraints from
05D and the Congress. Each Resource Sponsor thus owns the manpower
resources required to support his respective programs. He owns, as well,
the fiscal resources necessary to compensate that manpower.
As a Resource Sponsor, OP-Ol owns manpower in all categories:
active-duty military (Regular and Reserve), Reservists not on active duty,
and civilian (over 600,000 manpower billets total). There are certain
programs involving the administration of manpower matters that are also
assigned to the OP-Ol Resource Sponsorship. If this sounds confusing, it is
because it is. For instance, perhaps the most important activity involving
manpower is the annual analysis and determination of the numbers of each
type of manpower the Navy should request the Congress to authorize. The
bulk of the effort involved in these determinations goes on within the
offices of OP-01's organization. However, Resource Sponsorship
responsibility for these programmatic activities has been assigned not to
OP-01, since he is not the Resource Sponsor for his own organization.
Confusing? Absolutely.
In general, OP-01 is responsible for programs involving personnel
administration and training that provide support to the Navy at large .
Examples in the personnel administration category would be the
Naval Military Personnel Command and Recruit Training Command, which
support the personnel administration needs that benefit the entire Navy.
OP-Ol also owns the fiscal resources involved in moving military personnel
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between permanent duty stations. By contrast, personnel-related programs
that can be tracked to a specific installation, such as Morale, Welfare, and
Recreation, are considered to be the responsibility of the Resource Sponsor
owning the particular naval base or air installation at which the personnel
are stationed. An instance arguably inconsistent with this philosophy would
be the Navywide Personnel Administration Support System. Although "PASS"
offices are located physically on installations, PASS is centrally owned by
the OP-Ol Resource Sponsorship.
Similarly, OP-Ol owns "entry"-type training programs (recruit
training for newly enlisted personnel, the U.S. Naval Academy, the Naval
Reserve Officer Training Corps program, and the [Surface] Officer Candidate
School 4); these programs provide training that benefits the Navy as a whole.
OP-Ol also owns postgraduate and other professional education programs
not associated with any particular warfare area (the Naval Postgraduate
School, graduate education for selected officers at civilian institutions, and
the Naval War College). By contrast, training specific to a given warfare
area, such as surface or air, would typically be the responsibility of the
Resource Sponsor most closely identified with that warfare area. For
instance, the Surface Warfare Officer School is in the OP-035 Resource line.
The foregoing are selected examples only, however. It would be a
mistake to imagine that a consistent pattern applies to all resources.
Resource assignment occurs on a case-by-case basis, often arbitrarily. The
result is a patchwork that often leads to confusion and occasional conflict
^But not its aviation counterpart, Aviation Officer Candidate School,
which is in the OP-05 Resource line.
5The Resource Sponsor for Surface Warfare.
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as to ownership. A recurring theme of every POM development cycle is the
frequent bickering among Resource Sponsors and between Resource Sponsors
and claimants as to who really "owns" a given resource responsibility (this
is more often an issue with new program initiatives than with established
efforts).
A better idea of what OP-Ol owns may be derived from looking at
how the resource line has been subdivided. The list in Table 3- 1 defines in
broad terms the types of programs that make up the $5 billion in OP-OI's
resources.
The resource line is heavily weighted toward "operations"
appropriations as opposed to "investment."6 OP-Ol has no involvement in
major weapons systems acquisition or procurement; the primary
procurement efforts involve automatic-data-processing equipment.
A tiny amount of the Navy's Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation appropriation has been assigned to OP-Ol in support of
manpower, personnel, and training R&D efforts. The other major investment
programs involve military construction at OP-Ol -owned bases and the
entire Family Housing, Navy, appropriation. 7
Operations and Maintenance, Military Personnel, and Reserve Personnel
are examples of operations appropriatons. Research, Test, and Evaluation;
Military Construction, and Other Procurement are investment appropriations.
TThis is a prime example of the inconsistency of Navy resource
assignment, one would expect Family Housing to follow the pattern of
unaccompanied personnel housing and thus be assigned to the resource line









Correctional Facilities (Operations/Construction) OP- 15
Base Operations Support (Personnel Administration) jOP-13
Base Operations Support (Training) OP- 11
Civilian Personnel Management .OP-14
Civilian Training/Professional Development DP- 14
Dependents Education (DOD Schools) OP-15
Family Housing j0P-I5
General Skill Training CCVF" Schools) OP-11
Base Operations Support (Naval Home Gulfport) OP-15
General Skill Training ("A" Schools) OP-11
Human Resources Management (Operations/Construction) OP-15
Military Construction—Chapels OP-096
Military Pay Bonuses (OP-01-Owned) OP-13
Military Compensation (Incl. RateEstablishment) OP-13
Military Construction—Training 0P-O1
Military Construction—Marine Corps Support .OP-12
Manpower, Personnel, & Training Research & Development OP-01B7
Military Personnel Administration .OP-13
Military Personnel Administration—Naval Reserve .0P-O1R
Morale, Welfare. & Recreation (Operations/Construction) OP-15
NAVMMACS/NAVMEP (Personnel Administration) jOP-12




Personnel Administration Support System (Operations/Construction) 0P-01B5
Permanent Change of Station/Temporary Duty Under Instruction OP-13
Manpower Support to Defense Agencies OP-12
Manpower Support to Defense Agencies—Naval Reserve OP-OIR
Manpower Support Outside Navy—Other Services OP-12
Manpower Support Outside Navy—Personnel Exchange Program jOP-13




Total Force Manpower Management OP-12
Training—Naval Reserve jOP-OIR
Other Training Support jOP-12
Unaccompanied Personnel Housing j0P-15
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3. "Program-it izing" theOP-01 Resource Line
The list of "programs" in Table 3-1 is fairly new to OP-Ol. First
conceptualized in 1983, this division of resources into identifiable
"programs" was not formalized for POM development until the POM-86 cycle.
The reader unfamiliar with the details of the DoD Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System might assume that the establishment of
the "Ten Major Defense Programs" readily solved the problem of identifying
the purpose of individual resources in programmatic terms. This is far from
true; the chief contribution of the "Ten Major Programs" is to imply a
labeling system for defense resources. Broken down into subunits called
Program Element Codes, the ten programs constitute a very broad
categorization. Most importantly, they—like any labeling system—are only
as useful as the accuracy with which the labels are assigned.
Although Resource Sponsorship assignment is made more or less on
the basis of Program Element Code CPE's"), assignment does not follow a
consistent pattern. In some instances, all resources in a given Program
Element will be owned by a single Resource Sponsor. The breadth of some of
the PE's is so large as to encompass several Resource Sponsor jurisdictions.
Moreover, the PE codes themselves are far from uniform in scope. Some
cover a limited, clearly defined area. PE 8873 IN, "Permanent Change of
Station Travel" offers a tidy example: this PE includes only fiscal
resources, all from the Military Personnel and Reserve Personnel
appropriations, all within the OP-Ol resource line.
By contrast, other PE's are enormous in their coverage. A
particularly untidy example would be PE 25096N, "Base Operations—Other
Base Support." This PE encompasses several million dollars, in at least
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three appropriations, as well as both military and civilian manpower; it
covers a host of functional activities involved in base operations support--
morale, welfare, and recreation; housing operations and furnishings, and
many more. No fewer than six Resource Sponsors share the total resources
assigned to this PE, based on their ownership of individual installations.
Another feature of the programming phase compound the problems in
such cases. PON development occurs on a fairly broad scale. Only manpower
(and the associated compensation from the Military and Reserve Personnel
appropriations) are programmed down to the level of the individual
installation. The Operations and Maintenance dollars (the bulk of the
resources in all base operating support accounts) are aggregated at a much
higher level, according to function (for example, "morale, welfare, and
recreation"; "operations and furnishings for bachelor housing"; etc.).
Confusion over specific ownership becomes a normal way of doing business
during POM formulation (and a continuing problem in translating the POM
into the more detailed documentation required in budget formulation, which
requirea that all resources be factored to the detailed level of individual
activities).
In short, although every dollar and every unit of manpower bears a
Program Element Code label, those labels are not, unto themselves, a useful
system for organizing resources at a low level of detail.
Thus, although all resources were labeled according to PE code, the
OP-01 Resource Line was not uniformly organized in terms of programmatic
output prior to 1983. "Program" designations were often made adhoc, to
meet the need for a particular presentation or briefing.
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The obvious question arises as to how those responsible for
developing OP-Ol's POM managed to work with such a-rnassive pool of
resources without some means of categorization. The answer is partly
intertwined with the organizational situation in OP- 1 2 in the early 1 980's
OP- 120, head of the Program Development and Coordination Branch,
was the individual responsible for preparation and submission of the OP-01
Resource Sponsor Program Proposal each year. A designated Special
Assistant, 0P-120A, served as the primary action officer directly
responsible for the bulk of the actual coordination and preparation. To say
that OP- 1 20 and OP- 1 20A were the focal point for OP-0 1 PON activities
understates the situation. Between them, they handled 90 percent or more
of 5PP development activities and decisions . Higher levels of authority
served principally in reviewing and approving capacities. Since OP- 120 also
had responsibility for overseeing OP-01's Assessment and Appropriation
Sponsor activities, this obviously meant that the bulk of the 5PP
development was done by one individual: the lieutenant commander assigned
totheOP-120Ajob.
Given the compressed nature of the POM schedule, together with the
size of the OP-01 resource base (comprising over $5 billion and over
600,000 manpower billets), the officer serving as 0P-120A was extremely
busy during the POM development months. Lack of time precluded the
possibility of any real analytical work on resource requests; the judgments
as to whether a given item should or should not be included was often based
solely on the intuition of theOP-120A incumbent. Occasionally, items
would be of high enough visibility to merit the attention of the flag officers
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in the OP-01 organization. However, the bulk of resource requests were
never seen by anyone higher than a captain (0-6).
The level of quality of the Sponsor Program Proposals produced
during those years is not at issue in this thesis; if critical items were not
included in those SPPs (or an abundance of extraneous items were ), evidence
is not available at this point.
In 1 982, another lieutenant commander was added to the OP- 1 20
staff to help handle the peak workload of POM development. This temporary
assignment became permanent, doubling the size of the POM staff during the
POM-85 cycle. However, many of the decisions made during that cycle were
still made at the lieutenant commander level (the difference being that
there were twice as many of them available to make such decisions).
It was during the interlude between POM-85 and POM-86
development cycles that the OP-01 resource line was finally categorized
into specific "programs, " identifiable as to common purpose and/or
function. That categorization, plus a few relatively minor modifications, is
the basis for Table 3-1.
Categorization alone did not solve another problem, however.
Although OP-01 resources were now visibly organized according to program,
no designated "program managers" existed for most of the aggregations. In
prior POM development exercises, resource requests were submitted by any
and all who had an interest in a particular set of resources. For instance,
the Commander of the Naval Military Personnel Command (CNMPC), a major
claimant, was responsible for execution of the budgets of several naval
activities (his own headquarters command, NMPC; the Naval Recruiting
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Command; the Navy Band; etc.) Resource requests for "his" activities came
directly to OP- ! 20 from CNMPC.
Similarly, requests involving training resources came directly from
the major claimant in that area, the Chief of Naval Education and Training
(CNET). However, CNET was not the claimant for such institutions as the
Naval War College or the U.S. Naval Academy. Their requests might come
directly from them, via their own major claimant (OP-098), or cycled
through another OP-01 division having a programmatic interest in their
activities.
In sum, there was no formal system to divide program advocacy and
program analysis . In many instances, the program manager was, de facto,
the individual charged with executing that program— the claimant, thereby
putting him in the dual role of policy maker and policy executer: such
duality jeopardized the possibility of truly objective analysis.
4 Program Analysis: The Need for "Honest Brokerage"
Given the shorthanded situation in OP- 120, objective analysis was
all but unheard of, save in very isolated instances. No procedures had been
formalized for the systematic investigation of resources—either those
already in the approved program base or those being proposed. Resource
requests were judged on the credibility of the submitter, with no
consideration given to his relative objectivity or lack thereof; if one of the
two lieutenant commanders sharing the 0P-120A job could be favorably
disposed to a request, they became the de facto program advocates when
presenting the total Sponsor Program Proposal to their bosses ("Captain,
these folks really need this stuff!" could often ensure a successful request,
whereas "These guys are really blowing smoke, Sir!" could effectively
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destroy a petitioner's chances). In this light, claimants who maintained
close contacts with-the OP- 120 staff enjoyed a distinct advantage. The
Commander of the Naval Military Personnel Command was fortunate enough
to reside in the same building. His POM coordinator had merely to walk
around the hallway to communicate face-to-face with the two lieutenant
commanders making resource allocation decisions. The Chief of Naval
Education and Training routinely sent a delegation from his Florida
headquarters to the Washington-based OP- 120 spaces for extended periods
during the POM development period.
One aggregation of resources had always been readily identifiable as
associated with a particular programmatic activity, the Personnel
Administration Support System (PASS); PASS had a formally assigned
program manager within the OP-01 organization. That officer was a
frequent visitor to the OP- 120 area; her program prospered therefore.
By contrast, those resources lacking a dedicated source of
advocacy—whether from claimant or elsewhere—often served as the first
available target when resource cuts were called for. If there was no one to
defend them (or, perhaps, even to explain their purpose), such resources
could be extremely vulnerable.
To be sure, all such actions had the official sanction of flag officer
approval, inasmuch as they were part of the Sponsor Program Proposal that
was officially submitted by OP-01 himself, via OP- 12 and OP-OIB.
However, OP-01 did not personally review every resource request— or every
decrementing action. He saw the 5PP in its summarized form, after all but
the most contentious decisions had been made. That situation was
paralleled at the lower levels of review within the OP-01 hierarchy.
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Information was filtered as it was passed upward, so that the bosses could
focus their attention on those items still at issue. This meant that much of
the "real" decision-making took place at the lieutenant commander level,
based primarily on intuition and/or personal impression.
The other OP-Ol divisions regarded POM development as being the
bailiwick of OP- 12. Although the Division Directors were given the
opportunity to review the total program at two or three milestone points
during the creation of the Sponsor Program Proposal, neither they nor their
staffs played a consistently strong role in that creation.
5. Enter the Program Managers
An important initiative beginning with the POM-86 cycle was to
designate a formal manager for each aggregation of resources— that is, each
of the OP-Ol programs listed in Table 3-1. Following the philosophy
underlying the assignment of programmatic responsibilities at the OPNAV6
level, management responsibility for the OP-Ol programs were specifically
assigned within the OP-Ol organizations. This correlated with the
philosophy of separating the functional responsibility of policy-making
from that of policy execution . The CNO and his staff are seen to be most
appropriate for the former, with claimants the logical repository for the
latter.
In practical terms, this meant that POM-86 procedures represented
an important departure relative to earlier cycles: for the first time,
claimants were no longer linked directly with the Sponsor Program Proposal
coordinators in 0P-I20A. Although claimants were still permitted to
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
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originate their own resource requests, those requests were reviewed by the
individual who had been designated as the manager or the program. The
Program Manager was intended to function in an advocacy role in dealing
with OP- 1 20. OP- 1 2/OP- 1 20 would assume the "Honest Broker" character
of 0P-090/0P-90. The Division Directors, OP-0 1 B, and OP-0 1 R would
become "mini-Resource Sponsors," each with his own assigned pool of
programs and resources (and, implicitly, with his own manpower and fiscal
constraints).
The new system produced mixed results during the development of
P0M-86. A major difficulty lay in that fact that many of the so-called
"Program Managers" had no idea of what it was they were to do. Nor was
there any established doctrine to use in training them. The designation of
"Program Manager" has its most explicit definition in the area of major
systems acquisition; OP-01 did not have an operational definition of what a
Program Manager was supposed to do in the non-acquisition world of its
resource line, save that they were "to be responsible for their programs."
For example, recruiting and advertising resource requests had
formerly come from the Commander of the Naval Recruiting Command (via
his major claimant, the Commander of the Naval Military Personnel
Command). No one in OP-01 had any detailed knowledge of the recruiting
resource base or a comprehensive view of that program's purpose, design,
operational peculiarities, etc. The individual assigned to be the Program
Manager for recruiting had had no previous experience in resource analysis
or management; she had to acquire all the requisite knowledge within a
short time. Her Program Manager duties were added to an already extensive
list of responsibilities.
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In many cases, the OP-01 staff members assigned as Program
Managers had no understanding of the PPB5 in general, or of the POM
development process in particular. When presented with a display of a
resource aggregation, they lacked any frame of reference from which to
assess it. Were the dollars and manpower "too much?" "Too little?" What
purposes were the resources supposed to accomplish? Many of the new
Program Managers had never worked with resources in this fashion and were
able to do little more than merely pass on the requests they might have
received from the more knowledgeable claimants.
6. The OP- 1 20 Reorganization
At the outset of POM-86, development of the OP-01 Sponsor Program
Proposal was still handled primarily by the two lieutenant commanders in
the OP- 1 20 branch. Other OP- 1 20 staff worked with the Assessment
Sponsor functions, but the focus of OP-01's Resource Sponsor responsibility
was essentially where it had always been—in the very few hands of
relatively junior people.
This situation was amended during the course of 5PP development (a
full commander assumed responsibility for developing the proposal), but no
real analytical effort was applied. Subsequent to the submission of 5PP-86
and finalization of POM-86, OP- 120 reorganized his staff with the purpose
of, among other things, rectifying the analytical deficiency.
Prior to the reorganization, OP- 120 had approximately 20 officers
and non-clerical civilian employees on his staff. He restructured his
personnel into three separate sections, each headed by a Navy Commander.
One section, 0P-I20D, was dedicated primarily to coordinating-type
functions, intended to handle all such efforts during all PPB5 phases (since
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this thesis concerns POM development, it is easy to overlook the fact, that
OP-120 is the effective pointfnan for other important events involving
budget reviews at the 05D level, testimony for Congressional delivery, etc.)
In terms of POM activities, specifically creation of the OP-Ol Sponsor
Program Proposal, theOP-120D organization inherited the responsibilities
formerly handled by the 0P-120A special assistant.
The other two sections, OP- 1 20C and OP- 1 20E, were given the
responsibility of program and appropriation analysis . Patterned somewhat
after OP-90's staff, the OP- 1 20C and 1 20E staff were retitled as "analysts."
Like their "Program Manager" counterparts in other OP-Ol Divisions a few
months earlier, the newly named "analysts" were not entirely sure of what
exactly they were to be doing.
POM-87 was the first cycle in which the new OP-120 organization
was tested. According to the officer serving as OP- 1-20 during the latter
part of that cycle (he had been OP- 1 20E during the first part), the
reorganization produced positive results. For one thing, it spread the work
over a much broader basis, thereby increasing the total man-hours possible
for 5PP development. As with any innovation being tested for the first
time, the reorganized OP- 1 20 was not as effective as it conceivably would
become in later cycles, as the analysts acquired greater experience with
their new assignments.
7. A Major Revision. Conceptually and Organizationally
In sum, then, OP-Ol has implemented a new system for handling his
Resource Sponsor responsibilities that represents a significant change from
the methods of the cycles before POM-86. Since POM-87 was the first year
that both important innovations— the Program Managers and the program
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analysts—were in place, it naturally cannot be considered as a "normal"
cycle, or a standard for all future operations. Undoubtedly, there were
differences in both procedures during the POM-88 cycle—and will be in the
POM-89, etc. Given the dynamic nature of POM development at the CNO and
Secretary of the Navy levels, the most predictable aspect of any POM cycle
is some sort of change relative to the previous year.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE POM-87 SPONSOR PROGRAM PROPOSAL
1. 5PP Development: An Overview of the Process
In general, the process of SPP development parallels the process of
POM development Navywide: first, adjustments are proposed, relative
to an existing arrangement of constrained resources. Then,
decisions are made whether the proposals should be applied
against the baseline. The adjustments may be increases, decreases, or
transfers from one category to another, but the essence of the process is
that it is incremental . The programmatic resource base is not typically
reviewed in its entirety each cycle, but only at the margin.
In the Navy, both dollars and manpower are considered as resources,
because both are subject to constraints levied by higher authorities— the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget,
the President, and the U.S. Congress.
The process of receiving resource adjustment proposals, evaluating
their validity, and making a final determination as to whether they should
be applied to the existing array of resources sums up Sponsor Program
Proposal development. However, each Resource Sponsor is given wide
latitude in the specific procedures he wishes to use in crafting his SPP.
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This section describes the experience in OP-01 during development of the
POM-87 5PP.
In a very broad sense, 5PP development can be depicted as the process of
various petitioners lodging their opinions and recommendations about how a
Resource Sponsor should array the resources assigned to his jurisdiction.
Conceptually, this might be represented by the illustration in Figure Z-3.
The separate boxes represent the various "petitions" coming into OP-01
throughout the POM development cycle. Some are in effect recommendations
only, carrying no power to enforce compliance. Others represent virtual
orders from higher authority, "do-it's" which must be accommodated in the
Sponsor Program Proposal. The focus of the remainder of this chapter will
describe OP-Ol's POM-87 development activities in terms of this highly
simplified graphic conceptualization.
2. 5PP Development Guidance
Before embarking on the description of specific POM activities, a
brief explanation of the guidance issued internally within OP-0 1 will
amplify the previous discussions of guidance issued by higher levels.
The overall procedural guidance issued by the Director of the
General Planning and Programming Division (OP-90) applies to POM
activities at all levels of the OPNAV organizations. However, that guidance
usually is not overly detailed, thereby allowing Resource (and other)
Sponsors to amplify it according to their own circumstances--fact-of-life
considerations concerning the nature of their resource lines, the 5PP
development process used in that Sponsorship, the personal management
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Figure 3-3. How the OP-01 SPP Is Developed
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In OP-0
1 , the counterpart to the OP-90 POM Serial is a series of
memoranda called PQMGRAMS . In parallel with the OPNAV level of
organization, the POMGRAMS are issued from the office of OP-0 is PPB5
pointman, OP- 12. Like the POM Serials, POMGRAMS cover a variety of topics,
beginning with a general statement of guidance at the onset of each POM
cycle (typically, OP-12's POMGRAM XX- 1 forwards OP-90's POM Serial XX-
1
to parties who will be participants in OP-0 1 programming-phase activities).
Beginning in the POM-87 cycle, the POM6RAM5 were addressed "for
action" to the OP-Ol Division Directors, the Assistant Deputy (OP-OIB), the
Special Assistant for Naval Reserve (OP-Ol R), and the Chief of Chaplains
(0P-09G). This distribution list is notable for several reasons: first, all
but one of the addressees are in the OP-Ol organization, none are major
claimants . This represented a departure from previous years, when action
distribution included virtually anyone who requested it. The significance of
the revised list is that it represents OP-OI's Program Manager approach to
5PP development: the front line of decision-making would be within the
OPNAV organization, by OP-Ol 's "mini-Resource Sponsors." And, with the
exception of OP-09G, all addressees were direct subordinates of OP-Ol
;
there is no question as to his authority to direct them. Should they disagree
with his decisions, the conflict would be unlikely to go beyond the the OP-
Ol organization. Claimants (particularly the Fleet Commanders in Chief)
would not be confined by that restriction!
The POMGRAMS were sent for information only to the major
claimants with resources in the OP-Ol resource base, but specific actions
were reserved to the OPNAV addressees. The "invitation" for resource
adjustment requests is typically issued by POMGRAM. Formerly, claimants
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had been action addressees, invited to submit their requests directly to OP-
120. In POM-87, they were information addressees.
However, the text of that particular POMGRAM fails to follow a
basic precept of Navy correspondence: to wit, that only "action" addressees
are subject to the provisions of a directive—including, in this case, the
elicitation of a response. POMGRAM 87-10 discussed "Claimant Input" as
though claimants were still able to respond directly. The POMGRAM did
warn the claimants that their requests would be "reviewed for possible
inclusion in the 5PP" by 0P-01 Program Managers. It also stipulated that
any resource adjustments requiring resources in excess of the existing base
must be accompanied bv identified offsets for a zero-sum transaction (this
was to apply to all submissions, regardless of originator). [Ref. 18: p. 2]
3. Some Basics of 5PP Development
Although the implied focus for resource adjustment requests was on
the Program Managers, rather than the claimants, all inputs were subjected
to basically the same treatment. As discussed at some length earlier in
this chapter, perhaps the most important innovation of the P0M-86 cycle
had been creation and assignment of Program Managers within 0P-01 to
perform as "mini-Resource Sponsors" forOP-01's total resource line. The
most important innovation of the POM-87 cycle was the creation of a formal
analytical organization within OP- 1 2, to enable analysis of resource
adjustment requests that had previously been absent in 0P-0I5PP
development.
Another innovation of the POM-87 cycle was the formal direction for
Program Managers to determine some degree of discretion for each of their
programs. This was a significant injection of analysis that had previously
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been done informally, principally by the two mid-grade officers occupying
the old OP- 120A billet.
The resource base was to be examined and a determination as to the
nature of the programs, with each program to be categorized as falling into
one of three types:
• Funding levels established by statutory entitlement or specific 05D
policy; these would be considered "must-fund" programs and therefore
protected from decrements during 5PP development.
• Funding levels resulting from policy issued at the Secretary of the Navy
or CNO/VCNO level.
• Funding levels resulting from policy issued at the OP-Ol level or below;
this level obviously had the greatest discretionary flexibility for
resource trade-offs.
The analytical basis for the foregoing categorization scheme
revolved on who could make the decision to fund or not fund a particular
program. This cast the picture somewhat in terms of "whom we would have
to fight" if decrements to a program in the resource base were attempted.
[Ref. 19: in full]
The innovations notwithstanding, the development of SPP-87 shared
some very basic similarities with prior cycles. First, the requests for
additional resources far exceeded the existing OP-Ol resource base as of
the beginning of 5PP development.
The official baseline at the beginning of SPP development is the
October update to the Five-Year Defense Program. This revision reflects all
changes made in connection with the previous POM cycle, the official
submission to OSD of the Navy budget for the first year of that POM, and the
Congressional adjustments to the fiscal years under consideration in that
realm. Another update is made in January, to reflect decisions made in the
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interim, including those emerging from the joint review of the Military
Department/Defense Agency budget submissions by OSD and the Office of
Management and Budget. This means that the baseline is indeed subject to
shifting, requiring 5PP developers to maintain flexibility.
The excessive optimism on the part of the various "petitioners"
lodging requests against OP-Ol's resources is but one of several perennial
truths about 5PP development. Another is the near complete failure of any
petitioner to identify offsets from within the area of resources involved in
his particular jurisdiction. The guidance that specifically mandates offsets
is abundance--not just the annual POM Serials from OP-90 and the
P0M6RAMS from OP- 12, but standing instructions from the CNO himself.
The early stages of POM development continuously occur in an atmosphere of
hopefulness (and/or political gamesmanship): the prevailing philosophy
appears to be, "They can't say 'yes* unless we ask." Everyone asks,
attempting to justify his request as being, if not vital to the future
operational capability of the Navy, certainly highly enhancing thereof.
Like the majority of resource allocation activities in the public
sector, OP-Ol's 5PP development is done under fairly strict resource
constraints. The substantial increases to programmed resource levels that
occurred in the first year of the Reagan Administration (the POM-83 cycle)
left a legacy of outyear resource levels that are far out of synchrony with
Congressional action on the budget submissions of Fiscal Year 1983 and
subsequent years. If POM-83 might be thought of as Christmas morning for
DoD resource managers, the POM cycles following have been in the nature of
New Year's morning for many, who have had annual iterations of struggling
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to revise POM-83 levels [downward!] to match actual authorization and
appropriation levels. Most Navy Resource Sponsors fall into that category.
Reality notwithstanding, the rank and file of POM petitioners regard
each new cycle as a springtime-like period of new growth, bringing
increases to the Resource Sponsors' controls—and hence the promise of
increases for everyone's programs. Although OP-Ol has enjoyed modest
annual increases to his FYDP controls (making him the envy of many of his
colleagues, who have been forced to absorb numerous annual cutbacks),
those increases have been insignificant relative to the volume of resource
increases requested by his various petitioners. In many instances, the
increases have been more "paper puffery" than real, resulting from revisions
to inflation indices or repricing of various appropriations.
In practical terms, this has typically meant that the overwhelming
majority of resource adjustment requests receive no serious consideration.
The obvious question might emerge: given repeated instances of non-
success, why do essentially the same "petitioners" continue to submit their
proposed resource adjustments? The answers may be as true within the
Navy environment as within any other sector of government (or, for that
matter, private enterprise): it makes sense, politically. Resource
allocation constitutes a concrete statement of policy. Therefore, resource
requesting constitutes a viable political tactic for the savvy manager in any
organization.
The political underpinnings of resource decision-making are not, unto
themselves, the focus of this discussion.9 More to the point are questions
9Although a candid study of political gamesmanship within the Navy
organization would make fascinating reading, were it possible to compile!
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of how, given the magnitude of resource requests received, does OP-O!
determine which are valid, and—most importantly!—which he will cover in
his Sponsor Program Proposal. The next section of this chapter will
attempt to answer those questions by examining what actually occurred in
developing the POM-87 5PP.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE POM-87 SPONSOR PROGRAM PROPOSAL
The foregoing sections of this chapter have set the stage for the event
of interest: a recounting of what actually occurred in putting together the
OP-Ol Sponsor Program Proposal during the POM-87 cycle. Albeit important
innovations had been instituted that year, many of the perennial attributes
of SPP development applied.
In addition, certain events that had not been anticipated, and which were
not documented in the formally published memoranda that constitute the
principal primary-source history of POM-87 events, had an incalculable 10
impact on the ultimate outcome of POM-86 as it affected the OP-Ol
resource line. These events will be incorporated in the discussion of the
various events involved in SPP development.
The conceptualization of SPP development depicted in Figure 3-3 is the
orientation for the following discussion of SPP development events. Figure
3-4 focuses on the events prior to submission of the SPP to OP-90, or, the
period between September and March.
To recapitulate that conceptual view of SPP construction, the
process is seen as the submission of various "petitions" requesting
^Incalculable to the extent that there is no effective way of assessing





































Figure 3-4. How OP-01 Structures His SPP
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revisions to the existing array of OP-OI's resources (as contained, initially,
in the October update to the Five-Year Defense Program; to be adjusted
during the course of 5PP development by the January FYDP update). Some
petitions carry more weight than others, in terms of the force they convey
to command compliance.
The period during which these various petitions are received, analyzed,
considered, and determined is fairly compressed. Following the schedule
laid out by the Navy's central POM coordination office, 11 the POM
development phase occupies the months between August through mid-May.
5PP development for each Resource Sponsor must be effectively complete by
the imposed deadline for submission of his SPP to 0P-90--usually the first
week in March. The remaining weeks constitute the so-called "end-game,"
during which the Resource Sponsors are essentially in a response mode;
their basic work has been done, and they are primarily concerned with
defending their SPP's during the various reviews involved in crafting the
consolidated Navy POM from the 14 individual Resource Sponsor "mini-
POM's."
One important clue to the general nature of POM development in general
has already been introduced: the absolute need for flexibility . The
overlapping phases of the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System, together with vagaries of the Congressional budget process, has
created a situation in which decisions are being made concurrently on
several different years of Navy resources, with each year the focus of
deliberation at different levels. The decisions made on earlier years may
1 ] Refer to Chapter 2, Section B.5
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profoundly impact the resource situations of future years. As too many
grassroots-level PPB5 players may tend to overlook, the year of primary
importance to themselves may, in fact, be several years in the future of
decisions not yet made.
The nature of PPB5 dictates that the first important resource decisions
in the programming phase are made three to ten years before their
execution—and 24 or more months before Congressional authorization and
appropriation determines the final numbers. The OPNAV staff member
involved in POM activities lives in a somewhat disoriented world. He or she
comes to work in August of 1984 with a perspective oriented to Fiscal Year
1987 and the four years beyond (the period under consideration in POM-87);
POM-86 (and all previous cycles) are, thankfully, a drill of the past—even
though the fiscal years actually involved are still in the real-time future
(August 1984 is still in Fiscal Year 1984— or, to the person whose job may
be primarily- involved in POM activities, "three POM's ago"). Meanwhile, the
real-time uncertainties have yet to be resolved.; the final all-important
Congressional decisions resources of two fiscal years preceding the POM-87
baseline have yet to be made. Too often, offices primarily involved in the
programming phase of PPB5 forget that they must function in at least two
"realities"—"POM time" versus "real-time." When they overlook that fact,
they may tend to forget that what is happening in the real time of
Congressional decisions will have a genuine effect on what can happen in
POM time. The same applies to POM vis-a-vis the joint 05D/0MB review of
the Military Department/Defense Agency budgets prior to final ization of the
President's Budget in January.
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Another truism of POM development— and hence, of 5PP development— is
the relatively short period during which the real decisions will be made .
Although the formally issued guidance continually professes that the
programming phase of PPB5 occupies the months between August and
September (with an overlap into the budgeting phase), in OP-Ol, the serious
concentration on 5PP development does not typically begin until publication
of OP-90's first POM Serial. In the POM-87 cycle, this did not occur until
the last week of September 1984.
In terms of 5PP development, the most important guidance issued by
OP- 12 is the "data call"— the formal invitation to submit resource
adjustment requests. In the POM-87 cycle, this was not published until
December 4, 1984. Given the fact that the OP-01 Sponsor Program Proposal
was scheduled for submission to OP-90 on March 1 , 1 985, this left less than
three months to:
• Receive all adjustment requests;
• Verify them for accuracy (Were the adjustments in fact applicable to
OP-Oi's resource line and not some other? Were the appropriations
requested the "right" appropriations? Were the data labels, such as
Program Element Code, accurate?)
• Complete the mechanical chores associated with data processing; and
• Analyze them for validity; weigh them against all other requests as
well as programs in the existing base; assess them relative to guidance
received from higher levels; and make a final determination as to
whether they should be included in the 5PP.
In short, a great deal of mechanical and analytic effort is involved in the
construction of a major proposal to realign a resource array. When the
resource base in question is in excess of $5 billion and 600 thousand units
of manpower, the implicit effort must be considered to be of non-negligible
magnitude, to put it mildly! The only conclusion that can be drawn is that
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resource decisions are made, of necessity, under an extremely compressed
schedule. By further implication, therefore, the number of people who can
possibly be effective players is reduced, as is the amount of "analysis."
The quotes surrounding the last term are meant to underscore the
enormously subjective connotation of the term. Despite the textbook
discussions of PPB5, which might lead the uninitiated to believe that every
resource decision emerging from DoD is founded on "objective" and/or
"quantitative" analysis, the examination of 5PP development in OP-OI
unturned no documented procedures for such examination— or of any
uniformly applicable standards for such examination. In short, "analysis" is
a term very much in the mind of the beholder, so to speak. It is what the
person doing it (or receiving it) wants it to be—or has said that it is. The
procedures and criteria used against one resource adjustment request may
or may not be the same as those used in any other circumstance.
Equally important is the absence of anv stated requirement for analysis
guiding the development of OP-Ol's 5PP for the POM-86 cycle.
The preceding caveats having been laid forth, the remainder of this
section will describe the activities of OP-Ol's development of SPP-86, in
terms of the illustration in Figure 3-4
1. CNQ Programming Analysis Memoranda: The "CPAM's"
The preceding chapter introduced the CPAM, as defined in OP-90's
POM Serial 87-1. That document briefly described the CPAM in general as
"... a fiscally constrained and issue/capabilities oriented overview of the
FYDP as reflected in the October update and as modified by 05D/0MB
decisions. CPAMs will focus attention on policy and programmatic issues."
The first POM Serial of the POM-87 cycle stipulated five separate CPAM's—
Maritime Strategy; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Readiness and
Sustainability; Resources (a general, overview-oriented look at projected
Navy resource levels, versus an examination of a broad warfare or support
area); and Research, Development and Acquisition. [Ref. 15: p. 3]
The CPAM of obvious interest to the OP-01 Resource Line would be
the one involving Manpower, Personnel, and Training matters.
The office assigned primary responsibility for creating the
Manpower, Personnel, and Training CPAM was OP-91 , the Program Resource
Appraisal Division
,
a subdivision of the OP-090 organization. Interestingly,
OP-01 had been assigned lead responsbility for preparing this document,
until the POM-85 cycle. 12 Since then, OP-01 has been assigned a consulting
role, on an as-required basis.
The real purpose of the CPAM is not revealed in POM Serial 87- 1 . A
subsequent serial offers a better indication: "'The CPAMs . . . will provide
the analytical basis for CNO decisions on programing resources."
[Ref. 20: p. 1]
The depiction in Figure 3-4 indicates that the CPAM's constitute a
direct input toOP-01's 5PP development. Depending on interpretation, this
is not strictly the case. A representation perhaps more reflective of actual
events (at least as viewed in retrospect!) would show the CPAM as a direct
input into CNO's Programming and Fiscal Guidance (CPFG). As the figure
12At which point, responsibility was voluntarily relinquished by the
incumbent OP- 12. He informally requested the advice of his staff; their
response was that (in effect) the CPAM involved more work on the part of
the OP-01 organization than it represented in worthwhile impact on
decisions. The author was in the room at the time OP- 12 asked the
question and received the response; within a day, he had called the
incumbent OP-90 to inform him that OP-01 "had no objection" to
relinquishing the lead role.
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does accurately depict, the latter "petition" constitutes a mandatory "do-it."
To be sure, the best way to guarantee that a provision of a CPAM is
incorporated in a Resource Sponsor's submission is to have it dictated by
CPF6. The CPAM's are typically accorded what has become the exception in
POM-development presentations: they are delivered to the CNO Executive
Board. 13 This direct (and formal) communication to the CNO and his
corporate review board might enhance the the chances of particular CPAM
recommendations being included in CPFG.
However, since that particular collection of "do-its " is typically
not published until a few weeks (or, not infrequently, a few days ) prior to
the date SPP's are due in OP-90, the CPAM may be realistically portrayed as
a recommended adjustment to OP-0 1 's 5PP. Resource Sponsors receive
copies of the CPAM's as they are presented to the CNO; thus, there should be
no surprises should any provisions appear in the CPFG.
The Manpower, Personnel, and Training CPAM was delivered to the
CNO Executive Board in December 1984 As is typical of the genre, this
particular CPAM dealt with issues from a fairly broad vantage. That is, the
Navy's manpower, personnel, and training needs were seen in terms of
Navywide requirements, rather than in terms of the implications for
specific Resource Sponsors. However, two of the issues addressed in the
POM-86 CPAM applied directly to the OP-Ol Resource Sponsorship:
recruiting and Reserve bonuses. Because OP-Ol is the sole owner of all
resources associated with recruiting active-force personnel, any discussion
of the Navy's overall recruiting needs would obviously imply action by one
13 Refer to the discussion in Chapter 2, Section B.4.
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Resource Sponsor. By the same token, OP-01 was designated responsible for
a collection of bonus payments aimed toward attracting and retaining non-
active-duty Reservists (the drilling and otherwise rnobilizable members of
the Naval Reserve). Thus, the CPAM provided early (and accurate) warning of
what was to come with the publication of CPFG two months later: what CNO
heard in December convinced him to write it into the formal guidance he
issues in February.
This brings up a salient point. What convinces the CNO to
incorporate a given item in CPFG? Or, as the case may (more often!) be, not
to include it? The real knowledge of the basis for that admiral's various
decisions is limited to a select few. Some obvious clues present
themselves, however. For instance, if the Secretary of the Navy has
professed strong endorsement of particular programs, it would not be
unexpected for the CNO to lend his formal support, as well. M
An actual example might illustrate the point. An abiding interest of
the incumbent Secretary of the Navy has been an expansion of the role
accorded to the Navy's Reserve Component. His interest has been
accompanied by considerable attention and support from various
Congressional personages and committees. It was, therefore, far from
unexpected to anticipate that the CNO's Executive Board would be a
receptive audience to Reserve-related issues—and to see specific guidance
^No published study has been conducted in this regard; it would indeed
be interesting to examine the various routes to CPFG inclusion (and hence
accommodation in the Navy POM) in terms of which avenues have proven to
be the best bets. Informally exchanged knowledge may well have satisfied
this informational gap, but such knowledge is not certainly not documented!
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on Reserve-related issues appear in CNO's formal guidance to his Resource
Sponsors.
The final OP-Ol 5PP did not fail to consider the pertinent
.
recommendations emerging from the CPAM. Although full funding of neither
issue was included in the initial OP-Ol 5PP submission (the Reserve bonus
payments were contingent on legislative approval, and, according to DoD
policy, not specifically covered in either POM or budget), both issues were
given specific attention in 5PP development and in the final briefing of the
5PP to the various review groups. The recruiting enhancement was included
as an "overguidance" item, indicating that OP-Ol considered it to be valid
but "unaffordable" (that is, not of critical enough need to displace other
obligations). The "overguidance" technique is very often used as a tactic to
convince higher authority—usually beginning with OP-90--to increase
previously issued control ceilings; sometimes it works, sometimes not--in
the latter case, the Resource Sponsor will simply be directed to revisit his
original 5PP to accommodate the incremental requirements from within his
previous controls.
2. Warfare Appraisals
Like the CPAJTs, the appraisals are intended to provide an analytical
basis for CNO's programming and fiscal guidance to his Resource Sponsors.
Similarly, Figure 3-4 might offer a more realistic interpretation by showing
appraisals as feeding into the 5PP via CPFG, rather than directly.
However, for the same reason offered for the CPAJTs— the timing of
the CPFG relative to the SPP submission deadline—appraisals are
considered as a source of direct input during the period they are being
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presented to the various review groups (typically all have been delivered
prior to Christmas).
The issue was academic for development of the OP-01 5PP during
the POM-87 cycle, however; none of the nine warfare appraisals included
issues involving OP-01 resources.
3. Baseline Area Appraisal—Reserves
During the 1980's, considerable interest in the use of DoD's Reserve
assets has emanated from various levels. As mentioned above, the
Secretary of the Navy has indicated a strong inclination to increase
resources dedicated to the Navy's Reserve component; similar sentiments
have emerged from various Congressional committees (particularly during
annual appropriations deliberations).
Reflective of such highly placed interest, the area selected for in-
depth investigation during the POM-87 cycle was the Naval Reserve. The
intention of the Baseline Area Appraisal was to examine the Reserve
comprehensively, instead of the typical marginal look accorded to most
resource adjustments during POM development. 15 The Baseline Area
Appraisal was prepared by the Director of Naval Reserve (OP-09R), the
Assessment Sponsor for Reserve matters.
Because the OP-01 resource line includes several programs with
direct Reserve involvement, it was to be anticipated that the Baseline Area
Appraisal would produce several resource adjustment recommendations for
the OP-01 SPP. The expectation failed to materialize; the appraisal
15 ln other years, OP-09R prepared a Baseline Assessment Memorandum,
discussed below.
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included no issues forOP-Ol. The appraisal will be discussed in more detail
in the following chapter, which deals with the Assessment Sponsor role.
4. Baseline Assessments
Unlike the CPAM's and appraisals, the Baseline Assessments are not
formally presented to the CNO or to any of the review groups during POM
development. They are written documents, forwarded directly to the appro-
priate Resource Sponsors (arriving in late November). The intended purpose
of the Baseline Assessment Memoranda (the "BAM's") is cited in OP-90's POM
Serial 87-9:
Assessments provide resource sponsors with rational baseline costs for
realistically projected force levels and inform them of support needs,
both in general and for particular programs. . . . Data developmed for
these assessments are also input to the CNO Program Analysis Memoranda
series, and directly influence the construction of CNO Program and Fiscal
Guidance." LRef. 21: p. 1J
The specific issues to be covered in each of the six BAM's prepared
during the POM-87 cycle were determined by the Assessment Sponsors
responsible for preparing the BAM's. That is, the assessors themselves
decided which issues they would look at.
OP-Ol , as Resource Sponsor, received recommended resource
adjustments from four of the six BAM's:
• Manpower. Personnel, and Training : four issues (simulator operations
and maintenance, technical training equipment, recreation hours and
user fees at OP-Ol bases, and increased funding for operations and
furnishings at Bachelor Officer and Bachelor Enlisted Quarters at OP-Ol
bases).
• Ship Maintenance and Modernization : one issue (reduce funding for
General Purpose Electronic Test Equipment).
• Logistics : one issue (substantial increase in Family Housing
construction).
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• information Systems and Base Communications : two issues (increases
in funding for management information systems and base
communications at OP-01 bases)
The initial OP-0 1 -5PP submission compl ied with four of the eight
individual BAM issues. The 5PP partially covered some of the most
expensive issue, the Family Housing increases, placing the remainder in
"overguidance." As subsequent discussions of post-SPP deliberations will
reveal, the "overguidance" tactic produced results in this case.
The Manpower, Personnel, and Training BAM originated within the
OP-01 organization, under OP-OI's role as Assessment Sponsor (the BAM
was coordinated by the same section in OP- 120 responsible for assembing
the OP-01 5PP). This is among the most clear-cut instances of OP-0 1 *s dual
responsbilities as they pertain to POM development. Three of the four
issues in the OP-01 BAM were incorporated in the OP-01 5PP.
5. Program Manager Input
Following the premise that the OP-01 "Program Managers" should
take the leading role in making initial 5PP development decisions, the
Division Directors; the Assistant DCNO, 0P-01B; the Special Assistant for
Naval Reserve, OP-01R; and the Chief of Chaplains, OP-096 16 became in
essense "mini -Resource Sponsors," each owning his own programs in the OP-
01 resource line and the resources to support them. These individuals were
given a much greater role in the development of POM-87 than they had
previously experienced.
Like their counterparts at the real Resource Sponsor level, the OP-
01 Division Directors were expected to remain within their stated
16For convenience, this group will be referred simply as "the OP-01
Division Directors."
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constraints, and to bear the responsibility for covering resource require-
ments from within their own jurisdictions. That is, OP- 1 i, the "owner" of
the "Genera! Skill Training (C/F Schools)" program, would not allowed to
fund increases to that program from programs owned by OP- 1 3, OP- 1 4,
OP-OIR, etc. OP- 11 implicitly has considerable latitude in making
adjustments from among his own programs, however. Thus, if he genuinely
believes that signficant increases are demanded in General Skill Training,
he can channel the dollars and/or manpower from his "Officer Acquisition,"
""Navy Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps," "Recruit Training," or other
programs. Of course, he must ensure that he is still able to cover the
necessary functional requirements of ail his assigned programs (an
important part of which responsibility is ensuring that the programs remain
executable by the claimants).
The Division Directors, like their Resource Sponsor counterparts at
the higher level, were also given only an overall fiscal constraint, with no
limitations imposed on specific appropriations. 17 That is, if OP- 1 1 might
wish to add Operations and Maintenance dollars to a particular program, he
could offset the increment with Other Procurement, Navy, dollars, so long as
the latter are within his own jurisdiction. [Ref. 18: p. 2]
This flexibility does not extend to the various types of manpower,
however. Since the manpower categories are authorized separately by
Congress, the distinction is maintained throughout consideration at all
levels. That is, separate controls are issued for each type: active-duty
officers (non-Reserve), active-duty enlisted (non-Reserve), Naval Academy
17 A list of Navy appropriations appears in Figure 2-5.
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midshipmen, active-duty Reserve officers, active-duty Reserve enlisted,
and "Selected Reserve" officers and enlisted. 18 For example, active-duty
officers (non-Reserve) may be traded off only among their own type and not
for any other type of military manpower, or civilian. Although civilians are
no longer authorized in specific numbers by Congress, the Department of De-
fense policy imposed a control on the numbers of civilian billets during
development of POM-87.
The Program Managers were also given the responsbility for
determining the level of discretion associated with the resources for each
program. 5ome programs represent a "cost of doing business," so to speak,
and are thus not subject to discretionary adjustment at the Program
Manager level. For example, OP- 1 1 "owns" recruit training. The resources in
that "ownership" include the physical facilities at Recruit Training bases;
the Operations and Maintenance dollars to pay for running those facilities
(including the salaries of the civilian employees); the military manpower
billets for the staff, the instructors, and even for the recruits themselves;
and the Military Personnel, Navy, and Reserve Personnel, Navy, dollars to
compensate that manpower. The level of operations at Recruit Training
installations is largely a function of the number of recruits to be trained
each year. OP-1 1 does not himself make that determination; in effect, he
must respond resource-wise to policy decisions made beyond his control.
In other instances, he may have less or more control over his
programs. This is almost a case-by-case situaton, however, and the
resulting challenge in program and resource balancing is one of the most
18 These are the non-active-duty Reservists, the "weekend warriors" in
drilling units or otherwise in mobilizable status.
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important aspects of 5PP development at every level (and, subsequently, of
final POM development after the individual 5PPs are submitted to OP-90).
The major point to be made about the role played by Program
Manager's in the development of OP-Ol's 5PP during the POM-87 cycle is
that they were considered the front-line of resource decision-making, in
this respect, they in many cases displaced previously established
relationships 1 inking claimants directly to OP- 1 2 and his staff.
An important symbolic change underscored this shift in the POM-87
cycle. Perhaps one of the most effective techniques employed during
previous OP-Ol 5PP development cycles was something called the "sales
pitch." The "sales pitches" were informal face-to-face sessions between
various "petitioners" and OP- 12, convened after the initial submission of
resource adjustment request and before serious final development. The
"pitcher" was usually of comparable rank to the rear admiral OP- 12
incumbent; each officer was accompanied by a few staff members, to
maximize the informality of the atmosphere. In such surroundings, resource
requesters could conceivably exert greater influence on OP- 12 (and his
staff) that might be conveyed in the abstracted paper forms that
constituted the "formal" input.
Routine sales-pitch presenters of earlier POM cycles included the
Commander of the Naval Military Personnel Command and his subclaimant,
the Commander of the Naval Recruiting Command. In POM-87, sales pitches
were restricted to Program Managers. CNMPC and CNRC were not invited,




The OP-90 POM guidance provided for an additional medium for
claimants to register their requests: the Claimant Input introduced in the
preceding chapter. The Claimant Input via OP-90 allowed a claimant to "go
public" with his request, thereby enhancing his ability to give his issues
visibility if not guaranteeing their favorable resolution. Resource Sponsors
were required to publicly acknowledge the receipt of a claimant request
sent in this manner, and to relate the ultimate disposition of the request--
including justification for denial. Two important limitations applied to
claimant input sent via this route: claimants were limited to five issues
per Resource Sponsor (with priority specified), and they were required to
identify offsets for any requests involving resources above the FYDP level.
Claimants with resources in the OP-01 line thus had two avenues to
make their requests: directly and indirectly. The latter method can be seen
as having some advantage if the claimant and Resource Sponsor do not enjoy
a close rapport, in that the OP-90 "Honest Broker" will be made a player in
the transaction. However, the "broker" title is misapplied in this particular
case, because OP-90 typically made no referee-type decisions in
claimant/Resource Sponsor disputes (at least not openly). 19
On the other hand, submission via OP-90 might be seen as
jeopardizing a good claimant/Resource Sponsor relationship. In effect, the
claimant is almost putting the Resource Sponsor on report by going out of
house with his requests. At least one important OP-OI claimant perceived
the situation in this light for several years. The Commander of the Naval
190P-90 staff did occasionally arbitrate disputes over which Resource
Sponsor had responsibility for a particular initiative.
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Military Personnel Command, one of the three clairnancies involving the
lion's share of OP-Ol resources, traditionally opted to forego Claimant Input
via OP-90. His rationale was that since he directly reported to OP-Ol (in
the latter's role as Chief of Naval Personnel; refer to Figure 3-1 ), there was
no need to put his dealings with his own boss into external limelight. The
previously close relationship between the action-officer level POM
participants in NMPC and OP- 120 may have been a factor, as well.
Does the decision to file Claimant Input via OP-90 materially affect
the outcome of a claimant's request? No conclusive evidence has "been
gathered to indicate that it either helps the claimant's cause or hurts it. !n
the OP-01 5PP development experience, claimant requests were typically
judged on their own merits or—most often!—on the basis of affordability.
The constraints imposed on the resource levels precluded virtually all but
mandatory resource increases. Should a claimant offer offsets from within
his own jurisdiction (that is, in effect merely ask for a reprogramming of
existing resources), OP-01 had typically allowed it with little or no
discussion.
The stated "mandatory offset" requirement in both OP-90 and OP-01
guidance for resource adjustments involving resources above the existing
FYDP levels undoutedly stands as the most ignored direction in POM
development. Most claimants disregarded the edict on the basis that what
they were requesting was as absolutely vital as everything else in their
existing program bases. Claimants are not alone in this ploy.
The number of POM-87 resource adjustment requests claimants sent
directly to OP-01 is not known. The final submission into the computerized
format used for the 5PP development data base lists only the actual
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submitter; many requests originated in a claimancy bear the codes of the
OP-Ol Program Manager who reviewed thern.
Six claimants routed input via OP-90. The requests of three of
them— the Fleet Commanders in Chief— followed a typical pattern: military
manpower was the principal resource requested, to increment existing
levels at PA55 (the Navywide Personnel Administration Support System)
offices. PASS military manpower had been reduced during the previous
year's POM development, in response to a a general eduction in military
manpower. The Fleet CINC's lost their bid to recoup those losses in POM-87.
Other issues from the Fleet CINC's involving civilian manpower
increases were also rejected. One issue sent to OP-Ol demonstrates an
advantage of the OP-90 Claimant Input option: ascertaining the right
Resource Sponsor "ownership" of a given initiative. The Commander in Chief
of the Pacific Fleet wanted OP-Ol to provide manpower to support the Naval
Wargaming System. OP-Ol respectfully declined, on the proper basis that
the Wargaming System "belonged" to another Resource Sponsor.
Notably, the OP-90 guidance specifies that non-ownership is not,
unto itself, a defensible grounds for rejecting claimant requests. The
formal procedures governing Claimant Input via OP-90 clearly state that
potential disputes over ownership are to be resolved prior to submission of
SPP's. Since the Claimant Input is due in OP-90 by the end of November,
there is adequate time to identify such discrepancies.
The other three claimants filing Claimant Input via OP-90 represent
all but one of the major claimancies supported by OP-Ol resources. The
exception was the Commander of the Naval Military Personnel Command
(CNMPC), who chose to remain in-house with his SPP requests.
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If CNMPC constitutes one of OP-OI's three most important
claimancies, the other two would be CNO (0P-09BF) and the Chief of Naval
Education and Training (CNET). Each of these two filed input via OP-90, as
did the Commander of Naval Reserve Forces (COMNAVRESFOR).
The CNO claimancy (OP-09BF) has in its jurisdictions three highly
visible institutions: the Naval War College, the Naval Postgraduate School,
and the Naval Academy. As a rule, 0P-09BF includes something for each in
the "top-five" issues allowed by OP-90. In POM-87, the Naval Postgraduate
School requested increments of about $2 million for each year of the 5-year
POM period, to upgrade outdated laboratory facilities at the school. The
issue was submitted as the CNO claimancy's No. 1 priority. Acknowledging
the validity of the request (and the fact that it had been supported by the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations), OP-Ol placed the request in "overguidance."
The same tactic was employed for the No. 3 issue, which requested $ 1
million in Fiscal Year 1987 to upgrade computer facilities at the Naval
Academy. The CNO No. 2 and No. 4 issues involved considerably lesser
amounts and hence were accommodated ("ADP/Security Support" at the
Postgraduate School and a small expansion of the Naval War College's Off-
Campus program in Washington, DC. Only the No. 5 issue (additional civilian
manpower at the Consolidated Civilian Personnel Office in Washington) was
totally rejected, on the grounds that it was not justified on cost-
effectiveness or readiness improvement.
The foregoing details of how OP-Ol responded to some of the
Claimant Input via OP-90 illustrate the general method OP-used with all
submissions. If the issue involved a high dollar amount with high visibility,
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it was placed in "overguidance." If relatively minor resource levels were
involved, an effort was made to accommodate the request.
It bears reiterating that the treatment of Claimant Input cycled via
OP-90 was a mandatory item to he addressed in the formal presentation of
SPP's to the Program Development Review and Program Review Committees.
On paper, OP-01 came across very favorably.
It is also notable that each Resource Sponsor must respond directly
to the claimants who submit input via this route (since claimants are not
represented in the Navy Department POM review groups). In short, Claimant
Input has received considerable procedural attention from OP-90 in recent
cycles. This should not be construed to mean that claimants now enjoy a
more effective role in POM development, but they certainly can avail
themselves of a more visible one.
7. Department of the Navy Consolidated Planning and Programming
Guidance.
The six types of "petitions" just described represent, initially,
recommendations rather than mandatory guidance.20 They are submitted
(and/or presented) during the early stage of POM development, the "program
planning" period between August and January. In POM-87, the first formal
guidance of a truly mandatory nature was the DoN Consolidated Planning and
Programming Guidance (DNCPPG). Originally scheduled for publication in
20To be sure, sometimes a resource adjustment request supports a
verifiable "cost-of-doing" business or other so-called "fact-of-life"
adjustment. However, the petitioners filing such requests are not, initially,
in a position to command compliance. In the event that the Resource
Sponsor would fail to cover a genuine fact-of-life adjustment, the
petitioner can try to persuade higher authority to direct accommodation.
One obvious ploy is to get the issue into the CNO's Program and Fiscal
Guidance.
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October, the DNCPPG represented a consolidated version of what had been in
previous cycles two guidance documents— one issued by the CNO and the
other issued by the Secretary of the Navy.
The actual publication of DNCPPG did not occur until Christmas Eve.
Signed personally by the secretary of the Navy, DNCPPG was classified
SECRET, thereby precluding specific discussion of its contents. It is
sufficient for this discussion to note that it was broad in its guidance,
viewing the Navy in macro rather than in terms of specific Resource Sponsor
obligations.
Although DNCPPG did not impose fiscal controls, one important bit
of guidance was pertinent for every Resource Sponsor as he entered the
final stage of SPP development: active-duty manpower (non-Reserve) was
not to exceed the existing FYDP levels. In short, no additional manpower
would be forthcoming, and any Resource Sponsor wishing to add active-duty
'
manpower to his programs would have to offset the increments from within
his existing base— or convince higher authority to raise his control (at the
expense of another Resource Sponsor).
8. Defense Guidance
The prevailing programmatic guidance issued at the Department of
the Navy level is parallel to its counterpart emanating from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, in that both deal in broad terms, addressing most
of their specific direction no further than one hierarchical level downward.
That is, the DNCPPG was directed primarily at the two Service Chiefs who
report to the Secretary of the Navy. Similarly, Defense Guidance is aimed
primarily at the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors
of the Defense Agencies.
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The significance to lower occupants in the DoD POM development
structure is that neither document will usually address a specific
programmatic action. 21 Thus, Defense Guidance will provide an individual
Resource Sponsors with an idea of the general direction that POM
development will take (in the latter 1980's, the direction has been a
reversal of the more expansive controls of the first Reagan Administration).
However, the individual Resource Sponsor can rarely expect specific
programmatic actions. The real significance of Defense Guidance to him is
the impact it may have on the development of the Navy POM overall. For
example, if Defense Guidance limits the Military Department to existing
levels in either manpower or fiscal resources, the message to the Resource
Sponsor should be obvious.
This was the case forOP-Ol during the POM-87 cycle, with regard
to Defense Guidance.22 Not only was the guidance it contained directed at
least two levels above the individual Resource Sponsor level, it was not
published until April—well after the submission of the OP-Ol 5PP to OP-90.
Nonetheless, the representation depicted in Figure 3-4 remains
valid: Defense Guidance, like Department of the Navy Consolidated Planning
and Programming Guidance, constitutes mandatory direction to lower levels.
The individual Sponsors must follow the broad guidance that may apply; in
21 An exception to this might be specific guidance to add a particular
weapon system or type of weapon system. The Navy's Resource Sponsorship
arrangement has made the assignment of resources on this broad a scale
fairly clear cut.
22Like its Department of the Navy counterpart, Defense Guidance carries
a security classification of SECRET, precluding specific discussion of its
content.
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the unusual (for OP-0 1 ) instance that specific guidance is included, there is
no question as to to compliance. 23
9. CNO's Program and Fiscal Guidance
If the Defense Guidance and DoN Consolidated Planning and Program
Guidance represent too broad a scope to be of specific use in constructing an
individual SPP, that gap is certainly more than filled by CNO's instructions
to his Resource Sponsors. Scheduled for publication mid-February, CNO*s
Programming and Fiscal Guidance constitutes the most detailed list of
concrete instructions for the final stages of 5PP development in the 14
Resource Sponsorships.
Some of the inputs designed to influence the content of CPFG have
already been described—specifically, the CNO Programming Analysis
Memoranda (CPAM's), the warfare appraisals, and the Baseline Area
Appraisals. Another mode not yet discussed is the Program Issues Summary .
Presented in early January, the Program Issues Summary compiles the "top-
five" priori ities submitted by each Resource Sponsor; this is the formal
opportunity for the Resource Sponsors to unveil their own concerns— and to
let their peers know what they're doing in 5PP development.
Significantly, OP-01 typically used his Program Issues Summary
input to advance his concerns both as Resource and his Assessment Sponsor.
23Defense Guidance issued during the POM-85 cycle did include a small-
scale item that constituted specific guidance for the OP-01 5PP, in the
form of direction to augment funding to the Defense Activities Non-
Traditional Education Services program. This joint program assigned to the
the Navy as Executive Agent (and to OP-01 as Resource Sponsor). That event
was the exception, rather than the rule of Defense Guidance vis-a-vis
individual Resource Sponsors, however.
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Given the fact that there are fourteen Resource Sponsorships, and
that each was alloted five issues, it is improbable for a Sponsor to hope
that all— or even most—of his parochial interests would be incorporated in
the CPFG. Nonetheless, Resource Sponsors do respond. The value may be as
much in publicizing their own problems as in trying to persuade specific
direction from the CNO. In many instances, response to the Program Issues
Summary may constitute one more tactic in a canny Resource Sponsor's
strategy to secure a favored position during the all important decision-
making finale of POM development, the "end game'* after SPP's are submitted
to OP-90.
Earlier discussions of the CPAM's introduced the conjecture
concerning how the CNO decides what the content of CPFG should be. It
would not be understating the fact to say that CPFG constitutes the
guidance most awaited by Resource Sponsors— it is without doubt the most
detailed and the most concrete programming direction they will have
received at that point in the cycle. It bears repeating that the Resource
Sponsors are all direct subordinates of the CNO. That is to say, they are
unlikely to overtly defy what amounts to a direct order from the boss.24
CPFG is a highly visible document. That is, not only has each
Resource Sponsor probably received specific direction from the CNO, all
other major PON players are aware of that direction. Each Resource Sponsor
must account for CPFG "do-it's" when presenting his SPP. Failure to comply
24At least not publicly; no public record is available of face-to-face
disagreements that may transpire between the CNO and the Vice Admirals
who are his Deputies and the Directors of his Major Staff Offices.
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can only be considered acceptable under the most extenuating of
circumstances--and when supported with convincing justification.
Seen in another light, the CPF6 offers the risk-taking (and/or
politically astute) Resource Sponsor another potential tool for increasing
his resource controls. If he can muster the confidence to publicly admit
non-compliance and successfully defend his decision, he may well benefit.
The expression "going for broke" seems to apply. Should he lose his gamble,
he will not only be in the position of having to absorb whatever incremental
funding obligations for which he was probably trying to seek relief, his loss
will have occurred before his peers—and, in effect, the entire OPNAV
organization.
CPFG for POM-87 included numerous items of specific guidance for
the final development of the OP-Ol SPP, gleaned from a variety of inputs. In
his SPP presentation, OP-Ol categorized nine CPFG items as "key
direction/guidelines." [Ref. 22]
Some of these directives overlapped with issues received via other
avenues. For example, the Manpower, Personnel, and Training CPAM item
concerning bonus payments for Naval Reservists successfully transitioned
into CNO's formal guidance document. The same was true of the direction
concerning increased funding for recruiting and advertising.
Other CPFG instructions had not previously surfaced in the formal
appraisal/CPAM process. Reconstruction of the events of POM-87 cycle over
a year later did not readi ly reveal the documented origins of al 1 OP-0 1 's
CPFG "do- it's."
Of greater significance than the origin of specific guidance items is
how OP-0 1 responded.
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Interestingly, he opted to play the risk-taker role on some
directives—specifically, the direction to increment resources supporting
recruiting and advertising. In the judgment of OP-Ol, a program meeting the
guidance of the CNO would require additional military manpower—which
was not accomodated in his 5PP save as "overguidance."
In terms of resource controls, CPFG numbers represented modest
increases in every category. For example, fiscal resources for Fiscal Year
1987 were increased from $5,227 billion to $5,265. Although the increase
may seem almost neglible, given the fact that POM-86 and POM-87 had each
been "decrement" POM's (that is, producing net reductions to previously
approved baseline levels, as documented in the FYDP), the fact of the
increase may more important than the amount. One conclusion is that it
testifies to OP-Ol's skills (and those of his staff) in resource
gamesmanship.
Similar increments were accorded to every manpower category. For
the Navy at large, with the exception of Reserve manpower, POM-87
represented a non-growth iteration, relative to previously approved levels.
One will recall the provision of Defense Guidance that held the Military
Departments to FYDP levels with regard to manpower.
In only one category did OP-01*s 5PP exceed the CPFG control: the
full-time active-duty Reservists.25 The increase was to support a resource
request received from the Commander of the Naval Reserve Forces
claimancy. Given the highly receptive atmosphere for expansion of Reserve
capabilities that characterized Defense resource allocation during the
250ff icially designated as "TAR's," an acronym for "Training and
Administration, Reserves."
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!980's, and the support Reserve initiatives enjoyed at the 5ECNAV level,
OP-Ol's single instance of defying a CPFG manpower control may have been
a political tactic. To be sure, later in his 5PP presentation, he was able to
assert that a "Claimant Issue" had been properly covered.
The foregoing represent only some of the significant resource
adjustments included in OP-Ol's POM-87 5PP. The intent of the discussion
in this section was to give an idea of the forces contributing to 5PP
development. Although many (arguable, most) of the real resource decisions
occur before the 5PP is forwarded upward, to be consolidated into the "Navy
POM," the period between the March submission date and the deadline for
submitting the Navy POM to 05D represents another important series of
milestones for each Resource Sponsor. The last section of this chapter will
explore what transpired during the "end-game" of the POM-87 cycle, with
emphasis on how events affected the OP-Ol Resource Sponsorship.
D. POM-87 "END-GAME": WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OP-0 1 SPP
The "end-game" is that two and one-half months between the early
March submission of individual Resource Sponsor Program Proposals to OP-
90 and the mid-May submission of the consolidated Department of the Navy
POM to OSD. According to the formally prescribed process, events would
follow the conceptualized portrayal in Figure 3-5.
In theory, the 14 individual SPP's are collected by OP-90 and
experimentally applied them against the existing FYDP data base to give
high-level managers an idea of what the SPP's would do to the overall Navy
resource line. Concurrently, the SPP's are presented orally, first to the
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Figure 3-5. The "End-Game" Process
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Dy OP-9C0, then to the three-star-level Program Review Committee (chaired
by OP-90's boss, OP-090).
Meanwhile, the Assessment Sponsors are also reviewing the individual
SPP's for compliance with the recommendations in the Baseline Assessment
Memoranda and other items deemed important to a particular assessment
area. The stated purpose of the Post-5PP Assessments was laid forth in
initial POM guidance issued by OP-90:
These assessments will analyze the degree to which POM funding meets
the CPFG and achieves the required balance between and among each of
the elements necessary for overall POM-87 balance. IRef. 15: p. 10J
The results of those reviews used to be presented to the PDRC and PRC
groups; in the POM-87 cycle, the decision was made to produce the Post-SPP
Assessments as written documents, forwarded directly to the Resource
Sponsors. [Ref. 23: in full]
In prescribed practice, the outcomes of the SPP presentations ana" Post-
SPP Assessments are a series of revisions directed toward each SPP. The
document via which change is directed has traditionally been the "ZOW"
memorandum introduced in Chapter 2. Typically signed by OP-90 (or, in
certain circumstances, OP-090), the "ZOW" constituted a non-negotiable
directive to the Resource Sponsor. It represented, in most cases, the final
imprimature of the CNO on the Resource Sponsor's POM adjustments to the
FYDP. The final result of the ZOW process was a consolidated Navy POM, in
balance with regard to program priorities and within prescribed controls.
The 14 Resource Sponsor "mini-POM's were thus consolidated into the Navy
POM, a product which the CNO could endorse as his own.
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The remaining hurdle within the Navy Department would be the Office of
the Secretary of the Navy--as embodied in the Secretary's corporate review
body, the DoN Program Strategy Board. 26
However, the experience of the 1980's had created a pattern of sorts, in
which the documented procedures prescribed for any Navy POM cycle were
typically derailed at some point during the final development stage. A
prevailing theme was the personal injection of the Secretary himself into
the process—occurring earlier in the "end-game" every year since his
assuming office in 1981 (that is, during finalization of POM-83). In his
first year in office, the new Secretary of the Navy held back until April
before taking the dominant role in final POM balancing decisions. He took
that initiative a bit earlier in the cycle in each succeeding year (by POM-86,
the routine whereby each Resource Sponsor would orally present his SPP be-
fore a predictable pair of review groups— the PDRC, followed by the PRO-
was interrupted midway through the roster of Resource Sponsors; that year,
only half of the SPP's followed the prescribed journey through the formal
review process).
During the development of POM-87 an event took place that differed
from any that had shaped previous POM cycles. In February, the person
occupying the OP-90 billet died.27 Although hospitalized for a serious
illness the previous year, he had resumed his duties as OP-90, presumably
with every expectation of completing the cycle. His death created a
26Refer to Chapter 2 (Section B.4.d.) for a description of the DP5B.
27Charles 0. Prindle (Rear Admiral, United States Navy); he had been in
the OP-90 billet for about two years at the time of his death. During the
previous year, he had experienced severe health problems (including major
surgery), which he had presumably overcome to resume his duties full-time.
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situation never discussed in the formal guidance routinely issued during the
annua! POM cycles.
Coming at the height of POM development activity in the Navy, the
sudden vacancy in the job having primary responsibilty for coordinating the
final POM product resulted in significant departures from the procedures as
prescribed for the POM-87 cycle. For one thing, a replacement had to be
instated, and quickly, if OSD's deadline for POM submission was to be met.
In a move that in retrospect seems based on the logic of related experience
coupled with geographic proximity, the flag officer occupying the billet of
OP-60 was tagged to carry out OP-90 responsibilities during the remaining
weeks of "end-game," to bring the Navy POM to fruition. That individual was
subsequently ordered to serve as the Director of the Office of Program
Appraisal.28
In practical terms, this situation created several departures from the
schedule of events previously laid out for post-5PP activity. As one
revision, the SPP's were no longer scheduled for presentation to both PDRC
and PRC groups. Instead, the DoN Program Strategy Review Board assumed
the complete lead in final POM balancing and decision-making. The "ZOW"
process was halted after only a few issuances, to be pre-empted by
memoranda issued from the DP5B sessions.
Instead of reviewing Resource Sponsor Program Proposals on an
individual basis, followed by the assessments of those proposals by the
designated Assessment Sponsors29 , the DP5B reviewed the Navy POM in
28Refer to Chapter 2 for a description of this office and its significance.
29That is, following the pattern of previous "end-game" phases.
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terms of five broadly based task areas. [Ref. 24 in full]. A schedule of six
presentations was issued on March 6, with the first five sessions covering
the areas defined as "Air Warfare/Electronic Warfare"; "Surface
Warfare/Medical"; "Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation/Command,
Control, and Communications'" and "Manpower, Personnel and
Training/Logistics." The sixth and final session was advertised under the
caption, "Wrap-Up."
By implication, the DP5B sessions would treat proposed POM
adjustments at a very macro level. The official guidance for the DP5B
briefings promised that "The 5PP's and 5PP briefing material . . . will
form the basis for the first six DPSBs." [Ref. 24 p. 1 ] That promise
notwithstanding, the "end-game" of the POM-87 cycle represented a
significant compression of the iterative reviews of previous cycles.
More to the point, the POM-87 end-game represented a significant
change from previous cycles in that not only were fewer total hours
available for Resource (and other) Sponsors to prosecute their cases before
higher authority, but that not all Resource (and other) Sponsors were able to
have their day or days in court . Elevation of the final decision-making to
the DP5B level reduced the programmatic presentations to a total of five.
Although many of the 1 3 Resource Sponsors had been able to present their
SPP's before the system was diverted, many others were not. In short, the
final presentations, the basis for the ultimate decisions on the Navy's POM-
87 submission, were not made according to the established Sponsorship
delineations. Instead, the DP5B briefings were to be handled by "a flag
representative of the responsible OPNAV component." [Ref. 24 p. 1}
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In the case of OP-Ol, this worked out fairly well, allowing him to take
advantage of his multiple roles as Resource and Assessment Sponsor, and as
the CNO's primary advisor on Manpower, Personnel, and Training in general
Other advocates did not fare as well, as will be seen in the next chapter.
It may also be notable that the OP-Ol 5PP was one of the few presented
to the PDRC and PRC groups (convened jointly). The results of that
presentation were principally requests for amplifcation of the information
as presented. Only one "ZOW" was issued, directing OP-Ol to "define and
executable VOTECH30 program." That directive included no specific
instruction to change the funding levels contained in the 5PP. [Ref. 25]
For OP-Ol, the Resource Sponsor, the final outcome of POM-87
development may well have been significantly shaped by the personal
appearance of the OP-Ol incumbent in the star chamber in which the
ultimate POM decisions were made. The bulk of his SPP was upheld, and he
was granted $51 million in additional resources for some of the contested
items in the Family Housing construction program that he had placed in
"overguidance." 31
On the other hand, the the end-game did result in some decrements to
OP-Ol programs. Appropriations other than Family Housing and Military
Construction were reduced by SI 7 million in Fiscal Year 1987 (with higher
amounts in successive POM years). OP-Ol elected to take the cuts primarily
from Operations and Maintenance (the appropriation generally regarded has
30Vocational-technical education
31 5ubsequent review by OP-90 analysts resulted in a decision to rephase
DPSB direction for Fiscal Year 1987 into later years, leaving the net
adjustment to OP-OI's Fiscal '87 controls at $1 1 million more than the
baseline upon which the SPP was built.
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having the maximum flexibility). 'Base Operating Support' accounts were
reduced at the CNET and CNO ciaimancies (about $2 million each). Two other
claimancies (COMNAVRESFOR and CNMPC) were decremented $1 million
apiece in automatic data processing funds, me biggest single cut ($4
million) was levied against recruit and general skill training for enlisted
personnel—a relatively small proportion of these total accounts.
The second largest cut came out of a Reserve program, travel and moving
expense funds for Permanent Change of Station orders issued to career
active-duty Reservists.
in snort, the end-game adjustments—even the decrement to Operations
and Maintenance accounts—created no major disruptions in OP-01 programs
or jeopardize their executability. Nor did adjustments seriously revise the
5PP.
The bottom line, in fact, was toOP-Ol's advantage. OP-12's Deputy
Director summed up the final outcome of POM development for the year in
his wrap-up memo on end-game adjustments to the OP-01 resource line:
As we stand today [May 17, 1985], the overall Navy [Total Obligational
Authority] has decreased approximately $5 billion (5%) from the January
FYDP while the OP-01 TOA has grown just under 1 percent." IRef. 26:
P- 2J
Documentable research does not allow an unbiased evaluation of whether
such an outcome would have occurred had the unforeseen events not have
disrupted the prescribed procedures. Nor does it allow a full evaluation of
the intangible factors (the individual personalities and bargaining skills of
major players, for instance) and their effect on the final outcome. Suffice
it to say, OP-01 fared well in POM-87 formulation; many of his fellow
Resource Sponsors could not make the same claim.
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F. CONCLUSION
This chapter has attempted to place the Resource Sponsor role in the
overall context of Navy POM development, by describing the process as it
actually occurred in one of the 14 Resource Sponsorships. The various
forces that affect how the Resource Sponsor decides to structure his
Sponsor Program Proposal were introduced, together with an analysis of
their relative significance in a real-world example of 5PP development.
One of these forces—the Assessment Sponsor function— is of particular
importance in SPP development by all Resource Sponsors. That function is
the topic of the next chapter, with the same procedure used of exploring an
actual Assessment Sponsorship as it functioned during POM-87.
145
IV. THE ASSESSMENT SPONSOR FUNCTION: 0P-Q9R
The message imparted by the previous chapters should be clear: the
Resource Sponsor role may be considered key in the programming phase,
since it is the Resource Sponsor who has front-line decision-making
authority in allocating the resources assigned to him. As described above,
assignment of resource responsibility is done primarily (although not
always uniformly) on the basis of program . This would implicitly make the
Resource Sponsors the program advocates for their assigned areas. Were
only their judgments followed, the results could be a total Navy POM that
was nothing more than 14 separate "mini-POM's."
However, unlike other Services, the Navy applies additional levels of
scrutiny to the POM development process. Among the most significant of
these is the Assessment Sponsor function.
'
A. THE ASSESSMENT SPONSOR ROLE
According to formal guidance (as embodied in annual POM Serials), the
Assessment Sponsor role comes to the fore at two points in POM
development. The first—the Baseline Assessment Memorandum—occurs
during the "planning" stage of programming (circa November), prior to final
internal decisions on the individual Resource Sponsor Program Proposals.
The second milestone—the Post-SPP Assessment— is scheduled to occur
during the "end-game," following the March submission of the SPP's to OP-
90. The objective of the first milestone is for the Assessment Sponsors to
1 Refer to Chapter 2, Section B.3.b for a basic description of the
Assessment Sponsor role in POM development.
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tell Resource Sponsor decision-makers where deficiencies in the existing
resource arrays have been identified. The purpose of the second assessment
is to monitor how those identified deficiencies have been treated in each
5PP.
This chapter will examine how one Assessment Sponsor conducted his
task during the POM-87 cycle. As is the case with Resource Sponsors,
Assessment Sponsors have considerable latitude in how they accomplish
their assignments. Although OP-90 issues general guidance, that guidance
shares some common attributes with much of the other "from on-high"
issuances dictating POM development: in particular, it is so broad in scope
as to (in most cases) allow each Assessment Sponsor to establish his own
analytical methods and standards. Obviously, this results in a multitude of
analytical structures, with each Assessment Sponsor viewing his
jurisdiction according to different measures of effectiveness and employing
different methodologies to derive final judgments. Moreover, each
Assessment Sponsor has a great deal to say about what topics will be
"assessed" during each cycle. Suffice it to say, the assessment process is
highly selective, as well as highly subjective.
This is a function of reality. Since the designated Assessment
Sponsorships are extremely broad (for example, "Manpower, Personnel, and
Training"; "Reserve Programs"; "Logistics"),2 it would be extremely difficult
to conduct comprehensive annual assessments across all 14 Resource
Sponsorships. Moreover, such in-depth coverage is not, arguably, necessary.
Resource allocation throughout the Federal government is done on the
2Refer to Figure 2-4 for a listing of the Navy Assessment Sponsorship
jurisdictions.
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margin, with the ultimate product of Executive Branch deliberations the
President's annual budget submission to the Congress. That submission does
not consider Federal programs comprehensively but only in terms of changes
from previous submissions. Logically, the preparation of the President's
Budget is validly based on marginal analysis.
B. "COMPREHENSIVE" APPRAISAL
In recent years, Navy resource managers determined that some form of
"bottom-up" analysis during the programming phase would be beneficial.
Thus, the "Baseline Area Appraisal" was born in the POM-84 cycle. 3 The
"BAA" is designed to overcome the difficulties associated with marginal




. . . will provide resource sponsors with a realistic assessment of
the capabilities provided by programmed resources vis-a-vis the
capabilities required to acnieve the program's mission, identifying
shortfalls and providing alternatives to improve overall capability.
IRef. 15: p. 5J
In somewhat clearer language, a BAA examines the baseline resource
arrays, as contained in the most recent update to the Five Year Defense
Program, identifies each Resource Sponsor's deficiencies in a particular
assessment area, and recommends how the problems might be resolved.
This sounds very like the description of the Baseline Assessment Memoranda
offered previously, and indeed the two processes are highly similar. The
primary difference, by design, at least, is that the Baseline Assessment
Memoranda look only at selected issues. By contrast, the Baseline Area
Appraisal is intended to scrutinize critical programs in their entirety, thus
^Originally captioned the "Baseline Task Area Appraisal," or BTAA.
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providing benefits for both long-range planning and near-term programming.
[Ref. 15: p. 5]
Like the BAA, the Baseline Assessment is not limited to dealing with
resource requirements only at the margin. Official guidance emphasized:
... the baseline assessment is not dependent upon funding levels
currently programmed or displayed in the FYDP and should not be
expressed as a difference from the FYDP. The baseline assessment
resource display represents the absolute funding required to reach the
level of capability identified for a particular topic .... iRef. 21: p. U
The BAA is not constrained by as much formal guidance; the only official
pronouncement during the POM-87 cycle was in the first OP-90 POM Serial
Memorandum. The references in that serial to "scrutinizing critical
programs in their entirety" and "in-depth evaluations" might lead the reader
to expect a comprehensive look at everything in the Navy's resource base
relating to Reserve programs.
Once again, realities differ somewhat from what the documentation
might suggest. Although official guidance implies that a BAA provides an
in-depth analysis of a program or broadly defined warfare or support area,
the BAA's that have so far been developed have dealt with only a few issues
within those broad limits. The limits of time and human resources offer the
most probable explanation for this selectivity.4 In addition, there seems
little logical value in spending great amounts of time and effort to analyze
non-problem areas. Thus, the BAA might be better described as an
assessment of certain critical issues within a particular warfare or support
area.
^Beginning in POM-87, BAA developers were promised at least one-
year's advance notice, to correct the problems associated with the former
practice of the assignment being made only a few months prior to the
required delivery date.
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The pattern of selectivity was followed in the Reserve BAA prepared for
the POM-87 cycle. Only certain issues were treated, and those only to a
certain degree. Because of the BAA, the Reserve Assessment Sponsor, the
Director of Naval Reserve (OP-09R), opted not to prepare a Baseline
Assessment Memorandum in POM-87.
Before proceeding into the details of how 0P-09R performed his
Assessment Sponsor duties in POM-87, it bears repeating that Assessment
Sponsors are, initially at least, merely petitioners for Resource Sponsors'
dollars and manpower. By themselves, the Assessment Sponsors carry no
effective power to enforce compliance with their desires, at least not
formally.
C. THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL RESERVE
According to his charter, as articulated in the Organization Manual of
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Reserve
(0P-09R) is tasked with the following mission:
To exercise for CNO policy, direction, control, administration, and
management of the Naval Reserve; to establish plans, programs,
priorities, organizations, procedures, and standards for the Naval
Reserve; ... to provide budgetary support for Naval Reserve Activities.
IRef. 2: p. 09R-3J
Figure 4-1 shows the reporting relationship between OP-09R and the
Navy's two most senior officers. As the diagram indicates, he has a direct
line to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and implicitly to the CNO himself.
Does he enjoy a -lesser or greater position than the Resource Sponsors? A
review of Figure 2-1 might imply that the former is the case; however, his
designation as the Director of a Major Navy Staff Office implicitly puts him























Figure 4-1. Director of Naval Reserve Relationship
with CNO/VCNO
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OP-098. For that matter, he arguably shares status with the Director of
Navy Program Planning, OP-090. However, as is often the case, the
graphical representations possible in organization charts depict a much
tidier organization than exists in real life. In many respects, the Director
of Naval Reserve is extraordinary relative to his colleagues.
One respect deals with the combination of roles the individual assigned
to the 0P-09R billet will play during his tenure. His function as one of the
CNO's direct reportees, in his role as a Director of a Major Staff Office (and
Assessment Sponsor for Naval Reserve matters)5 constitutes only one of his
assigned jobs. He is "double-hatted" as the Commander of the Naval Reserve
Forces, a major claimant (whose primary responsibilities involve executing
Navywide Reserve programs).
OP-90's annual POM Serial memoranda set forth the general
responsibilities for Assessment Sponsors. Unlike other Assessment
Sponsors, however, 0P-09R enjoys additional standing guidance regarding
the disposition of the Navy's resources dedicated to its Reserve Component.
A standing instruction issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
7040.6A, lays out specific direction:
... it is important that the Naval Reserve be actively represented
throughout the entire Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPB5) process. IRef. 27: p. 2J
Like other Directors of Manjor Staff Offices on the OPNAV staff,
OP-09R's basic mission and responsibilities are outined in the OPNAV
Organization Manual [Ref. 2: p. 09R-al. OPNAV Instruction 7040.6 details
additional specific responsibilities for the 0P-09R incumbent.
5Although the OPNAV Organization Manual does not specify his
Assessment Sponsor role in nis official mission statement.
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The Director of Naval Reserve . . reviews actions being considered in
POM development which affect the Naval Reserve, comments on the
capability of the Reserve program to accomplish additional tasks or new
missions, and recommends initiatives for accomplishment in the Naval
Reserve. He also considers the effect of proposed reductions on the
Reserve program. He is responsible for the presentation of the total
Naval Reserve program to higher reviewing authority and to the Congress.
IRef. 27: p. 2J
The OPNAV directive also specifies certain actions for other major
players in the POM process:
AH OPNAV DCNO's and Directors of Major Staff Offices (DMSO's) shall
ensure that the Director of Naval Reserve and cognizant program sponsors
are provided timely information concerning major decisions which may
affect the Naval Reserve or Naval Reserve resources. This information is
to include, but is not limited to, POM policies and decisions, claimant and
field program and budget submissions, budget preparation and review,
apportionment, and proposed reprogramming actions. IRef. 27: p.3J
However, 0P-09R is also the Commander of Naval Reserve Forces, the
major claimant with responsibility for executing the programs developed
and approved in OPNAV.
On paper, a potential conflict of interest leaps to attention. Given the
foregoing discussions of the dichotomy between Resource Sponsor and
claimant, the reader will perhaps have acquired an appreciation of the
duality of the Navy resource management situation. The Commander of the
Naval Reserve Forces is unique in that he is the only major claimant who is
also an Assessment Sponsor.
An obvious question arises as to how the duality of the roles is viewed
by those most closely associated with POM development. To be sure, a
single individual (currently a vice admiral)6 is charged with carrying out
the responsibilities of two separate and distinct jobs, the Director of Naval
6The incumbent (as of this writing) is a 3-starred vice admiral; the
billet was downgraded in recent years from a 3- to a 2-starred position,
which was subsequently protested by Congressional committees.
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Reserve, on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, DC; and
the Commander of the Naval Reserve Forces, a major claimancy
headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana.
However, that single vice admiral has, in addition to his two titles, two
separate and distinct staff organizations—one at each geographic location.
The question thus focuses on the distinction between the functions carried
out by his respective staffs.
During POM development, the OPNAV organization has a certain priority.
According to OP-90*s POM Serial 87- 1 , 0P-09R is a major POM player in his
role as an Assessment Sponsor. Rotating his perspective a few degrees, he
can also submit input into the POM development process as a major
claimant.
During the POM-87 cycle, the 0P-09R/C0MNAVRE5F0R duality
experienced a unique role in POM development.
D. RESERVE PROGRAMS IN POM-87
A brief synopsis of certain external events will help set the stage.
I. Background: Increasing Visibility of the Reserves
As implied in earlier discussions, the Naval Reserve had, during the
early 1980's, been the focus of heightened attention from higher levels—the
Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the
Navy personally. The late 1970's had not been prosperous for Reserve
forces, in terms of the relative proportions of Navy resources dedicated to
Reserve programs. As a consequence of the combined attentions just cited,
the POM development cycles of the early '80's were significant for the Naval
Reserve for a variety of reasons.
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Early in the 1980's, the forerunner to the current COMNAVRE5FOR
organization, the Office of the Chief of Naval Reserve, was subjected to a
full-scale audit by the Inspector General of the Navy. Among the findings
cited by the IG were identified shortcomings in how the Reserves
participated in PPB5 activities. The general theme of the inspection report
was that Reserve leaders were not sufficiently well versed in the system to
be effective PPBS players.
From the preceding chapter detailing the situation within a Resource
Sponsor organization, it might be concluded that a reorganization of the
internal structure significantly affected how that organization conducted
its POM development activities during the POM-86 and POM-87 cycles. A
reorganization, albeit of comparatively lesser proportions, occurred within
the organization of the Director of Naval Reserve. The staff dedicated to
POM activities was expanded from two to four, thereby doubling the human
resources available to monitor what Resource Sponsors were doing and to
defend Reserve issues in the POM deliberation arenas. The reorganization
was only one factor that contributed to a distinct difference in the conduct
of POM-87 relative to previous years.
The Congressional interest in Reserve matters—particularly in the
Navy's Reserve component—emerged during the latter 1970's. The advent of
the Reagan Administration, and especially the appointment of John Lehman
as Secretary of the Navy, added to the rolls of high-level interest-takers.
Without digressing into the many factors that contributed to the increased
attention (and, implicitly, increased resources!) being directed to the Naval
Reserve, suffice it to say that the Reserve Assessment Sponsor function
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assumed considerable visibility in POM development (which visibility, as of
this writing, appears to be continuing).
In that respect, Reserve matters took on a significance somewhat
different than that accorded to other Assessment areas. For example,
"Manpower, Personnel, and Training" a long-established Assessment
jurisdiction, was not accorded the higher-level attention of Reserve affairs.
Might one then assume that Reserve issues received greater consideration
than did MPT in POM-87?
Documentable evidence makes that question extremely difficult to
answer conclusively. It is demonstrably true, however, that Reserve issues
did occupy an important place in the development of POM-87.
One important event that appears to have been an influence had its
origins external to the Department of Defense: the Congressional
deliberations on the Fiscal Year 1984 Defense Authorization legislation
included a specific directive to DoD to submit "a study" of how the
Department was "utilizing its Reserve components." The catchword was
"Total Force utilization." Within DoD, the Total Force attention was
translated into programming-phase guidance for the POM-87 cycle (which
would be in its initial stages during the execution of the Fiscal Year 1984
budget).
The CNO's Program and Fiscal Guidance for POM-87 included specific
mention of the Congressional "Total Force" directive. Resource Sponsors
were enjoined to address items included in the report to the Congress. The
earlier-issued Department of the Navy Consolidated Planning and
Programming Guidance also included specific mention of the Total Force
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matter.? Resource Sponsors were given a degree of advance warning during
the first months of the programming phase, when they received a draft
outline of the FY-85 Report to the Congress, which outlined specific
initiatives to be included in POM-87 development. [Ref. 28: in toto\
2. Development of the Reserve Baseline Area Appraisal
Another indication of the heightened attention directed toward
Reserve matters was the decision that the Baseline Area Appraisal during
the POM-87 cycle be focussed on the Naval Reserve. Official guidance
notwithstanding, the typical Assessment Sponsor function during a POM
cycle considers resources on the margin. In POM-87, marginal analysis of
the Navy's Reserve component was deemed insufficient. Reserve programs
were to be subjected to an in-depth examination in the "BAA."
The Reserve forces can be conveniently categorized as "Surface" and
"Air." The BAA for POM-87 was subsequently narrowed to focus on the
Surface Reserve segment. A further narrowing brought the subject area to
"Manpower, Personnel, and Training" issues.
Obvious questions arise: how did the "assessors" in OP-09R perform
their roles? What sources of information and analysis were used in
formulating the BAA?
Partial answers to the questions require a brief examination of
0P-09R's other role, as the major claimant, Commander of the Naval Reserve
Forces.
Once again, the Reserve situation is distinctive relative to that of
other claimants. "C0MNAVRE5F0R" executes the majority of Reserve
7Both documents are classified, thus precluding specific citation.
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programs in the Navy (contrast his situation to that of the major Fleet
Commanders in Chief, whose claimancies include a far broader variety of
missions and activities). Thus, the scope of interest to the major claimant
COMNAVRESFOR closely parallels that of the Assessment Sponsor, OP-09R.
The claimant, due to his responsibilities for executing budgeted
resources, is logically the most knowledgeable source of information
regarding executability of programs as they are formulated by the
designated policy-makers in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Logically, then, the staff of 0P-09R turn to their counterparts on the staff
of COMNAVRESFOR. Does this constitute a conflict of interest? Arguably it
does, in that the assessment function is intended to provide an objective
look at the Navy's programmed resources. A claimant, on the other hand,
might tend toward parochialism, seeing the world from the perspective of
his own problems in executing what he has previously been given, rather
than taking the broader, more objective view of what should be programmed.
The claimant would understandably want to have some voice in determining
what it is he is supposed to do. Certainly, his experience in actually
executing programs gives him insights the more isolated OPNAV policy-
maker might lack as to what actually works in real-time.
As a major claimant, COMNAVRESFOR has for several years adopted
an unusual method of presenting his recommendations to Resource Sponsors.
Throughout the summer, subclaimant activities develop their "'issues'' (that
is, their wish-lists for revising existing resource arrays). As is the case
with most POM "petitions" to Resource Sponsors, the COMNAVRESFOR issues
are more often requests for additional resources than requests for "zero-
sum" realignments. And, following the typical pattern, the originator of an
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issue rarely identifies an offset for those resources representing an
increase to existing levels.
In late August, Resource Sponsor representatives are invited to
C0MNAVRE5F0R headquarters in New Orleans for a two- to three-day
conference, popularly called the "POMFEST." The purpose of the POMFE5T is
the face-to-face presentation of the multitude of subclaimant issues, with
the issues' originators given the chance to personally plead their case
before the people who will have a hand in making the final decision at the
Resource Sponsor level. This "heads-up" alert to all the issues for a major
claimancy comes a full three months in advance of the scheduled date for
distribution of "Claimant Input via OP-90" issues.8 C0MNAVRE5F0R
subclaimants do not limit themselves to the overall claimant allotment of
"five issues per Resource Sponsor." They are at this point fairly
unconstrained in their requests.
At least two benefits of POMFEST appear obvious. First, the Re-
source Sponsor representatives have an early idea of what the claimant will
be asking for—presented in an environment in which the originator of the
request can be queried as to his justification and whatever other questions
the Resource Sponsor staff may have (in other words, the kind of inter-
change that is precluded by paper-copy submissions confined to the speci-
fied formats prescribed forOP-90's "Claimant Input" exercise). A second
benefit is that ownership disputes can be surfaced (and perhaps even re-
solved) on the spot, thereby avoiding lengthy long-distance squabbling
during the heat of SPP development. Another benefit of lesser importance is
8Refer to Chapter 2, Section B.S.a, for a description of this medium of
claimant participation in POM development.
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that each Resource Sponsor representative has the opportunity to see the
COMNAVRESFOR requests in their entirety early in the 5PP development
cycle. That is, they can see not only what the claimant is requesting of
their own Resource Sponsor line, but all the requests against other lines, as
well.
The Resource Sponsors will see the COMNAVRESFOR issues again (at
least five of them!), because the claimant will formally submit them as
Claimant Input via OP-90 (thereby requiring the Resource Sponsors to
formally account for each of these five issues in presenting their Sponsor
Program Proposals).
Many of the issues are used for another purpose, as well: as the
basis forOP-09R's Assessment Sponsor function . In the Baseline Area
Appraisal on Reserves for POM-87, many of the items had their beginnings
as COMNAVRESFOR subclaimant issues.
The rationale for this was articulated by 0P-09R's primary action
officer for POM development, 0P-09R4.9 According to that officer, the
claimant is a logical source of information regarding the deficiencies in
executing Naval Reserve programs, since it is the claimant who must
translate the POM programs into not only budget submissions but executed
realities. If, for example, a POM initiative designed to enhance recruiting of
Naval Reservists includes resources that prove too limited to accomplish
the objective, the claimant executing that initiative will be the first to
^Captain Barry Bennett, U.S. Naval Reserve. The author had numerous
conversations with Captain Bennett throughout preparation of this thesis.
Captain Bennett is a veteran of five POM cycles in 0P-09R, with the
prospect of at least two more; in terms or specific experience as a POM
participant, he is well above average for an officer assigned to OPNAV.
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know. Logically, the claimant will be the first source of reliable
information on that deficiency—and hence the source of corrective action in
future years.
The prevailing philosophy is that claimants are not policy makers
but merely policy executers . On the other hand, Assessment Sponsors-all
from OPNAV organizations—are potential policy makers. Can a claimant
provide the necessary objectivity in deciding among the many competing
claims against limited resources, or will he opt for what makes his own
responsibilities easier to discharge?
In the view of 0P-09R staff, the claimant's perspective is
mandatory to an objective view of the overall resource situation.
Another explanation for the method OP-09R uses in articulating his
Assessment Sponsor functions comes from the Deputy Director of Naval
Reserve, 0P-09RB. l0 He views the Assessment Sponsor function as being
essentially reactive to requirements developed at other levels (Congress,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of the Navy, or
Resource Sponsor, as the case may be). The Assessment Sponsor does not
himself originate requirements, but merely assesses what is required to
bring those requirements to fruition. Logically, the best source of
information for executability issues is the claimant. Thus, the BAA validly
included many items originated within the C0MNAVRE5F0R claimancy.
,0Rear Admiral Neale Smith, U.S. Naval Reserve. Rear Admiral Smith
served in the Deputy 0P-09R position during the POM-87 cycle; his duties
included representing 0P-09R on the Program Development Review
Committee (and standing in for his boss when that individual was unable to
attend meetings of the 3-star Program Review Committee.
16!
Another source of information for the BAA came from within the
OPNAV organization. Since the four areas addressed in the appraisal
included manpower, personnel, and training, it was logical to employ the
existing methods by which Reserve manpower requirements are derived. The
existing system is based on the premise that Reserve manpower should have
a distinct relationship to the manpower requirements attendant to
mobilization of Reserve forces. That is, first the Navy should survey what
manpower billets would be required in the event of a mobilization; then, the
Naval Reserve should be structured specifically to train the personnel
necessary to fill those manpower slots. By this methodology, Naval Reserve
manpower requirements become a function of "non-Reserve Navy" 11
manpower considerations. For instance, if a new aircraft carrier is
introduced into the active fleet, it would entail not only full-time active-
duty billets but several hundred augmentation billets against a possible
mobilization. Implicitly, Selected Reservists would need to be recruited,
trained, and retained in the Reserve to support that eventuality.
The existing system is based on an analytical model in operation for
several years: called "NAMMOS," for Navy Manpower Mobilization System,
the model's methodology is applied throughout the Department of Defense
and has been specifically scrutinized (and blessed) by the Congress. The
office having cognizance for maintaining this model is OP-01, the DCNO for
Manpower, Personnel, and Training. The Reserve BAA used the NAMMOS
1
'The distinction between resources associated with "Reserve" and
"Non-Reserve" programs is often controversial or confusing simply on the
basis of terminology. To avoid argument or confusion over the use of such
terms as "Regular" or "active Navy" to describe those aspects not associated
with Reserve programs, this thesis will refer to resources associated with
the Navy's two components as "Reserve" and "non-Reserve."
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model for much of the manpower analysis. One conclusion was that the
Naval Reserve was programmed to grow at a brisk rate of 35 percent over
the figures in the October 1 984 edition of the Five Year Defense Program
(the initial baseline against which POM-87 was developed). That rate of
growth (more than 30,000 part-time "Selected Reservists," and 9,800 full-
time active-duty "TAR's" 12) "presents a formidable challenge in the areas of
recruiting, retention, and training." [Ref. 29: p. m-5]
Among the specific issues treated in the BAA were those three
"challenges." Working with the existing manpower model, plus drawing on
other expertise from within the various OPNAV organizations concerning
requirements for attracting, training, and keeping Reservists, 0P-09R also
called upon the analytical staff of the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA).
The CNA analysts assisted primarily in the manpower assessment.
Training requirements were based on the inputs from the various Resource
Sponsors having responsibility for significant Reserve-related requirements
(specifically, 0P-03, Surface Warfare; 0P-04, Logisitics; 0P-05, Air
Warfare; and 0P-093, Medical Support). The DCNO for Manpower, Personnel,
and Training, 0P-01, maintains a staff to oversee Navy training require-
ments at large; 0P-09R requested comments from those individuals, as well.
The portion dealing with recruiting was based heavily on input from
the Commander, Naval Reserve Force claimancy. The logic for this was that
C0MNAVRE5F0R would have the chief responsibility for Reserve recruiting,
therefore the C0MNAVRE5F0R staff constituted the best source of
12For Training and Administration of Reserves"; TAR's are career active-
duty Reservists whose primary responsibility is to take care of Reserve
programs.
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information as to what resources would be required to meet the needs
associated with the projected growth. [Ref. 29: p. sp-14]
Similarly, the analyses personnel-related issues were drawn heavily
from claimant comment. For instance, one specific citation was a
shortcoming in the Navywide Personnel Administration Support System
(PASS) which prevented necessary identification of certain Reservist
attributes.
The foregoing discussion has touched only a few elements of the
POM-87 Reserve BAA, to convey a general idea of where the analyses were
born and upon what they were based. This general outline of the BAA is not
intended as a comprehensive description of the document but enough to
provide insight as to how 0P-09R accomplished his Assessment Sponsor
function during the planning subphase of POM development.
Although this thesis is not concerned with the relative validity of
the BAA itself, or in critiquing the substance of it, a few comments on the
BAA are pertinent.
Although it would be difficult for an outsider to document, it
appears that the POM-87 Reserve BAA was not enthusiastically received
within OPNAV. The Resource Sponsors, as represented on the Program
Review and Program Development Review Committees, were not favorably
impressed with the "analysis" displayed in the BAA. Nor, apparently, were
the POM brokers in OP-090 and OP-90. 13 If the foregoing could be
substantiated, it would be pertinent to the POM development process.
13Based on this writer's personal impressions, from conversations with
various POM participants who were involved in POM-87.
164
The BAA was instituted to serve as a believable assessment of the
status quo. Its specific purposes are to define what should be done to bring
the Navy up to the capabilities required to respond in given situations. Or,
putting it another was, it should convey to those concerned— including the
CNO—what the Resource Sponsors should be doing in POM development. If
the analytical basis for the appraisal is open to doubt, then Resource
Sponsors will naturally be unwilling to commit any portion of their
constrained resources. The options left to the Assessment Sponsor in that
case are to secure the support of higher authority—such as OP-090, the
CNO, or the Secretary of the Navy— to direct the reluctant Resource
Sponsors. Shaky analysis will not aid the cause, obviously!
A contrast to other Assessment Sponsor methodologies would be
useful, to compare the various techniques, sources of analysis and raw data,
and so forth. It would be equally useful to evaluate various sponsor's
"success rates"— that is, the number of assessment recommendations
adopted by Resource Sponsors and, if possible, the reasons why those
adoptions were made. It will be recalled from the beginning section of this
chapter that— like their Resource Sponsor counterparts—Assessment
Sponsors are not bound by narrowly defined methodological or procedural
guidance in how they discharge their responsibilities. There are possibly
many lessons to be learned from one another's experience.
Of course, it is also noteworthy that "sound analysis" is not the
ultimate factor that will persuade a resource decision-maker to commit his
resources. The student newly introduced to PPBS, as it was described upon
its introduction into the Department of Defense in the 1960's, might
erroneously assume that quantitative considerations overcame all others to
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guide resource allocation. Twenty-five years' practice illustrates
otherwise; the wealth (or poverty) of so-called objective analysis
notwithstanding, the very subjective elements of human dynamics, political
exigencies, and other frustratingly unquantifiable phenomena still play a
critical role in resource decision-making! This is as true at the lowest
levels of the Navy as it is in the U.S. Congress. Analytical quality is best
seen as a supporting tool to the successful securing of resources, rather
than the primary tool.
E. FOLLOW-UP: END-GAME ADJUSTMENTS TO RESERVE PROGRAMS
To be effective, any process for recommending changes must include
some sort of control mechanism to track the progress of recommendations
and, if possible, to ensure their enactment. In the Navy's POM development
process, such control mechanisms are built into the "end-game" activities
that follow the submission of Resource Sponsor Program Proposals to OP-
90. It is during the end-game that the 14 separate SPP's are consolidated
into the Navy POM; intrinisic to the consolidation process are the various
reviews of each SPP.
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, each Assessment Sponsor has
at least two formal opportunities to make his recommendations known to
the Resource Sponsors (and to the entire POM development community). In
POM-87, the Reserve BAA took the place of the Baseline Assessment Memo-
randa prepared by other Assessment Sponsors, but the process was similar
A major difference was the level of visibility accorded to the BAA. The
Baseline Assessment Memoranda are available to virtually all POM
participants, but they are really read only by two factions: the people
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preparing them and the Resource Sponsor to whom they are directed. By
contrast, the BAA was seen by a far greater audience. Unlike the Baseline
Assessment Memoranda, which are prepared only as written documents, the
BAA was prepared as a presentation, for the highest levels of the OPNAV
organization— including the CNO himself.
The logical objective of the BAA authors, as the advocates of Reserve
programs in the Navy, was to get their recommendations incorporated into
Resource Sponsor Program Proposals. As was described in Chapter 2, a
variety of routes are available to a Resource Sponsor; the most effective
medium is typically the CNO's Program and Fiscal Guidance. Thus, the
logical goal of the BAA presenters would be to convince CNO to include
specific guidance to the Resource Sponsors. CPF6 did indeed include
specific guidance for many Reserve issues, with perhaps the most
significant being the blanket directive that "Reserve BAA issues shall
receive priority consideration." [Ref. 30: p. 4]
Another route to success with Resource Sponsors is inclusion of
specific (or even general) admonitions in other higher-level guidance
documents. Reserve issues were incorporated in the November Department
of the Navy Consolidated Planning and Programming Guidance, issued in
November. 14
0P-09R measured response by the Resource Sponsors in a traditional
Post-SPP Assessment, prepared in March 1 985. Beginning with an
overview of Reserve programs within the Navy, the Post-SPP Assessment
was based on the SPP's as submitted to OP-90 (that is, the presentations)
14Refer to Chapter 3, Section C.7., for a description of this document.
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and the actual data-base update that would, if accepted, adjust existing
FYDP levels for Reserve programs. In addition, 0P-09R surveyed the
"Sponsor Program Proposal Documents," the SPPD's prepared as the formal
response to claimant input.
Typically, the 5PPD is of interest only to the Resource Sponsor who
prepares it and the claimant to whom it is directed. It is the formal
medium through which claimants receive word as to the disposition of the
requests they filed via OP-90 in November. The fact that 0P-09R
specifically used claimant input (from COMNAVRE5FOR) as a yardstick for
measuring Resource Sponsor treatment of Reserve issues should underscore
the duality of the 0P-09R/C0MNAVRESF0R incumbency. It is not a typical
method in Post-SPP Assessments.
Following the general comments, the Reserve Post-SPP Assessment
detailed each SPP's treatment of identified Reserve issues. For example,
the OP-01 Resource Sponsorship had three issues identified in formal
guidance:
• Program growth in Selected Reserve Manpower up to the pre-determined
level required for mobilization.
• Insure minimum essential resources for recruiting and advertising.
• Identify Selected Re-enlistment Bonus requirements for full-time
Reservists CTAR's") and other bonuses for Selected Reservists to
attract and retain required personnel.
The Post-SPP Assessment noted that OP-01 funded the first directive,
was "coordinating" the second, and had "complied" with the third (which
would require Congressional approval). The Assessment also noted that
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Although the cognizant Resource Sponsors (OP-04 and OP-093) ar
responsible for programming funds for [vocational-technical] tuition
payments, OP-01 should program necessary assets to manage the
execution of the VOTECH program through ithe Chief of Naval Education
and Trainingj CNET. iRef. 30: p. 13J
Finally, a 'remaining problem" was cited, concerning a shortfall of
funding to reimburse barracks service charges incurred by Reservists in the
course of their weekend drills.
The question then becomes, as with the BAA, what control mechanism
ensures that the Post-5PP Assessments are attended to by the Resource
Sponsors?
The answer in POM-87 was—to many Assessment Sponsors—far from
satisfactory. Having invested the time and effort into preparing the Post-
5PP evaluation of Resource Sponsor decisions, the Assessment Sponsor was
directed, in the POM-87 end-game, to simply forward the assessments to
the cognizant Resource Sponsors. Like the Baseline Assessment Memoranda
upon which most of the Post-SPP Assessments were based, the latter
documents were never presented to any formal review group. If, in fact, OP-
90 or anyone of higher rank actually saw those pieces of paper, there is no
documentation as to what result transpired.
As far as that goes, there is no real record as to what individuals in a
given Resource Sponsor organization actually saw—much less paid attention
to!— the Post-SPP Assessments. In short, the documents themselves
carried no real clout. Conceivably, Resource Sponsors could file them away
without reading them, since they were bound by no formal procedure to
respond.
In previous years, the Post-SPP Assessments,had been formally
presented to the Program Review and Program Development Review
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Committees, the 3- and 2-star boards that serve as a major element in the
control of Navy POM development. Under that procedure, an Assessment
Sponsor had an official—and visible—day in court. He could bring issues to
the surface, before all parties involved, and in the presence of the "Honest
Brokers" in the OP-90/090 organization. Then, if the evidence were
sufficiently convincing, the Resource Sponsor might be directed to comply
during the last weeks of the end-game process. Lacking a public hearing,
the Assessment Sponsors were forced to rely on other means of persuasion.
The various Assessment Sponsors reacted in different ways. One
viewpoint held that the Post-SPP Assessments were essentially worthless
due to the lack of visibility; that is, once prepared, the assessments were
dispersed into an untrackable vacuum. 15 0P-09R representatives saw it
differently, recognizing the potential in dealing informally with lower-level
staff members in various Resource Sponsor organizations to follow up on
specific assessment items.
In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that certain events transpired
during the POM-87 cycle that distinguished that years process from
previous years' experiences. Some of the most important changes had to do
with the timing and process of end-game activities. In earlier years, all
presentations—beginning with the individual SPP's and followed by the
Post-SPP Assessments—were formally briefed to the review groups. The
increased role played by the Department of the Navy Program Strategy Board
had been an important factor in the POM-86. The DP5B injected the Navy's
highest level of review at a much earlier juncture than in previous cycles
15Captain C. Shields, OP- 120; conversations on March 4-5, 1986.
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and to a comparatively lower level of detail. Instead of merely hearing the
Navy POM presented in summary, the DP5B was examining specific items and
issues, over the course of at least six 2-hour sessions. POM-87 events were
compounded by the unexpected death of the incumbent OP-90, the chairman
of the 2-star Program Development Review Committee. In the POM-87 end-
game, formerly sequential PRC and PDRC presentations were consolidated
into single sessions, with both 2- and 3-star admirals present concurrently,
under the chairmanship of OP-090.
On the face of it, it might be assumed that the combined sessions
resulted in a decrease in the total time available for an individual Sponsor
to plead his case. POM-87 participants aver otherwise, contending that the
POM-87 end-game reviews actually represented an increase in the attention
from high-level decision-makers. 16
The most significant level of review, in terms of the effect on ultimate
POM decisions, occurred at the DPSB level. Chaired personally by the
Secretary of the Navy, the DPSB sessions produced the final decisions on the
content of the Navy POM. Obviously, six 2-hour sessions would be
insufficient to allow an in-depth consideration of all but major issues.
However, the depth to which the DPSB went in POM-87 surpassed anything
they had previously done.
Each Resource Sponsor was afforded the opportunity to present his
program proposal, albeit on a highly structured basis and before a relatively
small audience. Limited to 15 of the "most important issues," the individual
16Captain C. Lautenbacher, OP-90 1, interview on May 28, 1986. Captain
Lautenbacher served as OP-90's primary action officer for POM development
during both the POM-87 and POM-88 cycles.
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DP5B briefings gave rise to final decisions and directives to the Resource
Sponsors in the form of Memoranda for the Record. At the end of the DP5B
reviews, the Secretary of the Navy was prepared to sign the Navy's POM
submission to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Resource Sponsors constituted the basis of the DP5B agendas, not
the Assessment Sponsors. What avenue, then, did the latter have to make
their concerns known to the high-level officials who would make the
ultimate decisions on end-game issues?
One obvious answer would be, "via informal channels,"~for example,
telephone calls to DP5B members or their staffs. Another ploy might be to
convince OP-090, the VCNO, or even the CNO of the validity of a particular
problem, in the hope that one of these DP5B participants would be the de
facto advocate in the closed sessions. However, such tactics have
limitations; the very senior levels of the DP5B participants mitigates
against loading them up with any but the most significant issues.
Some Assessment Sponsors enjoyed a more direct route to the DP5B
audience: in person. This was the case for those who were double-hatted as
Resource Sponsors (OP-Ol and OP-04, in particular).
The Director of Naval Reserve was at a disadvantage during the POM-87
end-game, however. He was not, as the Reserve Assessment Sponsor,
formally invited to any DP5B session. Nor did he have anyone who could be
counted upon to represent his concerns other than the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
POM participants from the 0P-09R staff agree that the absence of
0P-09R in the DP5B star chamber was unsatisfactory. The DP5B sessions
would have been expectedly broad in their scope, attempting to cover Navy
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programs in their totality. Reserve issues would conceivably be lost in the
shuffle. Moreover, the participants in the DP5B would be primarily oriented
to *'non-Reserve" Navy matters and possibly averse to sharing their limited
resources with Reserve programs. The situation was revised the following
year, in which the incumbent OP-09R (who, as a 3-star vice admiral, would
have adequate status to be credible in the DP5B sessions) was an invitee at
all presentations involving. Reserve issues.
F. THE BOTTOM LINE: HOW RESERVE ISSUES FARED IN POM-87
After all the end-game deliberations are completed, after OP-90 and his
staff have reviewed the 14 separate SPP's for mechanical details as well as
substance, after the various high-level review groups have had their day,
after the Secretary of the Navy is satisfied that the Navy POM represents
not 14 mini-POM's but an overall balancing of resources arrayed to optimize
the fulfillment of stated policies—the POM becomes the official submission
to OSD. Typically, this occurs mid-May; the POM participants in OPNAV sit
back to enjoy a (comparatively!) restful few weeks while analysts in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense begin the
scrutiny that will continue into the so-called "Summer Program Review" of
the Service POM's. The Summer Review will culminate in the final decisions
by the Defense Resources Board, as documented in the Program Decision
Memorandum signed by the Secretary of Defense.
The various OPNAV POM players will not be idle during the Summer
Review, to be sure. They will share much of the responsibility in defending
the Navy submission. However, for most participants, the mid-May
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submission to 05D marks the "end of the POM" for this year and is the
logical milestone for assessing successes and failures.
As was the case for OP-01, in his role as a Resource Sponsor, OP-09R,
as the Reserve Assessment Sponsor, issues an annual wrap-up report. The
wrap-up has at least three stated purposes: [Ref. 31: p. 1]
• To summarize Reserve-pertinent POM actions;
• To serve as a "desk reference for use by Naval Reserve managers",
• To assist in constructing the detailed budget submission for Fiscal Year
1987; and
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Figure 4-2. Reserve Fiscal Resources in POM-87
The 0P-09R wrap-up report began by citing 12 individual items of
higher-level guidance (refer to Table 4- \ ) involving Reserve issues, then
traced how each fared in the final Navy POM submission. Figure 4-2




POM-87 GUIDANCE FOR RESERVE PROGRAMS
Department of the Navy Consolidated Planning and Programming Guidance
• Provide Reserve Airwings with more capable aircraft
• Program resources to implement Total Force Initiatives
Consolidated Program and Fiscal Guidance
• Equal funding priority for Sea-and-Air Mariner "A" School seats
• Priority consideration for Reserve Baseline Area Appraisal issues
• Selected Reserve manpower growth to numerical mobilization requirement levels by Fiscal Year
1987; attainment of quality for medical and construction requirements by Fiscal Year 1988
• Minimum essential resources for Reserve recruiting and advertising
• Reserve flying hours goals (Tactial Air: 150; Patrol: 140; Other: 130)
• Naval Reserve Force ship operations at operating tempo required to maintain readiness for wartime
requirements
• Funding of Total Force initiatives approved in the 1984 and 1985 Reports to Congress
• Modernization and transition plan for Naval Reserve Carrier Air Wings
• Identification of bonus payment programs to recruit and retain Selected Reservists in required
quantity, quality, and location
— Selected Re-enlistment Bonus (SRB) for full-time active-duty Reservists ("TAR's")
— Expanded bonuses for drilling Selected Reservists
— Unit incentive pays
• Identification of procurement items funded for primary use by the Naval Reserve
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well, growing from 2.6 percent of the Navy"s total fiscal resources in Fiscal
Year 1985 to 3.1 percent in the first year of the POM-87 program.
TABLE 4-2
POM-87 SCORECARD FOR THE RESERVE BASELINE AREA APPRAISAL
Issue Outcome
Surface Training Manpower Funded
Curricula Adaptaton Manpower...., Funded
Management School Detachments Funded
Triad of Training Partially funded
Navy Evaluation Code (NEC) Training Funded
Fleet Training Center Instructors Funded
Air Reserve Squadron (A-6E) Training Funded
Table 4-2 details specific outcomes of the Reserve Baseline
Assessment items. The most dramatic increases in resources are
associated with manpower, however. In an POM cycle that represented
decrements from the previously approved Five-Year Defense Program for
most Navy resources, the Reserve programs enjoyed significant increases in
manpower in every category except "non-Reserve" active-duty. However, the
decreases in those levels were more than offset by increases in full-time
Reservists ("TAR's").
One conclusion might well be that the increases to Reserve resources in
the POM-87 cycle were due, at least in part, to the effectiveness with
which the Director of Naval Reserve, 0P-09R, discharged his
responsibilities as an Assessment Sponsor—and as an advocate of Reserve
issues. Formal documentation is insufficient to support a hypothesis one
way or another. It is enough to say that the Navy decided to devote a
somewhat larger proportion of its total manpower and fiscal resources to
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the Reserve side of its "Total Force." It is probable that the factors
underlying that fact are not attributable to any one phenomenon but rather
to a combination of events, personalities, and dynamics. In that regard, the
POM-87 development cycle as it pertained to Navy Reserve programs was
absolutely characteristic of any resource-allocation process!
G. QUOVADI5
The preceding chapters have explored the Navy's POM development first
in its overall context, then from the perspective of the first-line resource
decision-maker in the programming phase, the Resource Sponsor. A parti-
cular Resource Sponsorship was described, detailing actual events during
the development of POM-87. This chapter has dealt with one important
element in the "check-and-balance" scheme of POM development, the
Assessment Sponsor function. Again, a specific Sponsorship was examined,
tracing the events as they actually occurred in the preparation of POM-87.
This tour of the Navy's POM process has been, admittedly and intention-
ally, selective. No claim is made to a comprehensive account—much less
analysis—of the process in its entirety. The very size of the Navy's
resource base and the great variety of methods and procedures followed by
the several "Sponsors" preclude quick analysis, unless the objective is a
very broadly stated "overview." Such was not the intent of this thesis.
However, the foregoing introduction to the various roles,
responsibilities, and relationships in the POM process does provide
sufficient basis for some analysis of the process.. The following chapter
will explore some of the significant findings to emerge from this selective
investigation of how the Navy builds its POM.
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V. ANALY51S_QF FIMQ1MGS
The intent of the discussion in the previous three chapters was to
supply the reader with an appreciation of some of the major aspects of POM
development in the Navy. The selective look at POM development, focussed
on two particular offices, reveals several things of significance about the
process as it took place during an actual cycle. Much analysis was woven
into the narratives of the previous chapters. This chapter will attempt to
summarize the most important of findings, explore possible causes and
relationships among them, and propose ways of improving the situation.
There is a tendency in any research of this type to dwell on the
documentable. This is particularly true when trying to construct events of
several months or years prior to the writing. Documentation provides only
one perspective, however. And, in a situation such as this, the
documentation tends to be fairly dry, bled of personal opinion and limited to
official pronouncement. In this case, the majority of the documentation
dealt more with what was supposed to take place. Very little was written
about what actually did happen--or how .. And, when such documents were
available (the "wrap-up" memos cited in Chapters 3 and 4), they dealt
primarily with the content of the outcome rather than with the process
which led to that outcome. The bulk of the information on how POM-87
activities actually transpire came from interviews with POM-87
participants. Admittedly, much of their recollection is undoubtedly sh3peo
by personal opinion.
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However, those opinions should not automatically be discounted; real
life is lived by real people, and their perceptions can be as active a factor in
shaping the final outcome of a process as any amount of so-called
"objective analysis." This chapter, therefore, will be based not only on the
discoveries emerging through research of the POM-87 process from
available documentation but also on the personal thoughts of some of the
individuals who played in significant positions during that cycle.
A. MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF NAVY POM DEVELOPMENT
If the process by which the Navy formulates its annual Program
Objectives Memorandum were to be described in a single word, a few
appropriate adjectives would be "complex," "complicated," "dynamic,"
"flexible," or "diverse." At the outset of this thesis, it was theorized that
the overall resource decision-making process within the Department of
Defense was a highly complicated system, which was not completely
understood by many of its active participants. An additional proposition
was that the system as practiced did not always match the prescribed
procedures as laid forth in available documentation.
An examination of real-world events in two Navy offices~OP-01 and
OP-09R~confirmed those contentions.
The Navy programming process is extremely complicated, in the literal
sense that it certainly contains "intricately combined or involved parts; not
easily understood or untangled." [Ref. 32: p. 272]. The Navy's process for
POM development, in particular, involves a highly complicated web of rela-
tionships
. There are many, many players with the potential to make signifi-
cant resource decisions; their relationships—and interrelationships—are
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not always clearly defined in formally issued procedural guidance.
Moreover, many of the same individuals have been assigned multiple
responsibilities, which are not always spelled out in great detail.
One of the most significant prevailing themes of Navy POM development
is the great amount of discretion and flexibility accorded to individual
managers. Guidance issued by higher levels of authority—from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense down through the Department of Defense
hierarchy—is typically couched in terms of expected content . Managers at
lower levels—beginning with the Secretary of the Navy—have tremendous
latitude in determining the procedures to be employed In attaining the
prescribed content. The "controlled decentralization" endorsed by the
Reagan Department of Defense appointees in 1981 appears to be functioning
in the resource management activities of the mid-1980's.
The decentralization pattern is continued within the Department of the
Navy and within the Navy itself. Just as Defense Guidance does not
prescribe specific procedures by which the Military Departments and
Defense Agencies should make resource decisions, guidance from the
Secretary of the Navy to the two naval service chiefs, the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, is typically oriented to
what the final product should contain, rather than the processes by which
that product should be developed.
Within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the CNO has vested
extensive authority in the Deputy Chiefs and Directors of Major Staff
Offices in setting their own procedures in carrying out their "Sponsorship"
functions.
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On the face of it, it would seem that the final "Navy POM" might well be
nothing more than a collection of "mini-POM's," each representing the
parochial interests of its Resource Sponsor. Countervailing this possibility
is the overlapping set of Assessment (and other) Sponsorship roles. The
entire Navy process is based on the idea that the Navy's aggregated
resources—dollars and manpower—should be viewed from a variety of
dimensions. Each dimension—programmatic, budgetary appropriations,
Resource Sponsorship, claimancy, or warfare/task area—can provide a
useful perspective on the Navy's resource base. Taken together, the various
ways of "slicing the Navy resource pie" help assure that the overall Navy
resource array is balanced among the Navy's various missions and functional
priorities.
This multiplicity of dimensional perspectives helps create a system of
rhecks and balances Such a system mitigates against undue parochialism
on the part of any single element. Does it protect completely against a
single entity dominating the decision process, so to speak?
The examination of POM-87 events in two Sponsor's organizations
indicates that in the main the Navy system is effective in producing a
proposed resource allocation that represents the collective interests of the
Navy as a whole, rather than merely being the sum of its several parts. This
is not to say that the system is "perfect." No system is so effective as to
be immune from potential improvement! This is especially true given the
continually changing political environment in which resource decisions are
made in the Federal government.
8
In sum, this research has demonstrated that there is much more "right"
about the Navy's POM development system than "wrong." The system
exhibits some strong features, which allow it to function and produce.
Interviews with some of the top-level officials who participated in
POM-87 development substantiate the widespread feeling that dynamism
and flexibility are some of the best attributes of the Navy's POM process. 1
This makes sense. The resource allocation decisions throughout the
Federal government do not occur in an atmosphere of predictable, stable
events. Decisions are made in an ever-changing environment, as a function
of any number of factors, most of which are unquantifiable elements such as
"political climate," "personality," and so forth. The effective system for
dealing with such volatility would have to be flexible to succeed. Static,
hidebound procedures would be both inappropriate and ultimately
ineffective.
B. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS/AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Despite its overall strength, the Navy POM development process has
several areas that merit further attention and efforts to improve the
system as it operated in the POM-87 cycle. The title to this subsection
should not be misinterpreted; the system functioned in the POM-87 cycle
despite the "flaws" and weaknesses discovered in the course of this
research. There are, however, several areas in which the process could be
improved.
interviews with Rear Admiral J. L Johnson (OP-90 during POM-87),
Rear Admiral Neale Smith (0P-09RB), Captain C. Lautenbacher (OP-90 1 ),
Captain Barry Bennett (0P-09R4), and Mr. Irving Blickstein (OP-90D).
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The following sections of this chapter will deal with some of those
identified problems (and potential problems).
I. The Failure by POM Participants to Understand the System in Macro
The high degree of complexity of the Navy resource decision-making
system in macro makes it difficult for an individual to fully understand its
workings or even its interwoven fabric of relationships among the major
players. There is a prevailing tendency for the individual participants—
particularly those at relatively lower levels in the organization— to see the
overall system only in that small part that involves his or her area of
responsibility. This narrowness of vision extends not only horizontally
across the various Navy organizations, but across time, as well. Too many
POM players fail to see the programming phase in its full context of the
overall Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System within the Department
of Defense—much less \n the greater but even more significant context of
Congressional budget deliberations and actions.
Decisions are often made, therefore, in what amounts to a time-
phase vacuum A decision made during formulation of POM-83 will be
approved in the programming phase in calendar year 1981. However, that
"approval" is internal to the Department of Defense; the "real" approval will
not come until Congress completes action on the Fiscal Year 1983 budget.
That final approval might not come until the fiscal year is well into
execution. Meanwhile, POM decision-makers may well be proceeding with
related decisions based on the POM-83 development cycle. Should any of
those decisions be amended by higher authority, the implications for future
POM cycles should be obvious. This is not always the case.
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2. A Community of Resource Management Amateurs?
Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that two kinds of personnel
work in Navy resource management: active-duty military and civilian
employees of the Federal government. The former are bound by career
considerations, which involve periodic transfer among jobs. Should an
effective pattern of experience not be followed, the typical military
member will feel the effects through a failure to be promoted. This has
serious implications for Navy resource management, if indeed top decision-
making positions are to be filled by military officers.
According to the current system, most of the Navy's truly powerful
executive positions involving resource management are indeed reserved for
military officers—and officers of the line, at that, rather than staff corps
careerists who are inherently more narrowly specialized in their skills than
the typical Unrestricted Line naval officer.
The DCNO and DM50 jobs on the staff of the Chief of Naval
Operations are virtually all occupied by officers of the Unrestricted Line.
Of equal—or possibly greater significance— is the fact that lower-ranked
positions with considerable decision-making power are also filled by line
officers in the mid- to senior grades (lieutenant commander through
captain). It becomes thus important to ask, "How do these people receive
the necessary training to carry out their resource management jobsl?"
The answer is not entirely satisfactory. The career path for the
successful (that is, promotable!) naval line officer emphasizes duty in his
primary warfare speciality. "Shore tours" such as in OPNAV POM
development organizations take secondary precedence. The officer typically
receives his training in how to perform his assigned resource-management
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responsibilities on the job . And, since his tour will expectedly be limited to
two or three years, the opportunities for him to truly refine his skills in
this area are somewhat limited.
The preceding chapters may not have conveyed the sense of rapidity
with which annual POM development occurs. The cycle is typically occurring
"on the run." The compressed schedules result in little slack time for
participants; the emphasis i.s on meeting the several deadlines imposed
throughout the programming period. As veterans of the system agree, "You
spend the first year just trying to learn the jargon; by the second year,
you're doing well if you can keep up with the pace of activity; by the third
year, when you've had the chance to work with the system long enough to
make some constructive suggestions as how to improve it, you're most
likely on your way to your next duty station."
The implications for functional stability of the organization are
only part of the issue. Equally important is the implication that many of the
people in important decision-making managerial positions are essentially
dilettantes.
This is certainly not intended as a commentary on the
professionalism of the officers in these billets, but rather on the nature of
the system itself. It's not merely a function of the Navy's policy for
promoting its line officers. There is a near complete lack of formal training
opportunities available to educate POM participants without taking them
away from their jobs. Although several professional military schools offer
courses in resource management, the bulk of these appear oriented to major
weapons systems acquisition. [Ref. 171 The Defense Resource Management
Education Center in Monterey and and the Air University at Maxwell Air
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Force Base in Alabama offer several courses that would appear to deal with
the more general area of PPBS. However, attendance at these courses
requires investments in both time and travel funds that most officers
cannot afford.
The gap is only slightly filled by a short (three half-days) course in
PPBS offered by OP-90 every few months. At best, this provides a highly
summarized overview of some of the most significant elements of each of
the PPBS phases. It is too limited in scope to really explore any of the
subjects it covers in any amount of detail. Consequently, the average naval
officer reporting to a POM-development job in OPNAV will learn his new job
partly from the information passed on to him by his predecessor and mostly
just by doing it.
Although civilian employees are not as bound by the need to transfer
among various jobs in order to attain promotions, the lack of available
training opportunities is just as real for them as for the military officers.
The civilians have the advantage of being able to stay longer in a particular
job and thus (implicitly!) learn more about it and the overall context in
which it operates. However, the tendency to view the world in very narrow
terms (the "from my desk" orientation) seems just as prevalent for civilians
as for the military officers.
3. The Navy's Two Resource Systems
Another area of concern deals with the fact that the Navy operates
what is essentially a dual resource-management system. Resource Sponsors
have the lead during the programming phase, with their decisions oriented
along programmatic lines. However, what they decide will eventually
(subject to approval by numerous layers of authority!) be actually executed
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by the Navy's 26 "major claimants." Claimants view the resource world in
terms of appropriations—and at a much lower level of detail than do
Resource Sponsors in most cases.
It would seem imperative
,
then, for Resource Sponsors and
claimants to maintain close and cooperative working relationships . This is
not universally the case.
A basic issue of power is significant in this regard. During the
programming phase, Resource Sponsors have the lead; claimants take the
reins during budgeting. One implication of this power distinction is that the
players should not participate in each other's activities. To be sure, there
is validity to that thought; Resource Sponsors arguably do not have the
expertise to craft detailed budget estimates, and claimants lack the
subjectivity essential to policy-making. However, interpreting the
separation of powers to mean that each participant should be completely
isolated from the other's work can only produce decisions made in isolation
of reality.
The role accorded claimants in the POM has shifted to a more active
one in recent years. In the early 1980's, claimants had only the route of
"Optional Claimant Input"2 Resource Sponsors were not compelled to include
claimants in any 5PP development activities; some did, some did not.
Consequently, many claimants were completely cut out of the process, with
their only contact being the translation of the first year of the POM into an
executable, properly priced budget. Many were never consulted during the
2A less structured and less monitored predecessor to the POM-87
Claimant Input via OP-QO
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development of the program which that budget was to support.
Understandably, many claimants were dissatisfied.
The most senior claimants, the Fleet Commanders in Chief, have
gained the most prominence in POM development. In POM-87, they were, if
not active decision-makers, certainly active observers. Invited to many of
the important PDRC and PRC sessions, Fleet CINC representatives had the
opportunity to air their major concerns in person . While a claimant might
not be sure whether or not his written request is given due consideration (or
even read thoroughly), he can be more confident that his concerns are made
known when he delivers them personally, in an open forum.
The rear admiral who served as OP-90 during the POM-87 end game
saw the increased role of the Fleet CINCs as a major refinement of the
process that year. However, he admitted that the 23 other, lesser ranked
claimants did not enjoy the same advantages.3
This is not to say that those claimants are completely divorced from
POM decisions. In some instances, the Claimant/Resource Sponsor link is
both close and cooperative. At the other end of the scale, some such
relationships appear almost adversarial.
The Navy POM development system does have a mechanism built in to
ensure that claimants are given consideration. However, this mechanism—
the "Claimant Input via OP-90"—has some important limitations. The fact
that each claimant is limited to five "issues" (that is, resource adjustment
requests) per Resource Sponsor makes it more difficult for the larger, more
complicated claimancies to make all their possible problems known. By the
3Rear Admiral J. L. Johnson, USN (currently Director of the Office of
Program Appraisal); interview, May 1986.
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same token, it puts the smaller, less broadly based claimancles at a
comparative advantage.
The difference in orientation between Resource Sponsor and
claimant is important in at least two respects: data base considerations
and resource ownership.
The first appears, on the surface, to be almost strictly mechanical.
After all, the purpose of any data base should be merely to document the
human decisions that represent the real significance. In reality, however,
the Navy's resource data bases almost seem to become the masters of the
system instead of the servant tools they should be.
The explanation for this is rooted in the dual nature of the Navy's
resource management system. The programming and budgeting phases
operate along two separate chains of authority relationships—OP-90/Re-
source Sponsor- for programming phase activities, and Navy
Comptroller/Claimant for budgeting. Each chain maintains its own data
base, oriented toward its own perspective: Program Element/Resource
Sponsor for programming and Appropriation/Claimant for budgeting. It is
often difficult to remember that both data bases should (must!) match the
approved Five-Year Defense Plan resource arrays.
The fact that claimant lines of ownership do not correspond neatly
with Resource Sponsor lines complicates the problem. It is not at all
unusual during POM development to have claimants mistakenly forward their
issues to the wrong Resource Sponsor. The problem appears to be more
irritating for newly proposed programs rather than for additions/revisions
to existing efforts. Resource Sponsors are understandably reluctant to
commit their constrained resources to any but the most pressing
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requirements; it is always tempting to claim that funding a particular
effort is really "somebody else"s responsibility!"
• The occasional inconsistencies with which resources are assigned
to Resource Sponsorships compound the problem for everyone—claimant,
Resource Sponsor, and Assessment Sponsor.
4. I ark of Standardized Analytical Methodologies and Criteria
The Navy is greatly proud of the the fact that its POM is founded on
extensive analysis. However, an examination of just one small portion of an
annual POM's development revealed a tremendous variety among the various
analytical methods employed. "Criteria" were established by the persons
doing the "analysis," and thus became what their originators said they were.
Each Assessment Sponsor has the latitude to conduct his "analysis"
according to whatever measure of effectiveness he deems appropriate. The
authors of the warfare appraisals have the same flexibility. One may
question the quality of the analyses emerging from this relatively
unstructured system.
In the absence of any standardized methods and criteria for resource
analysis, can the results be trusted?
As one veteran POM participant summarized the situation, it would
probably serve no useful purpose to establish a standardized system. Based
on the variety of topics being analyzed, it would be difficult if not
impossible to find common criteria that would be universally meaningful.4
However, greater scrutiny of the analytical methods employed—
especially in the Baseline Assessments and Baseline Area Appraisals—could
Captain C. Lautenbacher, OP-901; interviews in May 1986.
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improve the validity and credibility of these documents. To many POM
participants, they are currently viewed as "off the top of somebody's head"
judgments and thus discountable.
5. The Program Manager Concept in Resource Sponsorships
Two features discovered during the examination of POM-87
activities in the OP-Ol and 0P-09R offices have the potential for reducing
the problems associated with the Claimant/Resource Sponsor relationship
and the various implications thereof.
The introduction in 1984 of the "program manager" idea in the OP-Ol
Resource Sponsorship has the potential of resolving many of the foregoing
difficulties.
An essential element of the concept was that all the Resource
Sponsor's resources—fiscal and manpower—were to be categorized
according to an output-oriented mission or function. An ancillary feature of
the concept was that each "program" thus identified should have a
designated manager, whose responsibilities would include tracking resource
changes in all dimensions— including across time, claimant lines, and any
other pertinent perspectives.
This view of the program itself as the governing entity has the
potential for eliminating the "decisions in a vacuum" problems that were
identified explicitly or implicitly in the investigation of POM activities.
The Program Manager would be charged with complete responsibility for
monitoring his program; an essential aspect would be tracing resource
adjustments throughout their life cycle, from initial proposal during a POM
cycle, through budget preparation adjustments during the budgeting phase of
PPB5, through Congressional adjustments during deliberations on Capitol
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Hill, and— finally— through execution itself. This comprehensive overview
would protect against decisions made in isolation.
An example will illustrate the point. Say that a particular proposal
is approved during POM-83 development, with resources programmed for
each of the five years in the POM period, Fiscal Years 1983 through 1984
Resources for the first year of the proposal—Fiscal Year 1983—sail
successfully through the budget reviews in the Department of the Navy and
Department of Defense. By that point, the individuals involved in POM
development are well into the next cycle and in all probability continuing to
program resources for the POM-83 initiative during the 5-year period
beginning with Fiscal Year 1984 (and perhaps even adding to the amounts
approved during the prior cycle). Meanwhile, Congress refuses to approve
the full amounts in the Fiscal Year 1983 line. The Resource Sponsor staff as
of the POM-87 cycle had no formal means of tracking such an adjustment;
presumably, the Congressional action might not surface until the summer
during which the first year of the POM-84 program is being scrutinized by
the Comptroller of the Navy in his budget review. By that time, the matter
is out of the Resource Sponsor's hands entirely! It's a budgetary decision at
this juncture, and the resources will in all likelihood be cut during the
Fiscal Year 1984 period (and subsequently from the follow-on years, as
well).
The point is, the resources dedicated to that hypothetical program
might have been preserved in the Resource Sponsor line had the
Congressional action been detected prior to wrap-up of POM development.
Every Resource Sponsor has alternative uses for every possible unit of
available resources—dollars or manpower. The resources "cut" from one
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program can always find an application in some equally valid program.
Under the existing system, however, those resources are effectively lost to
the Resource Sponsor, due to a comprehensive means of tracking
adjustments across time.
The problem is occasionally similar in tracking from execution. A
claimant works at a much greater level of detail than does a Resource
Sponsor. What a Resource Sponsor envisioned three years prior to actual
execution may or may not occur as programmed. The concepts originated in
OPNAV during a POM cycle may or may not be viable in practice. Lacking an
effective means to track actual performance leaves Resource Sponsors
vulnerable to the proverbial "throwing good money after bad."
The Program Manager concept has a wealth of experience accrued in
the acquisition community; the potential benefits in the relatively non-
acquisition oriented Resource Sponsorship of OP-Ol were only tapped at
their most superficial during the POM-87 cycle. As the participants become
more acquainted with the PPB5 in macro, POM development and their own
program jurisdictions in micro, their contributions will continue to
increase. The most important attribute they bring is the perspective of
each program in its entirety, not just as a marginal change to one phase of
an overall resource decision-making scheme.
6. Improving the Claimant/Resource Sponsor Bond
Another potential cure for the difficulties discussed thus far in this
chapter is already in operation as part of OP-09R's execution of his
Assessment Sponsor responsibilities: the "POMFE5T" event hosted by OP-
09R in his role as the major claimant, Commander of the Naval Reserve
Forces. The face-to-face presentation of claimant proposals early in the
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programming phase allows Resource Sponsor representatives numerous
advantages. The claimant prospers, as well.
Some of the important intangible benefits of such confrontation are
not perhaps quantifiable but certainly contribute to the success (or non-
success) of a programming proposal.
One issue that often creates confusion and hard feelings is a
potential dispute over Resource Sponsor responsibility for a particular item.
0P-09R/C0MNAVRESF0R experience with this has been perennial during
recent POM cycles. The P0MFE5T offers an opportunity to surface such
disputes early in the process. This is not to say that POMFEST will always
solve such disputes; sometimes the controversy will not be resolvable by
those involved, and the ultimate arbiter may turn out to be OP-90.5
Nonetheless, bringing potential disputes into the open at the earlier point in
POM development is to the advantage of all concerned.
An important theme of both the Program Manager and POMFEST
concepts is the potential it holds for improving Resource Sponsor/claimant
relationships. It should now go without saying that a close and cooperative
relationship between the OPNAV policy makers and the field policy
executers is simply in the best interest of everybody concerned—and
certainly seems basic to optimizing the allocation of the Navy's constrained
resources! The obvious conclusions emerging through the limited exercise
of a postgraduate thesis are not always as evident in the real world of a
multi-billion dollar resource management system. As of the POM-87 cycle,
there remained certain friction between claimant and Resource Sponsor.
5This happened during POM-87, regarding the issue of Reserve recruiting.
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6. Friction: Plus or Minus Attribute?
The claimant/Resource Sponsor relationship is only one of several
potentially volatile and adversarial linkages. The overlapping web of
responsibilities complicates the situation throughout the Navy resource
management system. Suffice it to say, every relationship has the potential
for contention—Assessment Sponsor/Resource Sponsor, Appraisal
Author/Resource Sponsor, etc.
It's a safe bet that any POM development cycle will feature various
displays of tension—perhaps openly staged conflicts between and among the
various major players. This is to be an expected by-product of the struggle
to produce a final Navy POM that not only satisfies the desires of the
various participants but constitutes a balanced and consolidated application
of the Navy's programmed resources!
Is tension to be considered automatically an undesirable aspect of
POM development? It is tempting to assume that a smoothly flowing,
conflict-free system would be the most efficient. Would such a situation be
the most effective means of making resource allocation decisions?
The situation was best summarized by one of the top-level officials
interviewed in the course of researching this thesis. Serving as the primary
action officer with responsibility for coordinating development of the Navy
POM, the incumbent of the the OP-901 billet during POM-876 describes the
overall process by which "we employ tensions, debates, and arguments" as
the best means of "getting issues into the sunlight," and thereby helping to
protect against an important issue being lost in the shuffle.
Captain C. Lautenbacher, interviews in April and May 1986.
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Another veteran participant7 saw the various and overlapping
relationships among major players as being a vital part of the checks and
balances that characterize the process of Navy POM development. An
important feature of the system, in this officer's viewpoint, was the
inclusion of OP-90 as an "honest broker," to provide an implicitly objective
source of arbitrating contention and resolving issues in the overall best
interest of the Navy at large.
The most evident forums in which such tensions are surfaces are the
Program Development Review Committee and Program Review Committee
Meetings. On paper and in fact, these review groups constitute perhaps the
most valid insurance that all pertinent issues will be surfaced during POM
development and the best protection against resource decisions made
strictly on single-viewpoint parochial bases. As was explained in Chapter
2, the PDRC and PRC groups include representation from every Resource and
Assessment Sponsorship, and every warfare appraisal office. In short, the
interests of every major POM development player are represented. Although
the primary participants are among the Navy's highest ranked officers (2-
and 3-starred admirals), the meetings are not confined to mere formality.
Considerable candid expression (some observers might even characterize it
as downright bickering) occurs during their sessions. The admirals do not
hesitate to voice their concerns, even when those concerns may constitute
direct disagreement with the proposals and positions of their colleagues in
the same room.
7Captain Barry Bennett (0P-09R4), the primary POM action officer in the
office of the Director of Naval Reserve; interviews in May 1986.
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7. Relative Importance of the Review Groups
The highest review group within the Navy POM process, the
Department of the Navy Program Strategy Board, has assumed a greater and
greater role in POM decision-making in recent years. Are they "as
important" in shaping the final Navy POM as the PDRC and PRC?
The question is not valid. All the review groups have a hand in
shaping the final POM product. The question might be better phrased in the
more basic query of "Who makes the real resource decisions in the Navy
POM?" Even then, the variety of decisions, coupled with the variety of
circumstances in recent POM cycles, dictates that any answer could only be
subjective. Every participant (and every observer) would be entitled to his
or her own opinion as to the relative power of any particular group.
It is certainly true that the DP5B has the [next to] last word on POM
development. 8 However, logic dictates that this body cannot explore in
detail every adjustment to existing resource arrays that the typical POM
will entail. They will limit their review, therefore, on the "most
significant" issues.
Who determines what constitutes "significant" in this case? In the
end game of POM-87, the Resource Sponsors were the basis of the final
DPSB review sessions. Each Resource Sponsor was given a quota of 1
5
issues to present; the implication here is important: what the DPSB heard
was what the Resource Sponsors told them. That is, it was in large part the
BThe Secretary of the Navy, whose signature appears on the formal
submission of the Navy POM to the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
reserves the ultimate responsibility to himself.
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Resource Sponsors who effectively determined what was or was not
important in POM-87.
It should not be forgotten, however, that many significant resource
decisions are made by relatively junior officers (and civilian employees).
The higher-ranked officials in the hierarchy vary as to their review
policies, obviously. Some admirals may wish to scrutinize every change in
detail; others may wish to see only those changes over a certain dollar
threshold. Therefore, what a lieutenant commander can do unquestioned
with resources in the OP-Ol Resource line may be totally different from
what he might do were he assigned to another Resource Sponsorship. That
qualification notwithstanding, large amounts of money and manpower are
adjusted on the judgment of lieutenant commanders, with little or no
dispute from their seniors.9
8. Conflicts of Interest?
One theme associated with the overlapping roles assigned to many
major players in the POM process is the potential for losing objectivity in
carrying out those various roles. The double assignment of a single
individual as both a Resource and Assessment Sponsor potentially carries
the threat that he will suborn his "best professional judgment" in one or the
other roles if a conflict should arise. Say, for example, that OP-Ol the
Assessment Sponsor is forced to assess OP-Ol the Resource Sponsor. Can
he, in his former role, exert the necessary objectivity to perform an honest
appraisal of deficiencies in the resource alignment he controls in the latter
role?
*The author's personal experience in this regard was born out by the
agreement of the senior POM players she interviewed for this chapter.
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The problem crops up in other relationships, as well. A unique case
in point was the dual assignment of Assessment Sponsor and major claimant
roles to the same individual (the Director of Naval Reserve/Commander of
the Naval Reserve Forces).
The major players interviewed for this research did not feel that a
conflict of interest would be a significant threat in practice. As one officer
put it best: "These are 3-star admirals. They're big boys who can
pigeonhole their interests, and they understand the sensitivity involved." 10
One protection against the possibility of conflict of interest is the
multi-layered review process for most of the major resource decisions
during a POM cycle. The very act of presenting particular opinions in the
PDRC and PRC sessions, in which representatives from every Assessment
and Resource Sponsorship will be present, mitigates against successfully
prosecuting one parochial ized judgment at the expense of another.
However, the situation of claimant versus Resource Sponsor is not
covered in the PDRC and PRC forums, simply because claimants are not
represented in those bodies. How, then, does 0P-09R maintain his
credibility among his OPNAV peers, many of who might suspect him of
voicing claimant concerns of executability rather than maintaining the
broader OPNAV policy-making perspective.
The answer to that question would appear to vary according to the
individual queried. The 0P-09R offices who played the major roles in POM-
87 are not overly concerned, however. In fact, they maintain that the
10Captain C. Lautenbacher (OP-901 ); his job afforded him an excellent
overview of the entire Navy POM, thereby giving him one of the most
objective perspectives on the potential for conflict of interest.
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claimant perspective that 0P-09R brings to POM development is "mandatory
to effective program development." 11
The rear admiral from 0P-09R 12 who represented the Reserve
Assessment Sponsorship in the 2-starred PDRC sessions (and, often, in his
boss' absence, in the 3-starred PRC meetings) was of similar mind.
Emphasizing the fact that 0P-09R and COMNAVRESFOR, while the same
individual, were supported by two separate and distinct staffs, he felt that
the claimant input was not only valid but essential in determining what
needed to fulfill the requirements originating from program sponsors in
OPNAV.
The key point in the foregoing thought Is that the Assessment
Sponsor does not originate requirements
,
but merely reacts to the
requirements emerging from program sponsors. For example, in the case of
the Assessment Sponsor for Reserve programs, a new requirement for
Reservist manpower on board frigates would come from the surface warfare
program sponsor, OP-03. 0P-09R, as Assessment Sponsor, would analyze
the requirement in terms of what resources would be necessary to fulfill
the needs as enunciated by OP-03. Since COMNAVRESFOR is responsible for
executing a large share of Reserve programs, his staff would be the logical
source of information on what resources would be involved. Conflict of
interest or merely thorough Investigation?
The answer will probably always be a source of contention for many.
Here again, however, the "decision-making in the sunshine" opportunities
1 ^Captain Barry Bennett (0P-09R4); interviews in May 1986.
12Rear Admiral Neale Smith (0P-09RB); interviews in May 1986.
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availed by the several layers of review groups help protect against any truly
blatant abuses.
C. PRELIMINARY SUMMARY: "IS IT BROKEN?"
As was to be expected, the research into what the Navy POM process is
supposed to be and what it actually was during a given cycle produced,
among other things, evidence of some weak points in the existing system.
These weaknesses involved both the system as prescribed on paper and as
performed in practice.
The preceding section of this chapter dealt with but a few of the
perceived shortcomings in both regards. It might be logical to proceed at
this point to a section called "Conclusions and Recommendations," in which
the author neatly lays out terse statements of identified problems and their
proposed solutions.
Before falling comfortably into such a predictable furrow, the
discussion will digress slightly at this point. The first milestone on the
detour will be a very basic question concerning the overall process:
Does i t work?
The answer, indisputably, is yes. None of the participants who
contributed to the research for this thesis would completely overhaul the
system—or even make major modifications to large portions thereof.
However, it is equally true that the system—despite its overall
effectiveness— is amenable to marginal improvement. Some efforts in this
regard are already underway. The reorganization of the OP-Ol staff with
major responsibility for POM development and the reorientation of the
20
overall methodology of POM preparation are excellent examples of such
effort.
The POM-87 cycle marked the first year that these two innovations were
implemented in concert. It would be unfair and invalid to assess their
effectiveness based only on the limited experience of that single cycle. In
concept, both ideas have tremendous potential for improving the process.
Some obvious ingredients necessary to making that improvement come true
will include educating the people involved in PPBS and in their roles therein.
The establishment of a true "working relationship" between the Navy's
policy makers in OPNAV and its policy executers in the field claimancies
offers another deep well of potential improvement.
In that regard, the dual nature of the 0P-09R and C0MNAVRE5F0R job can
offer continued benefits for Navy resource decision-making. In fact, other
claimancies and other Assessment Sponsorships might do well to learn from
the 0P-09R experience.
In sum, any of the areas discussed in Section B of this chapter merit
further exploration, with an eye toward making improvements. Naturally,
changes should be justified. But the overriding conclusion of this thesis
would surely be that improvements are possible, and I have listed but a few
of the areas in which a high potential appears clear.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND ABEAS FOR FURIHEBLBi
A CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In the first chapter of this thesis, certain disclaimers were stated
regarding what the project would not attempt to do Some of those bear
reiterating at this point.
.
!t was promised that this work would not constitute "a comprehensive
review of Navy POM procedures." Unquestionably, that has proven to oe the
case! The extent of research revealed, among other things, that the Navy
POM emerges as the result of a very complicated process, highly diverse,
characterized by a large variety of procedures. This thesis examinee only a
tiny portion of the overall scheme.
The limited scope of the research notwithstanding, certain themes
exerted themselves in the course of preparing this project. As just one sucf
example, the following observation is offered.
If there can be said to be a single most important characteristic to r L
process by which the Navy POM is crafted, that arguably would be the great
latitude accorded to lower levels of management throughout the Navy
structure. Centralized direction is present, to oe sure, but it is more
concerned with end product rather than process.
This is not to say that the Navy's lower level resource managers can
frolic in an atmosphere of completely unchecked control over their
programs. The multiple layers of review that have been built into the
system protect against parochialism and promote an overall balance to the
consolidated Navy POM.
203
The multiple dimensionsof review—that is, the several perspectives
from which Navy resource proposals are "analyzed" contribute to that
objective, as well.
Certainly, the existing system "works." As one very basic type of
evidence of its effectiveness, it does indeed produce an annual Program
Objectives Memorandum, which is duly submitted to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
A more valid measure of its effectiveness might deal with the quality of
that final product. Obviously, any such judgment would most likely be
subjective. One such example was cited by a major POM-87 player, 1 in
describing the reaction of Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft: "He said the
Navy POM was the tightest, best validated, and best balanced to come from
any of the Services."
Another similarly valid measurement would be the degree of acceptance
which the POM development process has among its practitioners. De facto,
the process is successful. It is what, in the main, Navy resource managers
want. If it weren't, they would have taken action to amend it. The fact that
only marginal adjustments have been made to the process is one indication
that it is "working."
One point that might be made here is that any "measure of effective-
ness" is going to be subject to individual judgment. Different people see
things from different perspectives, and what is important to one may have
no relevance to someone else.
!Rear Admiral J. L. Johnson (OP-90); interview in May 1986.
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Subjectivity notwithstanding, the Navy POM development process could
undoubtedly benefit from a comprehensive scrutiny, of the type begun in the
this thesis.
One obvious conclusion of this project is that the system by which the
Navy develops its annual Program Objectives Memorandum is extremely rich
in detail and extremely varied In fact, it's fair to assume that in the
absence of tight central direction as to procedure, every Resource Sponsor
follows unique procedures in constructing and defending his annual Sponsor
Program Proposal. Similarly, every Assessment Sponsor displays unique
characteristics in carrying out his assigned function, as does every
Appropriation Sponsor.
Moreover, the lack of strict and detailed procedural guidance from a
central source has resulted in a flexibility that allows (promotes!) changes
in the process over time. Not only does one POM cycle differ markedly from
its predecessors, the agenda as outlined at the beginning of a particular
cycle will likely turn out far differently than predicted.
Stability or instability?
Quite obviously, there are some overriding strengths to the existing
process that have permitted it to survive and to work, despite numerous
external and internal pressures. The ability to accommodate such pressures
without complete disruption may well be the greatest strength! That
flexibility is undoubtedly the direct result of limiting the centralized
procedural guidance.
On the face of it, looking only at the readily available documentation,
the Navy system seems stable indeed (to wit: the last real revision to the
Navy Programming Manual occurred a full seven years prior to this writing).
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Further examination reveals that that document describes a situation that
no longer exists. The flexibility of the current system is exemplified by its
reliance not on infrequently published standing guidance but on up-to-the-
minute memoranda, which can adjust the system in reaction to immediate
events.
Nonetheless, the Navy system will always show room for improvement
The changing nature of the external environment in which Navy resource
decisions must occur is only one reason. Another is the fact that any
system is a function of (among other things) the personalities who operate
it; different personal management styles and philosophies will produce
different results. And who is to judge what constitutes the "best" system?
The answer to that would be, logically, "the people in charge at the
time." Thus, the system should be able to accommodate changes made to
adapt to personel styles and priorities. The evidence from the POM-87
experience in OP-OI and 0P-09R indicate that that is true. The experience
of the Navy system in its entirety since the advent of the Reagan
Administration add to the evidence.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
What remains to be done, then, in the way of examining and evaluating
the process? Practically everything!
This study concentrated on a very limited area of a very complicated
system
. The Navy POM development process by itself constitutes a vastly
complex system. Taken in the overall context of the Department of Defense
resource decision-making arena or the even broader context including
Congressional deliberations, the topic becomes exponentially complicated.
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Does any single individual understand it in its totality? Probably not. 2
One reason for this is the fact that no comprehensive studies have explored
the various subsystems, either within the Department of Defense or within
the individual Military Departments/Defense Agencies.
Only a few studies have attempted to examine the DoD PPBS at all, and
those have treated the subject in very broad terms.
Since 1981, three "studies" have been published that attempt to treat
the PPBS in some broad context:
• A 1982 effort, headed by Dr. Bernard Rosker, under the sponsorship of
Rear Admiral J. Metcalf (then incumbent OP-90), examined the on-going
preparation of the Navy POM-84 submission. Dr. Rosker attended all
PDRC sessions and monitored pertinent guidance and other activities.
One valuable product of that study was the published proceedings of an
all-Service conference, hosted by the Navy, in which attendees
presented their own Service's methodologies for POM development.
IRef. 16: in full]
• A 1983 effort conducted jointly by representatives of the Department of
Defense and the Government Accounting Office. The purpose of the
"Joint DOD/GAO Working Group on PPBS was to "developo descriptions
of PPBS and its phases and to identify potential improvements."
IRef. 33: p. 1J The DOD/GAO study was restricted to a very broad view
of PPBS, however, and did not explore individual Military Departments or
Defense Agencies in any detail.
• A 1985 effort by the staff of the Senate Armed Forces Committee. Like
the Joint DoD/GAO effort, the 5ASC study was confined to a DoD-wide
perspective. IRef. 34: in full J
Each of the three studies is of value to the student of PPBS. Each offers
useful insights on the process in macro and surfaces valid criticisms of the
system. However, the scope is so broad as to be inapplicable to solving
2Although the author has met a few individuals who would qualify as
candidates, based on their extensive experience plus individual traits. Many
of those have been cited as references throughout this narrative.
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problems at a lower level. 3 To put it another way, should the Navy wish to
undertake substantive revisions to improve the workings of its own POM
development system, the three studies just cited would be useful primarily
as background material.
No truly detailed study has been published4 that examines the system in
detail below the level of the individual Military Department.
Such a study in the Navy would, for example, explore the various
techniques and procedures followed by each of the 13 Resource Sponsors. It
might continue to look at the various methods used by the Assessment
Sponsors. The relationships between and among major players almost
certainly vary on a case-by-case basis; a detailed investigation of these
could produce some valuable lessons that might help all concerned better
perform their separate roles. At the very least, it might help them
understand the process a little better.
Just a few of the additional areas demanding further exploration
include:
• The preparation and eventual effect of the warfare appraisals and
CNO Program Analysis Memoranda;
3The exception would be the proceedings of the Navy-sponsored
conference, which treats each Service's system in greater detail. Of
particular interest are the transcriptions of the "question and answer"
sessions, in which PPBS practitioners from the various Military
Departments were able to exchange candid remarks that, four years later,
offer valuable insights into how PPBS operates in reality.
4lt is entirely possible that such an effort has been undertaken in a
"private domain" environment, such as graduate school or privately endowed
institution. However, the documented findings of such studies were not
discovered in the course of research for this thesis.
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• The relative significance of the Appropriation Sponsors during POM
development,
• The different relationships among claimants and Resource Sponsors;
• The different methods employed in acquisition-oriented programs.
There are dozens if not hundreds more potentially fertile topics!
At the outset of research for this thesis, it was feared that participants
would be unwilling to be completely candid in discussing problem areas,
that they might feel defensive about admitting that "their" performance was
anything less than perfect. That did not prove to be the case. The
individuals interviewed in the course of research represented the military
spectrum from lieutenant to vice admiral (and the civilian from GS-7 to
SES-4). A pleasant surprise was the prevailing candor from virtually all
those interviewed; they were more than willing to talk about the less than
optimum aspects of the system, as they saw it. Predictably, parochial
considerations occasionally colored an individual's perception. In the main,
however, the POM participants were open in expressing their concerns. They
were interestingly in accord as to the relative strong and weak points of the
system (its flexibility was the most cited strength; the lack of individual
knowledge of the system the most often mentioned weakness).
The foregoing observations would appear to bode well for future
researchers. If their experience is even remotely as successful as this
author enjoyed, they will find a spirit of candor and honest desire to
improve the status quo through exploration of "lessons learned" from prior
experience.
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C. A FEW FINAL NOTES . . .
The most important contribution envisioned for this thesis prior to its
actual creation was that it might increase the understanding of the process
by which the Navy develops its Program Objectives Memorandum. To the
extent that the author's own understanding was indeed expanded, that goal
was achieved. It is her hope that the readers of this work will fare
similarly. 5
It is also hoped that this work is merely one among a great many in the
same area . The overall POM process in the Navy is so rich and varied,
concerning so many different programs and areas of interest, as to provide
opportunities for unlimited research.
Academic institutions such as the Naval Postgraduate School are only
one arena in which such research might be conducted. The "real" Navy could
and should take a greater interest in analyzing its procedures, with a
continual eye toward improvement. One such effort was at one time
instilled in the annual process; sometime after submission of the annual
POM to 05D and prior to the onset on the next cycle, major POM participants
gathered for a "lessons- learned" conference—two to three days during
which problems of the most recent cycle were explored and alternative
5lt is appropriate at this point to note that the "References" cited in
throughout the text do not constitute the total research base from which
this narrative was drawn. The format requirements governing this
particular document dictate a strict division between references actually
cited and those not. The serious researcher is urged to refer to the
accompanying Bibliography as well as the List of References; together,
these listings represent the true research basis for this paper—and, I hope,
a useful jumping-off point for further research.
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improvements were presented. The practice seems to have died out,
possibly due to the press of other activities.
Organizations such as the Center for Naval Analyses could provide useful
services to future Navy resource management by continuing the efforts
begun during the POM-84 cycle (see Reference 16 for some of the results of
this project).
Another area with rich promise for future research would be a
comparison of the various methods by which the individual Military
Departments and Defense Agencies construct their POM's. Only the most
rudimentary efforts have been published in this regard; they typcially limit
themselves isolated descriptions of how each component carries out the
process, stopping short of any detailed comparison of methods or results.
We could well have any number of lessons to learn from one another!
The point to be made is that "improvement" should not wait until
dictated by a crisis; it can be as useful—or even more so!—when instituted




ACRONYMS AND SPECIAL TERMS
ASN Assistant Secretary of the Navy
BAA Baseline Area Appraisal; a more comprehensive analysis
of a broad task/warfare area, prepared during the early
stages of the programming phase
BAM Baseline Assessment Memorandum; a selected analysis of
support areas, prepared during the early stages of the
programming phase
CEB CNO Executive Board; the CNO's board of directors for
general purposes
CINC Commander in Chief; a Navy Fleet CINC (e.g., Pacific or
Atlantic) is also assigned responsibilty as a major
claimant for budgetary functions
CNET Chief of Naval Education and Training; a major claimant
CNMPC Commander of the Naval Military Personnel Command, a
major claimant
CNO The Chief of Naval Operations; the senior military officer
in the U.S. Navy
CNRC Commander, Naval Recruiting Command; a subclaimant
within the CNMPC major claimancy
COMNAVRESFOR Commander of the Naval Reserve Forces; a major claimant
CPAM CNO Programming Analysis Memorandum; a document
prepared during tne early stages of the programming
phase
CPFG CNO's Program and Fiscal Guidance (in some POM-87
documents, referred to as Consolidated Programming and
Fiscal Guidance)
DCNO Deputy Chief of Naval Operations; three-star vice-admiral
billets
DEPSECDEF The Deputy Secretary of Defense
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DG Defense Guidance; policy guidance issued annually by the
Office of the Secretary ot Defense for preparation of
Military Department/Defense Agency POM's
DM50 Director of a Major Staff Office within the Office of the-
Chief of Naval Operations; typically three-star vice-
admiral billets
DNCPPG Department of the Navy Consolidated Planning and
Programming Guidance; policy guidance issued to the Navy
and Marine Corps for preparation of Service POM's
DoD The Department of Defense
DODI DoD Instruction; a standing directive
DON The Department of the Navy
DP5B The Department of the Navy Program Strategy Board
DRB Defense Resources Board; the corporate board of directors
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, composed
of the senior civilian executives in DoD and the Military
Departments, plus military Service chiefs
End-game The period following submission of individual SPP's to
OP-90, during which they are reviewed and consolidated
into the final Navy POM
FHN Family Housing, Navy; a budget appropriation
FY Fiscal Year
FYDP The Five-Year Defense Program; the documented version
of the approved resource array, updated three times each
year to reflect decisions made in the course of PPBS
phases
GAO Government Accounting Office
JCS The Joint Chiefs of Staff
MILCON Military Construction, Navy; a budget appropriation
MILCON, R Military Construction, Navy Reserve; a budget
appropriation
MPN Military Personnel, Navy; a budget appropriation

















Naval Military Personnel Command
Operations and Maintenance, Navy; a budget appropriation
Operations & Maintenance, Navy Reserve; a budget
appropriation
Office of Management and Budget, within the Executive
Office of the President; the central budget coordination
office for the Executive Branch
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower,
Personnel, and Training (OP-01 ); doubly assigned as the
Chief of Naval Personnel
Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower,
Personnel, and Training
Special Assistant for Naval Reserve Matters, within the
Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Manpower, Personnel, and Training (OP-01
)
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare;
also a Resource Sponsor (Platform)
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare;
also a Resource Sponsor (Platform)
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare; also a
Resource Sponsor (Platform)
Director of the Navy Program Planning Office
Director of Naval Reserve in the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations; doubly assigned as Commander, Naval
Reserve Forces
Director of the Total Force Training and Education
Division, within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Manpower, Personnel, ana Training (OP-01
)
Director of the Total Force Programming and Manpower
Division, within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Manpower, Personnel, ana Training (OP-01
Head of the Program Develpment and Coordination Branch,
within the Office of the Director of the Total Force
















Director of the Military Personnel Policy Division, within
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval operations for
Manpower, Personnel, and Training (OP-Ol
)
Director of the Civilian Personnel Pol icy Division, within
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval operations for
Manpower, Personnel, and Training (OP-Ol
Director of the Human Resource Management Division,
within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Manpower, Personnel, and Training (OP-Ol
)
Director of the Total Force Information Systems
Management Division, within the Office of the Deputy
Chiefof Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, and
Training (OP-Ol)
Director of the General Planning and Programming
Division, within the Office of the Director of the Navy
Program Planning Office (OP-090)
Director of the Program Resource Appraisal Division,
within the Office of the Director of the Navy Program
Planning Office (OP-090)
Director of the Fiscal Management Division, within the
Office of the Director of the Navy Program Planning
Office (OP-090)
Office of Program Appraisal; the analytical arm within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Other Procurement, Navy; a budget appropriation
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Naval Operations Instruction; a standing
directive
Personnel Administration and Support System; a program
owned by the OP-0 1 Resource Sponsorship
Program Decision Memorandum; the final document of the
programming phase in the DoD Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System, the PDM documents adjustments to
Program Development Review Committee; the two-star



















Program Element Code; the most basic element of the "Ten
Major Defense Programs" categorization
Program Objectives Memorandum; the major product of
the programming phase in the DoD Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System
An annual series of guidance documents issued from the
OP-090 staff to control activities during the
programming phase of PPBS
An annual series of guidance documents issued within the
OP-01 organization during the programming phase of PPBS
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System; the DoD
resource management system for formulating the defense
portion of the annual President's Budget submission to the
Congress
POM Preparation Instructions; the style guide issued
annually by the Office of the Secretary or Defense for
preparation of the written documentation of Military
Department/Defense Agency POM's
Program Review Committee; the three-star review board
within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; a budget
appropriation
Reserve Personnel, Navy; a budget appropriation
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Navy Instruction; a standing directive
[Resource] Sponsor Program Proposal; submitted annually
to OP-90
Training and Administration of Reserves, designates a
career Reservist on full-time active duty
The Vice Chief of Naval Operations; second in seniority to
the Chief of Naval Operations
Vocational-technical education
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ZOW Not an acronym, but simply a title for a memorandum
issued during the end-game, directing specific changes to
a Resource Sponsors Program Proposal
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APPENDIX B
THE TEN MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS
The Five-Year Defense Program is based on the following categorization
according to program:
Program Q ...Support of Other Nations
Program 1 Strategic Forces
Program 2 General Purpose Forces
Program 3 Intelligence and Communications
Program 4 Airlift and Sealift Forces
Program 5 Guard and Reserve Forces
Program 6 .Research and Development
Program 7 Central Supply and Maintenance
Program 8 Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel
Activities
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3. Department of the Navy, Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000. 16D,
Subject: Policy. Roles
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the Navy for Implementation of the POD Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS ), 8 January 1970.
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{£££$), May 23, 1984.
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,
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,
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PIC-2F/57324956, Subject: Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS) Course
,
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,
December 4, 1984.
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1 3 December 1 984.
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,
28 September 1 984.
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,
briefing prepared for
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Review Committee, document undated (but presented in March 1985).
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6 March 1985.
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instruction 7040.6A, Subject: Program and Budget Support for the
Naval Reserve
,
November 1 8, 1 975.
28. Department of the Navy, CNO Memorandum POM 87- 1 7: Ser
90 1 /4U60 1 823to Distribution, Subject: Total Force Report Outline
and POM-87 Initiatives
,
28 December 1 984.
29. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Director of Naval Reserve, Baseline Area Appraisal
,
briefing prepared
for presentation to CNO Executive Board, Program Development
Review Council, and Program Review Committee, document undated
(but presented in December 1 984).
30. Department of the Navy, CNO Memorandum 7000: Ser 09R4/41 9-85, to
the Director, General Planning and Programming Division (0P-90),
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I anguage, American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1971
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a report, September 1 983.
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Organization: The Need for Change. 99th Congress, 1st Session, S. Prt.
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